Abdool v. Bondi

Decision Date12 June 2014
Docket NumberNo. SC13–1123.,SC13–1123.
PartiesDane P. ABDOOL, et al., Petitioners, v. Pam BONDI, etc., et al., Respondents.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Neal Andre Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel—South, and M. Chance Meyer, Staff Attorney, Ft. Lauderdale, FL; James V. Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel—Middle, Tampa, FL; Martin J. McClain and Linda McDermott of McClain & McDermott, P.A., Wilton Manors, FL; and Terri L. Backhus of Backhus & Izakowitz, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Carol M. Dittmar, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Respondents.

LEWIS, J.

On June 14, 2013, the Governor of Florida signed into law the “Timely Justice Act of 2013 (the Act) which, according to its stated purpose, was enacted to “reduce delays in capital cases and to ensure that all appeals and postconviction actions in capital cases are resolved as soon as possible after the date a sentence of death is imposed in the circuit court.” Ch.2013–216, § 13, Laws of Fla.1 To accomplish this objective, the Act amends and adds several provisions to Chapters 27, “State Attorneys; Public Defenders; Related Offices,” 922, “Execution,” and 924, “Criminal Appeals and Collateral Review” of the Florida Statutes. See ch.2013–216, Laws of Fla. The Petitioners, all of whom are inmates under a sentence of death, have filed an emergency petition requesting that this Court invoke its mandamus and all writs jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of four sections of the Act and to declare those sections unconstitutional.

The disputed portions of the Act can be briefly summarized as:

Section 27.703(1): Conflict of Interest and Substitute Counsel

The Timely Justice Act modifies section 27.703(1), Florida Statutes, to require that Capital Collateral Regional Counsel (CCRC) not accept an appointment or take any action that creates an actual conflict of interest with his or her client. Ch.2013–216, § 5, Laws of Fla. An actual conflict of interest is defined by the Act to occur when “an attorney actively represents conflicting interests. A possible, speculative, or merely hypothetical conflict is insufficient to support an allegation that an actual conflict of interest exists.” Id. This amendment imposes a more stringent conflict standard than the previous statutory language, which only required that CCRC not accept an appointment that created a conflict of interest. Further, the amended statute places the responsibility of determining whether an actual conflict exists with the court, whereas the prior version of the statute required that the court appoint substitute counsel if the regional counsel of record determined that a conflict existed.

Section 27.7045: Constitutionally Deficient Representation

Section 27.7045, a new provision created by the Act, disqualifies appointed counsel from the representation of capital defendants for five years 2 if it is determined that: (1) in two separate capital postconviction proceedings a court held that counsel provided constitutionally deficient representation; and (2) in both of those postconviction proceedings, the defendant was granted relief. Ch.2013–216, § 7, Laws of Fla.

Section 27.7081: Capital Postconviction Public Records Production

Section 27.7081 delineates several requirements for the collection, storage, destruction, and requests for the production of public records in capital postconviction proceedings. Although the statute generally mirrors Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852, the two are not identical. Ch.2013–216, § 8, Laws of Fla.

Section 922.052: Issuance of Warrant of Execution

Under the prior version of section 922.052, the Governor, in his or her sole discretion, was authorized to issue a warrant to execute the sentence of death for any convicted capital defendant whose sentence was final. See§ 922.052, Fla. Stat. (2012). The Act modifies this section in several ways. First, the Act states that the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court “shall inform the Governor in writing certifying that a person convicted and sentenced to death, before or after the effective date of the act, has: (1) [c]ompleted [his or her] direct appeal and initial postconviction proceeding in state court, and habeas corpus proceeding and appeal therefrom in federal court; or (2) [a]llowed the time permitted for filing a habeas corpus petition in federal court to expire.” Ch.2013–216, § 12, Laws of Fla.

Second, the Act requires the Governor to issue a warrant for execution within thirty days after receiving the letter of certification from the Clerk, and to direct the warden to carry out the execution within 180 days. Id. Third, if the Governor, in his or her sole discretion, determines that the Clerk has not complied with the certification obligation with respect to any person sentenced to death, the Governor may sign a warrant of execution for such person where the executive clemency process has concluded. Id.

