Greenfield's Estate

• Citation: 14 Pa. 489
• Parties: Greenfield's Estate.
• Decision Date: 01 January 1853
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

14 Pa. 489

Greenfield's Estate.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

APPEAL from the decree of the Court of Nisi Prius sitting in equity.

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The case was argued by C. Fallon and J.M. Scott, on the part of complainant.—It was contended, 1. That the deed of 15th December, 1834, to Howell and others, if taken by itself, is void as to complainant.

2. That the deed, if taken in connection with the declaration of trust of same date, is also void as to complainant; or at least, they together constitute a testamentary disposition of property which is revocable, and has been revoked by the subsequent will.

3. That at all events, even assuming the deed to be valid in all respects, complainant is entitled to so much of the funds in the hands of the grantees, as arose from the income of the estate purporting to have been conveyed.

4. That the bill should not have been dismissed with costs.

Under the first point, it was contended that the deed was void as to complainant, at least without some evidence to sustain it, on the ground that the two grantees who it was alleged procured the making of it, stood in fiduciary relations to the grantor; the one, Joseph Howell, being her confidential adviser, the other, Judge Bouvier, being her legal counsel and attorney, having drawn her previous will, and having in that capacity been employed about and drawn the deed, she having previously, at the instance of Mr. Howell, consulted with Mr. Bouvier in relation thereto: Story's Equity, sec. 308-9-11; 1 Cox Rep. 125; 13 Vesey 137.

The burthen of establishing its fairness and adequacy, is thrown upon the attorney: Story, sec. 312; 2 Vesey 627; 4 Dessausure 678-9; 1 Ball & Beatty 105-6; 2 B. & B. 89; 15 Vesey 34; 14 id. 273.

There is no evidence that the deed was read to Mrs. Greenfield, and if it had been, it should also have been explained: 2 Atkyn 202; 3 Peere Wms. 130; 9 Vesey 292; 12 id. 376; 2 Sch. & Lef. 492; 2 Vesey 199; 14 id. 91.

That Mrs. Greenfield thought she was executing a will, and the deed and declaration of trust should be considered as a testamentary disposition and as revocable: 2 Ves. Sr. 440-591; 2 Haggerty 247-554; 4 id. 356; 1 Jarmin 12.

The deed and declaration being executed simultaneously, the deed was not valid till the declaration was recorded: 17 Ser. & R. 70; 4 Watts 134. She was indebted at her decease.

At all events, the executor is entitled to the income unexpended

at the decease of Mrs. Greenfield: 2 Watts 188; 6 Coke 17; 3 Bac. Abr. 387; 1 Dal. 148.

That defendants should pay the costs: 15 Vesey 34.

H.M. Phillips and W.B. Reed, with whom was H.J. Williams, for Howell and Bouvier.—Mrs. Greenfield was legally competent to make such a settlement, and had sufficient intellect to do so.

The instruments were executed in form, and the deed transfers the whole estate. She understood their effect, she knew that they were not a will; she had made wills before. She was informed by Judge Baldwin of the nature of the instruments.

The estate was taken possession of by the trustees, and the income received for years. They are not void because voluntary. The authorities cited in 2 Story's Eq. sec. 973; 4 Kent 282, and 1 Ves. Jr. 53, were cases of imperfect agreements. In this case, no aid is asked of a court of equity. The title at law is perfect. When a money consideration is stated in a deed of bargain and sale, no averment is to be received to the contrary: 1 Bin. 518-19; 2 Ph. Ev. 761; Robb on Frauds 119.

No fraud is proved: 13 Ser. & R. 434. The English rule, from which ours has been adopted, is founded on the statutes of 13 and 27 Eliz. The former avoids instruments made to delay, hinder, and defraud creditors; the latter to protect purchasers; but in both cases, fraud is the test. Voluntary settlements by one not indebted, are not void: 2 Br. Ch. C. 90; 5 Vesey 384; 12 id. 148, 136.

They are valid as to subsequent creditors: 8 Mees. & Wels. 405; 4 N. Hamp. 229; 1 Marshall 582; 8 Wheaton 229-242; 11 id. 211.

The presumption is that a party executing and acknowledging a sealed instrument, is acquainted with its contents, and parol declarations cannot be received to substitute another contract for it. It was not necessary to prove that the deed was read to the grantor, unless it was required by her: 2 Johns. Rep. 404; 5 Bos. & Pul. 415; 1 Nev. & Man. 576.

