Interport Pilots Agency, Inc. v. Sammis

Decision Date10 January 1994
Docket Number643,D,Nos. 454,s. 454
Citation14 F.3d 133
PartiesINTERPORT PILOTS AGENCY, INC., Charles Jonas, Captain, Francis Burn, Jr., Captain, Philip Gaughran, Captain, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, v. S. Fraser SAMMIS, Robert Pouch, Defendants-Appellees, Board of Commissioners of Pilots of The State of New York, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants. ockets 93-7499L, 93-7573XAP.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Joel N. Kreizman, Little Silver, NJ (Evans, Osborne & Kreizman, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellants-cross-appellees.

Barrie L. Goldstein, New York City (Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of the State of New York, Andrea Green, Deputy Sol. Gen., of counsel), for defendants-appellees-cross-appellants.

Before: McLAUGHLIN, JACOBS and REAVLEY, * Circuit Judges.

JACOBS, Circuit Judge:

On this appeal this Court has occasion for the first time to construe the Federal Boundary Waters Act, enacted in 1837 and codified in its current version at 46 U.S.C. Sec. 8501(b) (1989) (the "boundary statute"). The boundary statute allows vessels entering or leaving a port on waters that are a boundary between two states to use a pilot licensed by either state. Connecticut-licensed pilots assert a right under the boundary statute to pilot ships to New York ports on Long Island Sound, and are protesting their treatment at the hands of New York authorities, who claim that the boundary statute does not apply to Long Island Sound and therefore confers no entitlement on the Connecticut pilots. The Connecticut pilots also allege violations of their substantive and procedural due process rights, actionable under 42 In the district court, the Connecticut pilots secured a declaration of their right under the boundary statute to pilot ships to New York ports on Long Island Sound, but lost on all other claims. These appeals ensued, and for the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment.

U.S.C. Sec. 1983, and a common law claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are Interport Pilots Agency, Inc. ("Interport"), an organization of ship pilots, and three Interport members who are licensed as pilots by the State of Connecticut and the federal government (the "Connecticut pilots"). None of Interport's members is licensed by the State of New York. Defendants are the Board of Commissioners of Pilots of the State of New York, its President and its Secretary (collectively, the "Board"). In 1988, Interport and the Connecticut pilots began to challenge the Board's policies concerning pilotage in Long Island Sound, which policies allegedly excluded the Connecticut pilots from assignments aboard ships seeking to navigate to and from New York ports on the Sound. After the Connecticut pilots began offering ships pilotage services to New York ports through a shorter route than that traditionally used by New York pilots, the New York Board issued notices which had the effect of discouraging shippers from using the services of the Connecticut pilots. Plaintiffs brought this suit, claiming that the Board's actions violated the federal boundary statute and plaintiffs' due process and economic rights.

The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs, declaring that the boundary statute authorizes the Connecticut pilots to navigate Long Island Sound to and from New York ports. 774 F.Supp. 734 (E.D.N.Y.1991). On the ground of qualified immunity, the district court subsequently dismissed the claims asserted against the individual defendants in their personal capacity. The case proceeded to a jury trial. At the close of the evidence, the district court directed a verdict for the Board on the substantive due process claim and the common law claim. The only issue submitted to the jury was plaintiffs' claim that they were deprived of procedural due process. The jury returned a verdict for the Board, but plaintiffs contend that the jury instructions were erroneous. Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial was denied. A final judgment issued and plaintiffs noticed this appeal as to the dismissal of both due process claims. The Board has cross-appealed the award of declaratory relief.

Pilotage is the art of navigating ships into and out of ports or along rivers, bays, harbors and other special waters. By legislation initially enacted in 1789, Congress determined to leave regulation of pilotage for the most part to the states. See Act of August 7, 1789, ch. 9, Sec. 4, 1 Stat. 54. That provision now reads:

Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, pilots in the bays, rivers, harbors, and ports of the United States shall be regulated only in conformity with the laws of the States.

46 U.S.C. Sec. 8501(a) (1989). Congress has preempted state regulation of pilotage only with respect to vessels on the Great Lakes, 46 U.S.C. Sec. 9302 (1989), and American flag vessels sailing between American ports ("coastwise vessels"). 46 U.S.C. Sec. 8502 (1989). Thus, the states have authority over the pilotage of all American vessels sailing under register, that is, engaged in foreign trade, and all foreign flag vessels (jointly, "registered vessels").