JURISDICTION

Ordinarily, the constitutionality of a legislative act should be challenged by filing an action for declaratory judgment in circuit court. Moreau v. Lewis, 648 So.2d 124, 126 (Fla.1995). However, when a statute will adversely impact the functions of government to the extent that it requires an immediate determination of the constitutionality of the statute, we may consider a petition that challenges the constitutionality of that statute pursuant to our mandamus authority. See, e.g., Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So.2d 52, 54–55 (Fla.2000); Moreau, 648 So.2d at 126; Dickinson v. Stone, 251 So.2d 268, 271 (Fla.1971).

We have previously stated that is our constitutional responsibility to ensure the death penalty is administered in a fair, consistent, and reliable manner, and have recognized that we have an administrative responsibility to minimize the delays inherent in the capital postconviction process. Arbelaez v. Butterworth, 738 So.2d 326, 326–27 (Fla.1999). Accordingly, because the challenged provisions of the Act amend and add several statutory provisions that attempt to “ensure that all appeals and postconviction actions in capital cases are resolved as soon as possible after the date a sentence of death is imposed in the circuit court,” and could potentially negatively impact our ability to ensure that the death penalty is administered in a fair, consistent, and reliable manner for the Petitioners and hundreds of additional death row inmates, we treat the Petitioners' challenges to the constitutionally of the Act as a petition for writ of mandamus and exercise our discretion to accept jurisdiction. See Allen, 756 So.2d at 54–55.

ANALYSIS

The Petitioners challenge the facial validity of four provisions of the Act. Generally, when we review the constitutionality of a statute, we accord legislative acts a presumption of constitutionality and construe the challenged legislation to effect a constitutional outcome when possible. Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Howard, 916 So.2d 640, 642 (Fla.2005). Further, we emphasize that our review is limited. In a facial challenge, we consider only the text of the statute, not its specific application to a particular set of circumstances. For a statute to be held facially unconstitutional, the challenger must demonstrate that no set of circumstances exists in which the statute can be constitutionally applied. See Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So.2d 250, 256 (Fla.2005); see also Cashatt v. State, 873 So.2d 430, 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“A facial challenge to a statute is more difficult than an ‘as applied’ challenge, because the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid.”). As a result, the Act will not be invalidated as facially unconstitutional simply because it could operate unconstitutionally under some hypothetical circumstances. With this standard in mind, we begin our analysis with the Petitioners' separation of powers challenges to amended section 922.052.

Section 922.052: Issuance of Warrant of Execution
Infringement on This Court's Rulemaking Authority

The Petitioners first allege that amended section 922.052 directly intrudes on the constitutional authority of this Court to regulate the practice and procedure of courts in this State by creating specific time requirements that automatically require the issuance of a warrant of execution upon the completion of the statutorily designated postconviction proceedings, and do not account for the pendency of other capital proceedings, such as successive postconviction litigation. The Petitioners further contend that because the Act truncates their ability to pursue successive postconviction litigation, it infringes on our rulemaking authority by “reject[ing] this Court's entire system of rules and case law relating to successive motions.” To support these allegations, the Petitioners compare this section of the Act to the Death Penalty Reform Act (DPRA), which we held to be unconstitutional in Allen.

Article V, section 2(a), of the Florida Constitution, grants this Court the exclusive authority to adopt rules of judicial practice and procedure for actions filed in this State. See Se. Floating Docks, Inc. v. Auto–Owners Ins. Co., 82 So.3d 73, 78 (Fla.2012). Generally, the Legislature is empowered to enact substantive law while this Court has the authority to enact procedural law. Massey v. David, 979 So.2d 931, 936 (Fla.2008); see also Allen, 756 So.2d at 59. Accordingly, a statute which creates or modifies a procedural rule of this Court violates article II, section 3, of the Florida Constitution, which prohibits one branch of government from exercising any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly permitted by the constitution. See State v. Raymond, 906 So.2d 1045, 1048 (Fla.2005). Because the distinction between substantive laws and procedural rules is not always clear, this Court has provided the following...

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