Cozzie v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

Decision Date09 April 1998
Docket NumberNo. 97-1983.,97-1983.
Citation140 F.3d 1104
PartiesTerry L. COZZIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Russell W. Hartigan, James P. Newman (argued), Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Amy K. Posner (argued), Donald J. Harman, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Law Department, New York City, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before FLAUM, RIPPLE and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

Terry L. Cozzie initially filed suit in Illinois Circuit Court in Cook County. She alleged that she was wrongfully denied life insurance benefits as the named beneficiary of a life insurance policy issued by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("MetLife"). MetLife removed the action to the district court on the ground that the insurance plan is governed by the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. The parties submitted a statement of undisputed facts and, upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court decided in favor of MetLife. Ms. Cozzie now appeals. For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I BACKGROUND
A. Facts

Ms. Cozzie's husband, Robert J. Cozzie, was employed by Ameritech and participated in the Ameritech Life Insurance Program, an employee welfare benefit plan. That plan was a product of collective bargaining between Ameritech and the unions representing its employees. On November 6, 1994, Mr. Cozzie was killed in a car accident. According to investigators, Mr. Cozzie's vehicle was found overturned in a field, where it had come to rest, after missing a curve in the road, striking an embankment and rolling over three times. Mr. Cozzie had a blood alcohol level of .252%. This amount is more than 2+ times the legal limit under Illinois law at the time of the incident.1 The cause of death stated in the coroner's report was asphyxiation as a result of the car's resting on Mr. Cozzie. There were no witnesses to the accident and no apparent cause of the accident other than Mr. Cozzie's impaired condition.

Ms. Cozzie, as the named beneficiary of the life insurance policy, received $42,000 in basic life insurance benefits. However, MetLife, as the claim fiduciary under the plan, denied Ms. Cozzie's request for an additional $42,000 under the Accidental Death and Dismemberment ("AD & D") terms of the policy. This accidental death insurance "provides active employees added coverage for death or dismemberment from injuries caused solely by an accident." R.24, Ex.A at 8. MetLife informed Ms. Cozzie that she was not entitled to the added coverage because the death was not caused by an "accident" and because of an exclusion provision which eliminated coverage for loss of life caused by an "[i]njury that was purposely self-inflicted." Id. at 9.

Ms. Cozzie requested administrative review of that determination by MetLife. Upon review, MetLife affirmed its original decision. MetLife directed Ms. Cozzie's attention to the language of the plan which provides:

[T]he insurance companies have full discretionary authority to interpret the terms of the Program and to determine eligibility for an entitlement to Program benefits.... [E]ach insurance company determines conclusively for all parties all questions arising in the administration of the Program and any decision of the insurance company is not subject to further review.

Id. at 20.

B. Decision of the District Court

Adopting as its decision the Report and Recommendation filed by the Magistrate Judge,2 the district court determined that the appropriate standard of review for MetLife's decision to deny coverage for the accidental death benefits was the arbitrary and capricious standard. In deciding to employ this standard, the court first determined that the plan was an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA. It further reasoned that, if an ERISA benefit plan vests discretionary authority in a plan administrator or fiduciary to determine eligibility for benefits under the plan, review of such discretionary determinations is conducted by employing the arbitrary and capricious standard.

Reviewing the decision of the administrator under that deferential standard, the court determined that MetLife was reasonable in defining "accident" to mean "not reasonably foreseeable." It then concluded that MetLife was reasonable in its conclusion that, because death or serious injury is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of driving a car while intoxicated, Mr. Cozzie's death was not accidental. The court determined that it did not need to reach the question of whether Mr. Cozzie's death resulted from a "purposely self-inflicted" injury.

II DISCUSSION

Our approach to reviewing the grant of summary judgment by the district court is well established; we review that ruling de novo and we generally examine the record and the controlling law utilizing the same standard employed by the district court. See Anweiler v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 990 (7th Cir.1993). We shall uphold the court's entry of judgment so long as "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When the material facts are not in dispute, as in this case, the "`sole question is whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Santaella v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir.1997) (quoting Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 978 (7th Cir. 1996)).

A.

We first turn to whether the district court was correct in utilizing the arbitrary and capricious standard to review MetLife's decision denying Ms. Cozzie's claim for benefits under the AD & D policy. In Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 956-57, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989), the Supreme Court of the United States held that, in interpreting benefits under an ERISA plan, a de novo standard of review is appropriate unless the plan documents give "the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." As we have noted previously, the extent of the deference given the administrator "determines the extent of judicial deference." Morton v. Smith, 91 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir.1996); see also Foster McGaw Hosp. of Loyola Univ. of Chicago v. Building Material Chauffeurs Welfare Fund, Local 786, 925 F.2d 1023, 1025 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 818, 112 S.Ct. 74, 116 L.Ed.2d 48 (1991). In this case, the plan explicitly states that MetLife "determines conclusively for all parties all questions arising in the administration of the Program and any decision of the insurance company is not subject to further review." R.24, Ex.A at 20. Read literally, this provision would extinguish all judicial review of refusals by MetLife, but as our case law provides, and as MetLife concedes, such an interpretation would negate the contractual nature of the agreement. It certainly was not the intent of the parties to permit the insurance company to turn down a claim for benefits on whim. See Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 916, 114 S.Ct. 308, 126 L.Ed.2d 255 (1993). When language granting such broad power to interpret the documents is vested in the fiduciary, we have held that the appropriate standard of review ought to be the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Id.; Exbom v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 900 F.2d 1138, 1142 (7th Cir. 1990). Review under this standard is extremely deferential and has been described as the least demanding form of judicial review. See Trombetta v. Cragin Fed. Bank for Sav. Employee Stock Ownership Plan, 102 F.3d 1435, 1438 (7th Cir.1996). It is not, however, without some teeth. See Swaback v. American Info. Techs. Corp., 103 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir.1996) (noting the deferential standard that applies, but stating that we will not "rubber stamp" plan administrator decisions and that a decision that "controvert[s] the plain meaning of a plan" is "arbitrary and capricious"). Certainly, even under this standard, the insurance company is bound by the terms of the document. Interpretation and modification are different; the power to do the first does not imply the power to do the second.

As the Supreme Court noted in Firestone, although the existence of a conflict of interest on the part of the administrator does not alter the applicable standard of review, that conflict must be weighed as a factor in determining whether there has been a breach of duty even under a deferential standard. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115. Here, however, we agree with the district court that Ms. Cozzie has not established that such a conflict is operative in this case. Although MetLife acts as both administrator and insurer of the plan, that factor, standing alone, does not constitute a conflict of interest. See Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Co., 61 F.3d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir.1995). Indeed, it has not been demonstrated that MetLife has a direct stake, in terms of its own financial health, in the outcome of this issue of interpretation. See Cuddington v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 33 F.3d 813, 816 (7th Cir.1994) (refusing to find a conflict on a similar theory absent "specific evidence showing that the [plan administrator] had a conflict of interest"). Moreover, the plan is the product of the collective bargaining process between the insured's union and his employer. Ameritech and the union agreed to provide this insurance coverage and both parties had expectations about the administrator's performance under that agreement. MetLife therefore must, as a practical...

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