City of St. Louis v. Davidson
| Citation | 14 S.W. 825,102 Mo. 149 |
| Parties | The City of St. Louis v. Davidson et al., Appellants |
| Decision Date | 15 December 1890 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. Geo. W. Lubke Judge.
Affirmed.
Smith P. Galt and Andrew M. Sullivan for appellants.
(1) The findings and conclusions of law of the court were correct. Scheme and Charter, art. 3, sec. 26, par. 10. The provision of the charter of St. Louis cannot be construed to mean that the city shall have power to hire out prisoners to work for others, without doing violence to the words as therein used. On the other hand, every rule of law requires that the strictest construction be placed upon it; for it is both penal in its nature and is a part of a municipal charter. U. S. v. Morris, 14 Peters, 464; Sedgwick Const. of Statutes, pp. 279-288, 397; Dillon on Municipal Corp., secs 89, (55)-91-443 (371); Pacific v. Seifert, 79 Mo 215; Fowler v. St. Joseph, 37 Mo. 228. (2) The defendants are not estopped from setting up the want of authority on the part of the corporation to make this contract, by the fact that they have received the consideration or a part thereof. The contract was ultra vires and against public policy, and, when void as against public policy, there is no estoppel. Montgomery v. Road Co., 31 Ala. 76; Navigation Co. v. Dandredge, 8 Gill & J. 319, 320; Albert v. Bank, 1 Md. Ch. 413; Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co., 7 Wend. 31. Ultra vires is a good defense to an action on a bond given to secure an invalid contract. Dillon on Mun. Corp., sec. 458 (382). So, if a city is sued by an innocent holder of a bond it had no power to issue, the city is not estopped. Dillon on Mun. Corp., sec. 553 (426); Railroad v. Railroad, 10 Saw. 464. "We may take it as well settled that, in the law of contracts, the first purpose of the courts is to look to the welfare of the public; and, if the enforcement of the agreement would be inimical to its interests, no relief could be granted to the party injured, and that even though it might result beneficially to the party who made and violated the agreement." Greenhood on Public Policy, p. 2; Crawford v. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 190.
Leverett Bell for respondent.
(1) The contract for the employment of the inmates of the St. Louis workhouse at brush-making, on which this action is based, is not open to any objection in point of law. The constitutionality of the convict lease system has received the attention of the courts and the law-writers, and is sustained. Georgia v. Nelms, 65 Ga. 499; Mason Co. v. Jellico Co., 87 Ky. 467; Tiedeman's Police Power, 98. The provisions of the St. Louis ordinance and contract on the subject, above set out, show that the system in St. Louis is surrounded with proper safeguards, and is conducted with the purpose of ameliorating the condition of the prisoner, and is not in any respect contrary to public policy or good morals. (2) The defendants having enjoyed the fruits of the contract are estopped to deny the validity thereof. Green v. Railroad, 82 Mo. 653; Middleton v. State, 120 Ind. 166.
-- Action on bond for $ 2,000, given by Davidson to the city to secure the performance of a contract on his part, which contract was made with the city and purported to confer power on Davidson to work the prisoners in the workhouse, at so much per head per day. After working the prisoners for some months under this contract, Davidson abandoned it, and this action is brought to recover from him and his sureties the amount due the city for labor of prisoners thus employed and not paid for.
The separate answers of defendants were identical in terms, and set up the defense that the alleged contract was illegal and void as against public policy; that it was void because the city has no power or authority to make the same, and, therefore, they were not liable thereon.
The case was tried by the court sitting as a jury, and a special verdict was rendered, upon evidence tending to support it, as follows: For services actually rendered and unpaid for, by female prisoners, at the rate of twenty cents per day, and male prisoners at sixty-five cents per day, with interest, $ 432.10. For drawing holes in brushes at ten cents per one thousand, with interest, $ 620.64; making a total verdict of $ 1,052.74.
The court refused to give defendants' declaration, that, under the law and the evidence in the case, the plaintiff could not recover; but gave a declaration of law of its own motion, which was in substance that the city had no power to make said contract, and that it was void; that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover any of the penalties provided therein, for failure to employ prisoners; but that it was entitled to recover for the work actually done by the prisoners, and not paid for by Davidson; that, as to such work, the defendants were estopped to deny the validity of the contract. Defendants' motion for a new trial having been overruled, the case comes here by appeal.
Paragraph 10, of section 26, article 3 of the city charter, so far as necessary to quote it, is as follows: "Every person so committed to the workhouse, or such other place aforesaid, shall be required to work for the city at such labor as his or her health and strength will permit, within or without said workhouse, or other place, not exceeding ten hours each working day; and for such work the person so employed shall be allowed, exclusive of his or her board, fifty cents per day for each day's work, on account of said fine and costs."
At the time Davidson made the contract aforesaid, the city had passed ordinance 47, section 1763 of which authorized a contract of the kind made in the case at bar.
Was the city entitled to recover for the work actually done by the prisoners, and not paid for by Davidson? And was the latter estopped to deny the validity of the contract? are the questions arising on this record.
It will have been observed that the charter of the city while it does not permit, yet does not prohibit, the making of such a contract as the one before us, so that although the contract is ultra vires the corporation, yet it is not illegal because not prohibited by the charter. This is a distinction clearly marked out by the authorities. 2 Dillon. Mun. Corp. [4 Ed.] sec. 936; McDonald v. Mayor, 68 N.Y. 23; Bigelow on Estop. [5 Ed.] 685.
And though a city might successfully interpose the plea of ultra vires when sued upon a contract, yet it does not thence follow that a party who contracted with such city can, when sued on the contract, successfully interpose the plea of incapacity on the part of the city to make such a contract, such contract not being illegal in the sense already indicated.
In instances of this kind the plea of legal disability of the opposite contracting party is as much out of the power of a defendant to make as would be a plea of the minority of the other party in similar circumstances, something of which no one can advantage himself, except the party making it. Bigelow on Estop. [5 Ed.] 465; Oregonian Ry. Co. v. Railroad, 10 Saw. 464.
But upon a yet broader ground the defense set up in the answers cannot be...
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