The instruments were not testamentary papers, and were not revocable. 1. They purport to be made inter vivos, and to take immediate effect. 2. They did take effect by delivery of the deeds and the management of the estate. 3. That provisions are made in them for action during the life of Mrs. Greenfield. 4. That these provisions were complied with for ten years. 5. They were complete; there was no control retained by Mrs. Greenfield, and no power to appoint by will, and nothing to show an intention to retain any power over the estate, except over its income. It is not so much the form of the instrument which distinguishes a will from a deed, as the time of its intended operation: 1 Jarman 16-17-18; 3 Price 368, Attorney-General v. Jones; Thompson v. Brown, 3 Myl. & Keen 32, 8 Eng. Ch. Rep.; 2 Kelly's Geo. Rep. 32-6; 3 id. 569-574; id. 460-484; 4 Hawkes 141-171.

As to the compensation, it was not inordinate. That at the date of the deed, Mrs. Greenfield supposed that she was worth about $227,000. She had no blood relations. Nothing was to be paid to the trustees until after her death. It was not invalid because made partly in favor of counsel, there being no fraud existing: 1 Story's Eq. sec. 312; 9 Vesey 292, Hatch v. Hatch; 13 Vesey 137; 12 id. 376; 14 id. 273.

The fact of the declaration of trust not being recorded during the lifetime of Mrs. Greenfield, does not affect its validity. As between grantor and grantee, the recording acts have no operation, nor between legatees and cestui que trusts: 1 Whar. Dig. 452, Deed, pl. 54-55-63.

The answer of Mr. Rush, one of respondents, is not evidence against the others: 12 Vesey 361. Rush was interested to support the will.

The opinion of the court was delivered by BELL, J.

After much reflection, and a critical examination of the voluminous evidence and exhibits with which the case is loaded, we entirely agree with the Chief Justice, in his general estimate of the transaction in question. Any difficulty which may have retarded the announcement of our conclusion, has arisen, not from a doubt of the validity of the disposition made by Mrs. Greenfield, considered in its general aspect, but from hesitancy as to the light in which a particular feature of it ought to be regarded.

The original conveyance to trustees and the deed declaratory of the trusts, are to be accepted as one transaction: Hamilton v. Elliot, 5 Ser. & R. 384; Cromwell's case, 2 Rep. 75; and, consequently, the interests of the parties claiming under them, and the rights of those who impeach them, are to be considered precisely as though the two instruments constituted but one muniment of title. Conceding the creation of it to have been purely voluntary, the competency of Mrs. Greenfield to make it is beyond cavil. To say nothing of the valuable consideration mentioned in the conveyance itself, the perfect right of a proprietor to divest himself of his estate by way of gift, uninduced by pecuniary consideration, is among those which do not admit of question, and when such a gift is executed or otherwise fixed in the beneficiary, either by the direct conveyance of an estate or the creation of an use, it is beyond the power of the donor or his representative to revoke it Settlements like that before us, reserving a present interest in the creator of them, and carrying a future benefit or bounty to other designated parties, are very usual. If fairly made and carried into effect, uninfluenced by fraud or circumvention, they cannot be subsequently impeached, as is shown, among other determinations, by our own case of Ruth v. Reese, 13 Ser. & R. 434. The authorities cited for the plaintiff as hostile to this position, look only to unexecuted covenants or agreements to raise future trusts, by way of gift, which equity will not enforce, if founded in mere benevolence, or a purely moral obligation.

Nor is this transaction open to impeachment on the ground that it is in fraud of creditors. At the time of its inception, Mrs. Greenfield was of ample fortune, very far beyond any amount of debt for which she was liable. Indeed, there appears to have existed, at that time, but a single debt, and for this provision was made. Those averred to have been since created, cannot be invoked in aid of this attempt to invalidate the arrangement, for a voluntary settlement of an estate, made by one unindebted at the time, or who reserves sufficient to pay all existing debts, cannot be successfully attacked by subsequent creditors, unless, indeed, there be something to show the settlement was made in anticipation of future indebtedness. I know some doubt was thrown upon the soundness of this principle by Thomson v. Dougherty, 12 Ser. & R. 448; but it was afterwards dissipated in Mateer v. Hassin, 3 P. R. 160, supported by a multitude of cases cited for the defendants on the argument.

Neither is there the slightest pretence for saying the settlement must be accepted as a testamentary disposition, or that the donor was unduly induced to give it effect under the erroneous idea that it was a last will, or something in the nature of one. That it is not so, in fact, is abundantly shown by the reasons given at Nisi Prius, in corroboration of which, numerous authorities might be adduced. It may, however, suffice to refer to Thompson v. Brown, 3 Mill & Keen 32; and the concurring American cases of Hester v. Young, 2 Kelly (Geo.) Rep. 31-46; Jackson v....