The one limitation on each state's unilateral control over pilotage of registered vessels in its waters is the Federal Boundary Waters Act:

The master of a vessel entering or leaving a port on waters that are a boundary between 2 States, and that is required to have a pilot under this section, may employ a pilot licensed or authorized by the laws of either of the 2 States.

46 U.S.C. Sec. 8501(b). Neighboring states therefore share the power to regulate pilotage as to ports situated on waters that are a boundary between them. One assumed objective of the statute is to avoid "pilotage wars" between adjacent states, with each Under the authority given it by Congress, New York enacted the Navigation Law in 1853, creating the Board of Commissioners of Pilots to regulate pilotage practices, fees and licensing. See 1853 N.Y.Laws, ch. 467, Sec. 1. Its dominion was initially limited to navigation of New York Harbor by way of Sandy Hook. The Board instituted a pilotage system which requires the exclusive use of a New York-licensed pilot while in those New York waters. See id., Sec. 10. Vessels that fail to use a New York pilot when required to do so are nonetheless liable for pilotage fees and may be fined. In 1959, the Legislature authorized the Board to regulate pilotage on the Hudson River, and the Board accordingly extended the exclusionary licensing scheme. See 1959 N.Y.Laws, ch. 676, Sec. 7. Finally, in 1971, the Legislature extended the Board's jurisdiction to pilotage on Long Island Sound, the last unregulated inland body of water along New York's coastline. See 1971 N.Y.Laws, ch. 942, Sec. 1, codified at N.Y.Nav.Law Sec. 89-b (McKinney's 1989 & Supp.1993). This legislation also allowed for the grandfathering of all pilots, including Connecticut-licensed pilots, who were actively engaged in the occupation and who were found qualified under the Board's then existing regulations. See N.Y.Nav.Law Sec. 91-b(2) (McKinney's 1989).

                state attempting to appropriate for its pilots some exclusive privilege or advantage in a bay or harbor. 1  See Reardon v. Arkell, 59 F. 624, 625 (S.D.N.Y.1894);  The Abercorn, 26 F. 877, 879 (D.Or.), aff'd, 28 F. 384 (C.C.Or.1886);  The Clymene, 9 F. 164, 166-67 (E.D.Pa.1881), aff'd, 12 F. 346 (C.C.Pa.1882);  1986 N.Y.Op. Att'y Gen.  (86-F5) 22, 23
                

Navigation Law Sec. 89-b specifically addresses the pilotage of registered vessels transiting Long Island Sound as they make their way to and from the three New York ports situated on the Sound (Port Jefferson and the oil platforms of Northville and Northport). At all times relevant to this appeal, section 89-b(1) provided in pertinent part:

Every foreign vessel and every American vessel under register transiting the New York state waters of Long Island Sound or Block Island Sound east of Execution Rocks or Sands Point, and any such vessels entering or departing from any port situated on the New York state waters of Long Island Sound east of Execution Rocks or Sands Point, shall take a Long Island-Block Island Sound pilot licensed under the authority of this article or of the laws of any other state having concurrent jurisdiction over these waters.

The New York pilotage system is based on the assumption that only New York-licensed pilots have the expertise and familiarity with local waters and conditions to navigate safely. The Board claims that New York employs licensing standards stricter than those for a federal license, and points out that a Connecticut license is issued to any pilot with a federal license. The Board also justifies its licensing policies as a means of affording New York pilots a living wage and avoiding "destructive competition" among pilots to get business by promoting shorter, more hazardous routes. Accordingly, pursuant to the Navigation Law, the Board strictly limits the number of New York-licensed pilots. As traffic to New York ports has declined over the years, so has the number of pilots authorized by the Board to take pilotage assignments in the geographical areas within its jurisdiction.

As to Long Island Sound, 17 pilots are currently authorized to navigate ships to and from New York ports, and the Board maintains a long, stagnant waiting list. These 17 pilots are all members of a single association of New York-licensed pilots, now called Sound Pilots, Inc. ("Sound Pilots"), appointed by the Board to act as the dispatching agent for Long Island Sound. Sound Pilots has established a rotation system for pilotage assignments, and controls the selection of new pilots to enter the rotation.

Sound Pilots' rotation initially included Interport members who, although not licensed in New York, were allowed to pilot ships to In 1988, plaintiffs founded Connecticut State Pilots as a division of Interport. Acting...

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