Williams v. Pollock

• Decision Date: 24 July 1943
• Parties: WILLIAMS, Sheriff, v. POLLOCK.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

14 So.2d 700

153 Fla. 338

WILLIAMS, Sheriff, v. POLLOCK.

Florida Supreme Court

July 24, 1943

Appeal from Circuit Court, Brevard County; M. B. Smith, judge.

J. Tom Watson Atty. Gen., and Woodrow M. Melvin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, R. F. Maguire, and W. H. Poe, all of Orlando for appellee.

THOMAS, Justice.

The appellee pleaded guilty of violating Section 817.09 Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A. § 817.09, and was held under a commitment when discharged upon a writ of habeas corpus by the circuit judge who had the conviction that the act offended the Constitution of the United States, presumably the Thirteenth Amendment prohibiting involuntary servitude. The act denounces as a misdemeanant 'any person * * * who * * *, with intent to injure and defraud, under and by reason of a contract or promise to perform labor or service [procures] * * * money or other thing of value as a credit, or as advances * * *'

Better to present our observations on the matter involved, we will give also the substance of a related statute, Section 817.10 Florida Statutes, 1941, F.S.A. § 817.10, declaring that the 'failure or refusal, without just cause, to perform such labor or service or to pay for the money or other thing of value so obtained * * * shall be prima facie evidence of the intent to injure and defraud.'

The former was Section 1, the latter Section 2, of Chapter 7917 Laws of Florida, Acts of 1919.

This is not the first challenge of the act which has appeared in this court. The identical matter was considered in Phillips v Bell, 84 Fla. 225, 94 So. 699, where the court concluded that the portion of the law defining the crime was harmonious with the Thirteenth Amendment and observed, without deciding the point, that if the part referring to the prima facie character of certain evidence should be pronounced unconstitutional the ruling would not affect the remainder. The discussion was largely devoted to the applicability of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Bailey v. State of Alabama, 211 U.S. 452, 29 S.Ct. 141, 53 L.Ed. 278, and in another case of the same title reported in 219 U.S. 219, 31 S.Ct. 145, 55 L.Ed. 191, to the proposition under study.

We are inclined to adhere to our former decision, but we recognize our duty to defer to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States where the interpretation of the federal constitution is involved. Bearing in mind this obligation, we will examine, in their order, the first and second cases of Bailey v. Alabama and Phillips v. Bell, supra, then determine the effect upon them of a recent opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, Ira Taylor v. State of Georgia, infra.

In the first there was entertained a petition for habease corpus in which the constitutionality of a law making it an offense 'to enter into a contract * * * for service with intent to * * * defraud the employer, and, after thereby obtaining money * * * from such employer, * * * and without refunding the money or paying for the property, to refuse to perform the service.' An amendment made the 'refusal or failure [to perform] without just cause prima facie evidence of the intent.' The court considered these two features, one denouncing a fraudulent act and one providing a method of proof, together with a rule in Alabama preventing a person from testifying as to his motive. No testimony had been taken in the case and the question was the unconstitutionality of the act and the amendment on their face without regard to the practical application with amendment and the local rule dealing with proof. This is apparent from the comment of the court: 'When the case comes to trial it may be that the prosecution will not rely upon the statutory presumption, but will exhibit satisfactory proof of a fraudulent scheme, so that the validity of the addition to the statute will not come into question at all.'

We think it very significant that the court remarked upon the lack of doubt that the offense defined could be made a crime. Gist of the decision, as we understand it, was, summarizing, that the part of the law describing the crime and the one providing for the presumption were not interdependent and that if, in the prosecution, the state did not resort to the latter the validity of the former would be unaffected.

The petitioner was remanded, tried and found guilty. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment and again the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case. It then appeared that the conviction of the defendant was obtained because of the operation of the amendment providing that refusal of the employee to perform was prima facie evidence of intent to defraud the employer. In their analysis the court stressed the possibility of conviction for crime simply because of a breach of contract and failure to discharge a debt. By such flimsy testimony could the presumption of innocense be overcome. This was particularly true in view of the rule preventing a defendant from swearing that he intended no fraud.

It was the gist of the opinion that the statute designed to punish fraud became an instrument to compel service when the provision for prima facie evidence of guilt was brought into play, especially, as will be seen when we discuss Taylor v. Georgia, infra, when the defendant was prohibited from testifying about his purpose or intention. The court concluded that the Alabama law, 'in so far as it makes the refusal or failure to perform the act or service, without refunding the money or paying for the property prima facie evidence of the commission received [sic] of the crime which the section defines, is in conflict with the 13th Amendment, * * * and is therefore invalid.' [219 U.S. 219, 31 S.Ct. 153, 55 L.Ed. 191.]

From a perusal of both opinions the deduction is inevitable that the law denouncing the crime was not held in conflict with the constitution until made so by invoking in a given case the rule with reference to prima facie evidence and that, standing alone, it was not invalid.

We reach now, in its turn, our own decision in Phillips v. Bell, supra, where the chief justice expressed the opinion, concurred in by the other members of the court, that the section of the Florida Statutes defining the offenses was not inharmonious with the Constitution of the United States. One feature of that controversy was common to the first Bailey case, no testimony appeared in the record and so there was no need to...