In re Estate of MacFarline

• Citation: 14 P.3d 551,2000 OK 87
• Decision Date: 07 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. 92,350.,92,350.
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Doris MacFARLINE, Deceased, L.G. MacFarline, Jr., Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Stephen P. Regouby, Successor Personal Representative of the Estate of Doris MacFarline, Deceased, Defendant/Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma

14 P.3d 551

2000 OK 87

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Doris MacFARLINE, Deceased,

L.G. MacFarline, Jr., Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Stephen P. Regouby, Successor Personal Representative of the Estate of Doris MacFarline, Deceased, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 92,350.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

November 7, 2000.

David C. Butler of McKnight & Gasaway, Enid, OK, for Appellant.

Carey Cobb Calvert and Robert D. Hart of Tom L. Armstrong & Associates, Tulsa, OK, for Appellee.

LAVENDER, J.

¶ 1 Appellant, L.G. Macfarline, Jr. — a nephew of Doris Macfarline (decedent) — submitted a creditor's claim to appellee, Stephen P. Regouby, the successor personal representative (SPR) of decedent's estate. The claim sought to have the estate reimburse him for his payment of: decedent's funeral/burial expenses; decedent's medical bills and certain other debts of decedent; and certain expenses alleged by him to be estate administration costs. The SPR did not approve any part of the claim so nephew sued for reimbursement. Counter-motions for summary judgment were filed. The trial judge denied nephew's motion and granted the SPR's motion, essentially ruling he made the payments voluntarily, without right or duty and, thus, was not entitled to any reimbursement. Upon nephew's appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) affirmed, basically ruling: the record supported the trial court's decision because it sufficiently showed he made the payments as a volunteer with no protectable interest in the estate.

¶ 2 Nephew sought certiorari, which we previously granted. We hold material factual questions precluded summary judgment for either party and the legal analyses of both the trial judge and COCA were, at least, partially in error. Although the record is insufficient to show nephew's entitlement to summary judgment as to the totality of his claim, neither does it support summary judgment in the SPR's favor. The record does not conclusively show nephew was a volunteer unentitled to any reimbursement. Nor does it show a lack of protectable interest in the estate. Further, lack of a protectable interest in the estate would not automatically foreclose reimbursement for nephew's payment of reasonable funeral/burial expenses. We vacate the COCA's decision, reverse the trial court judgment, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

PART I. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

¶ 3 Summary judgment is reviewed de novo. In Carmichael v. Beller, 1996 OK 48, 914 P.2d 1051, 1053 we said:

Although a trial court in making a decision on whether summary judgment is appropriate considers factual matters, the ultimate decision turns on purely legal determinations, i.e. whether one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there are no material disputed factual questions. [A]s the decision involves purely legal determinations, the appellate standard of review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo. [An appellate court], like [a] trial court, will examine the pleadings and evidentiary materials submitted by the parties to determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact. Further, all inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the evidentiary materials must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. (citations omitted)

In the de novo review an appellate court engages in a plenary, independent and non-deferential re-examination of the trial court's ruling. Manley v. Brown, 1999 OK 79, ¶ 22 fn. 30, 989 P.2d 448.

¶ 4 In Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Glass, 1998 OK 52, ¶ 3, 959 P.2d 586, the review standard was further delineated as follows:

[A] summary judgment ruling must be made on the record actually presented by the litigants, not on a record potentially possible. If the summary judgment submissions disclose either controverted material facts, or, reasonable minds might reach different conclusions even if the material facts are undisputed, summary judgment should be denied. It must be remembered, neither this Court [n]or a trial court weighs the evidence on a motion for summary judgment and it is not the purpose of such procedure to substitute a trial by affidavit for a trial according to law. Weighing of evidence is a function for the jury and, in a non-jury case, for the trial judge after an appropriate trial of the issues. Finally, only if the movant for summary adjudication satisfies the initial burden to show entitlement to summary judgment is it incumbent on the non-movant to demonstrate by his/her own submissions the existence of a substantial dispute as to some material fact. (citations omitted)

