Chesebrough v. Conover

• Citation: 140 N.Y. 382,35 N.E. 633
• Parties: CHESEBROUGH v. CONOVER.
• Decision Date: 12 December 1893
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

140 N.Y. 382

35 N.E. 633

CHESEBROUGH

v.CONOVER.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 12, 1893.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, first department.

Action by Katherine F. Chesebrough, as administratrix of Julius F. Chesebrough deceased, against Daniel D. Conover. From a judgment of the general term (21 N. Y. Supp. 566) affirming a judgment of the circuit court for plaintiff, and an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Thomas E. Stewart,(Austin G. Fox, or counsel,) for appellant.

Calvin D. Van Name, (Lewis Sanders and Esek Cowen, of counsel,) for respondent.

EARL, J.

It appears from the complaint in this action that prior to 1879 the defendant had become interested in the construction of a railroad through Forty-Second street, in the city of New York, and that Mr. Chesebrough, who may be spoken of as the plaintiff, had rendered for him various services in and about the proposed road; and he alleges in the complaint that on the 7th day of March, 1879, the defendant agreed with him that if he would assist him in obtaining the rights, privileges, and franchises, and authority for the building of the proposed road, and draw for him certain papers, acts, and resolutions to be presented to parties, to the legislature, and to the common council, and writ certain letters and see certain parties, and go to Albany and use arguments, he would give plaintiff, as soon as said extension of said railroad through Forty-Second street was in operation, $10,000 of the bonds and $10,000 of the capital stock of the company for the services to be rednered, and the services already rendered, by him; that at the request of the defendant he drew certain proposed acts to authorize the construction and operation of the railroad through Forty-Second street, and also drew various other proposed acts of the legislature and other papers, and rendered certain other services mentioned, in the performance of the contract alleged, for all of which services he demands judgment for $10,000 damages. The defendant, by his answer, put in issue the material allegations of the complaint as to the contract, and the services claimed to have been rendered in pursuance thereof. Upon the trial the plaintiff gave evidence tending to prove the contract and the rendition of the services as alleged. There the defendant claimed that the services consisted, in part at least, of personal and private interviews with menbers of the legislature for the purpose of affecting pending legislation in the interest of the defendant, and that therefore the contract was against public policy and void, and that the defendant could not recover for the services; and upon his request the trial judge charged the jury as follows: ‘That even if the jury find as a fact that there was a contract between the plaintiff and defendant, but that it was a part of such contract that the plaintiff, if requested, would go to Albany and see some member of the railway committee when one of the bills testified to was before such committee, and talk to him privately to further said bill, so as to have the bill reported and passed along, or so that the bill could be passed, and that the plaintiff did talk with one or more members of such committee privately for such purpose, then the defendant is entitled to a verdict.’ ‘That even if the jury find as a fact that there was a contract between the plaintiff and defendant, but that it was a part of such contract that the plaintiff should, if requested, have personal and private interviews with members of the legislature, having in view, as one of their objects, the furthering of any bill pending in the legislature or a committee thereof, so that the same could be reported by such committee and passed, then the jury need consider no other question, but must render a verdict for the defendant.’ Notwithstanding the instructions thus given to the jury, they found a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and it is now claimed by the learned counsel for the defendant that upon the undisputed evidence the verdict should have been in favor of his client.

It is conceded by both parties that the judge properly instructed the jury, but they differ as to the force and effect of the evidence. It is not to be denied that upon the evidence the case was a very strong one for the defendant, and that the jury, with the power to weigh the evidence and draw inferences therefrom , could, under the instructions given, have found a verdict in his favor. But we think the jury could take a different view of the evidence, and find that the contract between the parties was not condemned by the rules of law, and that no services were rendered by the plaintiff in violation of the public policy embodied in the instructions given by the judge to the jury. If the plaintiff was employed to render what are commonly called ‘lobby services' in procuring the legislation desired by the defendant, then he should have been defeated in his action. Such contracts are condemned as against public policy, and the rules applicable to them are laid down in many decisions. Chippewa Valley & S. R. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co., 75 Wis. 248, 44 N. W. 17;Frost v. Inhabitants, 6 Allen, 152;Harris v. Roof, 10 Barb. 489;Sedgwick v. Stanton, 14 N. Y. 289. Here the jury could find that the plaintiff was not employed to render, and that he did not render, lobby services. He was not a lobbyist, and he had no acquaintance or influence with any member of the...