Walker v. Sumner
| Decision Date | 15 July 1993 |
| Docket Number | 92-15737,Nos. 92-15666,s. 92-15666 |
| Citation | 14 F.3d 1415 |
| Parties | Andrew John WALKER, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. George W. SUMNER, et al., Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Andrew Walker, Marion, IL, Pro Per, for the plaintiff-appellant.
John E. Simons, Deputy Attorney General, Carson City, NV, for the defendants-appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada.
Before: WALLACE, Chief Judge; NELSON and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.
We are called upon to consider unusual issues surrounding an inmate's claim that he was placed into disciplinary segregation without a hearing in violation of his right to procedural due process.
Walker is a federal prisoner who at the time of the events underlying this lawsuit was housed at Nevada State Prison ("NSP") pursuant to a reciprocal contract with federal authorities. On July 26, 1984, during a routine shakedown, Correction Officer Gurries found in Walker's cell a knife that had apparently been made inside the prison. Walker contends that the knife was planted in his cell by Gurries.
After the knife was found, Walker was immediately removed from the general prison population and placed in segregated housing. The prison officials contend that he was placed in administrative segregation because allowing him to remain in the general prison population posed a great security risk; Walker contends that he was placed in disciplinary segregation as punishment for the underlying offense.
Sometime within a few days after the transfer, 1 Walker was given written notice that he was charged with a disciplinary violation. At that time, the charges against him were explained by a member of the classification committee and he was told that an attorney would be appointed for him. It is unclear why he was told this; the prison's regulations do not allow inmates to be represented by counsel in disciplinary hearings, nor do they provide that counsel will be appointed to help an inmate prepare his defense. Walker informed the classification committee that he intended to call two witnesses at his disciplinary hearing, a corrections officer and an inmate.
Thirty-two days after his placement into segregated housing, a disciplinary hearing was held and Walker was found guilty of the charges against him. Walker was not present at the hearing. The members of the disciplinary committee contend that Walker waived his right to be present; Walker claims that he was not given the opportunity to waive knowingly the right to attend the hearing and to present a defense. According to Walker, the day the hearing was held, he was removed from his cell and taken to the prison's rotunda by Officer Benedetti, a member of the disciplinary committee. Walker contends that Benedetti asked him if he wished to have his disciplinary hearing that morning and that he replied that he was waiting for an attorney to be appointed for him as was promised. Walker also contends that the prison's rotunda was not set up for a hearing and that Benedetti had refused to allow him to call witnesses.
Walker was sentenced to 180 days in disciplinary segregation, but was given credit for the thirty-two days that he had spent in administrative segregation. Although the official classification of his confinement changed from non-punitive administrative segregation to punitive disciplinary segregation, he was not moved to a different cell after sentencing.
While serving his time in disciplinary segregation, Walker was sent to Illinois to attend a trial. Upon return, he was placed back in disciplinary segregation but he apparently was not given a full issue of clothing. In addition, Walker contends that his boots were not returned to him.
On August 1, 1985, Walker, proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against several prison officials and corrections officers (collectively "prison officials"). The complaint alleged that the prison officials had violated Walker's due process rights by failing to afford him an adequate disciplinary hearing and by placing him in disciplinary segregation before his hearing; had violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide him with adequate clothing, exercise and medical care; and had discriminated against him by not giving him sugar during meals.
Defendant Housewright was not served; the claims against him were dismissed without prejudice.
Upon recommendation of the magistrate judge, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Walker on his claim that his right to procedural due process had been violated because he had been placed in disciplinary segregation before his hearing. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials on all other claims.
A trial was held on the issue of damages. The logistics of the trial were complicated by the fact that on January 20, 1986, Walker had been transferred to a federal prison in Marion, Illinois. The district court concluded that the expense and inconvenience of having Walker transported back to Nevada for the trial outweighed the need for Walker in the courtroom, and the court concluded that the best solution would be to have Walker appear by telephone. Both Walker and the prison officials objected to this procedure. After trial, the district court found that only defendants Helling and Bates, two members of the classification committee, had been personally involved in the events at issue here, and the court awarded Walker $800 in damages against them. The court entered judgment dismissing the claims against the remaining defendants.
Walker appeals, raising several issues. He argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the prison officials on his claims that his disciplinary hearing violated due process and that he was denied adequate clothing. He also argues that the court erred in dismissing Housewright; in refusing to allow Walker to be present at trial; in refusing to order an inmate to be transferred so that Walker could call him as a witness; and in failing to order the prison officials to comply with a document request.
Helling and Bates cross appeal, arguing that the district court erred in permitting Walker to testify by telephone; in concluding that the transfer into segregated housing gave rise to a constitutional violation; in determining liability at the summary judgment stage; in awarding more than nominal damages; and in finding that they were personally involved in the violation of Walker's constitutional rights. Helling and Bates also contend that they were denied a fair trial.
We first consider issues raised in Walker's appeal.
Walker contends that the district court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials on his claim that his disciplinary hearing violated his right to due process. 2
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. In analyzing a procedural due process claim, a court must first determine whether the claimant has been deprived of a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; if so, the court must determine "whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient." Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1908, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989) (citations omitted).
Here, Walker contends that he had a liberty interest in not being arbitrarily placed in disciplinary segregation. See Conner v. Sakai, 994 F.2d 1408, 1411 (9th Cir.1993). "Liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise from two sources--the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-67, 103 S.Ct. 864, 868-69, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). The Due Process Clause itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in remaining in a general prison cell, id. at 466, 103 S.Ct. at 868; thus, we must determine whether Nevada state law gives rise to such an interest. The inquiry is not limited to an analysis of statutory law; rather, "prison regulations and policies can create liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Smith v. Sumner, 994 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir.1993).
"A state law or prison regulation creates a liberty interest if it places 'substantive limitations on official discretion.' " Id. (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1747, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983)). "Specifically, a state creates a liberty interest by both (1) establishing ' "substantive predicates" to govern official decisionmaking,' and (2) using ' "explicitly mandatory language," i.e., specific directives to the decisionmaker that if the regulations' substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome must follow.' " Id. (quoting Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462-63, 109 S.Ct. at 1910). The Nevada Department of Prisons Code of Penal Discipline in effect at the time of Walker's offense contains a detailed list of substantive offenses for which punishment can be imposed. Further, the code contains mandatory provisions requiring the prison to provide notice and a hearing to an inmate accused of a substantive offense. Finally, the code imposes detailed requirements on the hearing process itself, and carefully delineates the allowable punishment for each class of offense. Code of Penal Discipline, Notice, Offenses Sec. C, Summary Proceedings and Hearings Sec. B, Disciplinary Action Sec. C. In light of the requirement that notice and hearing be provided before punishment can be imposed, we conclude that Nevada law creates a liberty interest for inmates to remain free from arbitrary placement into disciplinary segregation.
Next, we must determine whether Walker was afforded sufficient process before being confined in...
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