City of St. Louis v. Williams

Decision Date01 July 1911
Citation235 Mo. 503,139 S.W. 340
PartiesCITY OF ST. LOUIS v. WILLIAMS.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Valliant, J., dissenting.

Appeal from St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction; W. A. Taylor, Judge.

Frank E. Williams was convicted of violating an ordinance of the city of St. Louis, and appeals. Reversed.

By an ordinance of the city of St. Louis, of date March 19, 1907, it was required that on every automobile operated in that city there be displayed, in a prescribed way, for the purpose of identification, the number of its city license; the sections in question reading as follows:

"Sec. 1553. That hereafter, all automobiles operated in the city of St. Louis, shall display identification numbers as herein provided. Such numbers shall be not less than five inches high, and the line marking the numbers shall be white and be five-eighths of an inch wide at every point and such numbers shall be placed at least three-fourths of an inch apart.

"Sec. 1554. All such numbers shall be painted on black or blue signs or plaques of wood, metal or leather, or directly on the machine itself, provided the machine be painted black at this particular place; and such signs or plaques shall be so attached to the machine that they will not sway in any direction independently of the motion of such machine. The numbers shall be of arabic numerals. The numbers to be displayed on said automobiles as herein provided, shall correspond with the number of the operating license tag or plate issued to the owner of said automobile, providing further that a license tag or plate bearing numbers and attached to the machine and lighted at night as herein provided may be used as a full compliance with the provisions of this ordinance.

"Sec. 1555. Such numbers shall be displayed on the rear of the machine, in plain sight as nearly as possible in the middle of the machine, and shall be low enough so as not to be hidden by the hood or any other obstruction on the machine."

In August, 1907, appellant violated this ordinance, and subsequent proceedings resulted in the judgment from which this appeal was taken. The case was heard below on an agreed statement of facts, which discloses that on the automobile which appellant was operating its registration number appeared in full conformity to the provisions of the statutes of the state, and that the city license tax imposed by the ordinance, to which reference is made in the section quoted, had been paid. The number of the city license did not appear on the vehicle.

Seddon & Holland and F. C. Sharp, for appellant. Lambert E. Walther and Truman P. Young, for respondent.

BLAIR, C. (after stating the facts as above.)

Except in matters of purely local and municipal concern (St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo., loc. cit. 476 et seq., 41 S. W. 1094, 46 S. W. 976, 42 L. R. A. 686, 68 Am. St. Rep. 575; St. Louis v. Meyer, 185 Mo., loc. cit. 597, 84 S. W. 914), the regulation of which has been committed to the municipality, the ordinances of the city of St. Louis, in instances in which they are repugnant to the general laws of the state, must yield. This conclusion is supported by constitutional, statutory, and charter provisions (sections 23, 25, art. 9, Const.; section 9582, R. S. 1909; section 26, art. 3, Charter of St. Louis), the common law (Tiedeman on Mun. Corp. § 146), and numerous decisions of our courts (St. Louis v. Meyer, supra; St. Louis v. Klausmeier, 213 Mo., loc. cit. 125, 112 S. W. 516), and is not open to question. It is not necessary to delimit the field within which the Municipal Assembly of the city of St. Louis may exert its power, freed from the restraint of general laws, to legislate in matters of purely local and municipal concern, but it will suffice to say that the subject-matter of the ordinance in question is clearly one with reference to which the state Legislature has the power to enact a general law (City of St. Louis v. Meyer, supra; City of St. Louis v. King, 226 Mo., loc. cit. 348, 126 S. W. 495, 27 L. R. A. [N. S.] 608, 136 Am. St. Rep. 643; City of Buffalo v. Lewis, 192 N. Y. 199, 84 N. E. 809 et seq., and, consequently, the ordinance itself belongs to that class to the validity of which harmony with the laws of the state is requisite. The motor vehicle law (chapter 83, R. S. 1909) was designed to apply uniformly throughout the state, and to repeal all conflicting provisions, whether found in statute or in ordinances. City of Buffalo v. Lewis, supra.

The sole question presented, therefore, is whether the ordinance above set forth is in conflict with the state law. The section of the statute with which it is said to come into collision is section 8505, R. S. 1909, by which section the manner in which the registration number of all motor vehicles registered in the office of the Secretary of State shall be displayed is minutely prescribed; that section concluding with the following proviso: "And provided, that said owner shall not be required to place any other mark of identity upon his motor vehicle."

In searching for the meaning of this section and proviso, conditions under the former law may be taken into consideration and the evils to be remedied taken into account. City of Buffalo v. Lewis, supra. Prior to the enactment of the section in question, the act of 1903 (Laws 1903, p. 162) required that a license be procured in each county in which an automobile was operated (State v. Cobb, 113 Mo. App. 156, 87 S. W. 551), and that the number of such license be displayed upon the vehicle. It was necessary under the act of 1903 to secure 115 licenses and display as many license numbers if an automobile was operated in all parts of the state. It is apparent that the chief purpose of identification numbers, such as the statute requires, is to enable officers of the law or bystanders, when occasion requires, to identify these rapidly moving vehicles, and prevent their owners or operators escaping by flight, for which they are so well equipped, responsibility for such offenses against speed regulations as they may commit and for negligence of which they may be guilty. The presence, on a rapidly moving automobile, of two or more identification numbers, between which the observer must choose, and which must themselves be "identified", or distinguished from each other, could have no other effect than in many instances to defeat the very purpose for which such numbers are required to be attached to the vehicle.

Doubtless these and like reasons influenced the Legislature to affix the proviso to the section mentioned. In view of these considerations and the plain and unambiguous language of the proviso itself, it would seem that it could hardly be contended that if the words of this proviso are "taken in their plain or ordinary and usual sense" (section 8057, R. S. 1909) they can be harmonized with the ordinance under which the conviction in this case occurred.

Counsel for respondent contend that the proviso in question has reference solely to marks of identification under the state law, and does not interfere with the right of the city to require an additional number to be displayed for the purpose of identifying the vehicle under the city ordinance. If the sole purpose of the required identification number was to proclaim that the state tax had been paid, the contention would be more plausible. But such is not the case. The size, position, manner in which they are required to be attached to the vehicle, and the marked difference in these respects between the numbers which motor vehicles are required to carry and those it is customary to require in the case of other vehicles, disclose that there was the additional reason, pointed out above, that these vehicles must often be identified, while in swift flight over the streets and highways, to the end that speed regulations may be enforced and responsibility for negligence fixed. In fact this is the principal purpose of the requirement. People v. Schneider, 139 Mich. 675, 103 N. W. 172, 69 L. R. A. 345; ...

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