It was made clear in Spirgis v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 1987 OK CIV APP 45, 743 P.2d 682 (approved for publication by Oklahoma Supreme Court), even when an opposing party fails to respond to a summary judgment motion the trial judge still must insure the motion is meritorious. 743 P.2d at 685. Thus, if a moving party has not addressed all material facts, or one or more such facts are not appropriately supported by the evidentiary materials submitted, summary judgment for the movant is not proper. Id. Consequently, the fact both sides to a lawsuit file counter-motions for summary judgment does not automatically mean summary judgment for one party or the other is proper. For a party to be entitled to summary judgment in his/her favor, the record must show that party entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

PART II. FACTUAL RECORD AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

¶ 5 In response to the SPR's March 1997 notice to creditors in decedent's probate case nephew, by a creditor's claim, sought reimbursement for his payment of decedent's funeral/burial expenses; medical bills allegedly incurred by decedent¹ and certain other debts of decedent; and certain expenses alleged by him to be estate administration costs. The payments were: $6,740.55 to a funeral home, $1,184.29 in medical expenses; $55 for 1994 Oklahoma income tax; $13 for 1994 federal income tax; $30 for preparation of 1994 income tax returns; $1,170 for preparation of an Oklahoma estate tax return; $5 for a monthly assessment to the Highland Park Homeowner's Association; $250 appraisal fee; $126.72 for lawn care at decedent's residence; $183.76 to the City of Tulsa, $90.68 to TCI Cablevision, $134.85 to SW Bell Telephone, $335.90 to Oklahoma Natural Gas and $138.82 to Public Service — the latter six apparently associated with upkeep of decedent's residence after her death. The total of the above payments is about $10,500.

¶ 6 The SPR failed to approve any part of the claim so nephew sued for reimbursement. Eventually, the parties filed counter-motions for summary judgment. They did not, however, stipulate to the material facts. Nephew's motion and its evidentiary materials show decedent died in January 1995 leaving a will dated December 28, 1994. The will states decedent married only once (in 1930); her husband predeceased her in July 1991; and she had no children, natural or adopted. The will devises her Tulsa residence (exclusive of furnishings) to Highland Park Christian Church (Church)(also located in Tulsa); names nephew residuary beneficiary; and Joe Buckner (decedent's neighbor) personal representative (PR). Further, although the will directs the PR to pay, as soon as practical after decedent's death, all expenses due and owing, or which may become due and owing, against her estate — including administration, last illness and funeral expenses — it does not specify the source from which the expenses should be paid.

¶ 7 The summary judgment record does not contain an exact inventory of estate assets. However, evidentiary materials show the main asset was decedent's residence (valued at $ 66,000 for estate tax purposes) and that the residuary assets were household items, furnishings and personal belongings (valued at $1,500 for estate tax purposes). Nephew's affidavit — submitted to support his summary judgment quest — acknowledges he took possession of, with the PR's permission, certain unspecified items of decedent's personal property between the time of death and October 1995. The summary judgment record fails to conclusively show the value of said items, the ultimate disposition thereof, and it does not conclusively show the ultimate disposition of the remainder of the residuary estate. Although nephew's motion states as undisputed facts that other unnamed nieces and nephews of decedent received certain personal property and that the PR disposed of other specified items of personalty (apparently to other unnamed individuals or organizations), no evidentiary material was submitted to actually substantiate the statements. We note an affidavit of the SPR, however, does attest that the original PR and nephew either disposed of or took all the residuary estate.

¶ 8 In his affidavit nephew states, in essence: the PR did not initiate probate until October 1995 (about nine months after decedent's death); he repeatedly requested the PR to initiate probate prior to October 1995; and because the PR failed to take action for the payment of creditor claims or estate administration expenses between the date of decedent's death and October 1995, he-nephew-paid the debts and expenses for which he seeks reimbursement. His summary judgment reply brief asserts his payment had the salutary effect of avoiding potential lawsuits, interest, late charges, and other potential charges to the estate. Further, although the record fails to contain underlying bills or statements from the individuals/organizations paid by nephew, attached to his motion is a list itemizing the payments made and detailing to whom he made payments.

¶ 9 Nephew's summary judgment submissions also show decedent had about $235,000 in bank accounts when she died, and his affidavit attests the accounts were held in joint tenancy and he was the surviving joint tenant. An Oklahoma estate tax return — presented with his motion — indicates there were four accounts (two checking, one investor and one...