Wilson v. Layne
| Decision Date | 08 April 1998 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 96-1185,96-1188,s. 96-1185 |
| Citation | 141 F.3d 111,1998 WL 159673 |
| Parties | 26 Media L. Rep. 1545 Charles H. WILSON; Geraldine E. Wilson; Raquel Wilson, next friend/mother of Valencia Snowden, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Harry LAYNE, Deputy, United States Marshal, Supervisor for the Washington Area, Operation Gunsmoke; Joseph L. Perkins; James A. Olivo, Defendants-Appellants, and Raymond M. Kight, Sheriff, Montgomery County, Maryland; John Doe, Unknown Sheriff's Deputies; John Doe, Unknown U.S. Marshals; United States of America; Eric E. Runion; Mark A. Collins; Brian E. Roynestad, Defendants. Charles H. WILSON; Geraldine E. Wilson; Raquel Wilson, next friend/mother of Valencia Snowden, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Mark A. COLLINS; Eric E. Runion; Brian E. Roynestad, Defendants-Appellants, and Raymond M. Kight, Sheriff, Montgomery County, Maryland; John Doe, Unknown Sheriff's Deputies; Harry Layne, Deputy, United States Marshal, Supervisor for the Washington Area, Operation Gunsmoke; John Doe, Unknown U.S. Marshals; United States of America; Joseph L. Perkins; James A. Olivo, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: Richard Adams Cordray, Grove City, OH, for Appellants. Richard Alan Seligman, Washington, DC, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Stuart M. Nathan, John B. Howard, Jr., Office of the Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, MD, for Appellants. David H. Coburn, James S. Felt, Steptoe & Johnson, L.L.P., Washington, DC; Arthur B. Spitzer, American Civil Liberties Union of the National Capital Area, Washington, DC, for Appellees.
Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, ERVIN, WILKINS, NIEMEYER, HAMILTON, LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Reversed by published opinion. Judge WILKINS wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Judge WILKINSON and Judges NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS joined. Judge WIDENER wrote a concurring opinion. Judge MURNAGHAN wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Judges ERVIN, HAMILTON, MICHAEL, and MOTZ joined.
Charles H. Wilson and Geraldine E. Wilson (the Wilsons) 1 brought this action against federal and state law enforcement officers and others not pertinent to this appeal. The Wilsons allege that their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when officers entered their home and sought to execute an arrest warrant for their son. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1994); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). The district court granted summary judgment in part in favor of the officers, but refused to do so on the Wilsons' claim that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by permitting two newspaper reporters to accompany them into the Wilsons' home and photograph the officers' attempt to execute the arrest warrant. The officers appeal from the decision of the district court denying them qualified immunity with respect to this claim. We reverse. 2
The material facts are not disputed. On April 14, 1992, federal and state law enforcement agents were engaged in a joint effort to apprehend fugitives with a history of armed, violent, criminal conduct. A team composed of Joseph L. Perkins and James A. Olivo of the United States Marshals Service and Mark A. Collins, Brian E. Roynestad, and Eric E. Runion of the Montgomery County, Maryland Sheriff's Department was formed to execute an outstanding arrest warrant. The warrant stated:
THE STATE OF MARYLAND, TO ANY DULY AUTHORIZED PEACE OFFICER, GREETINGS: YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED TO TAKE DOMINIC JEROME WILSON IF HE/SHE BE FOUND IN YOUR BAILIWICK....
J.A. 124. In addition, two newspaper reporters, one outfitted with a stillshot camera, were to accompany the officers to observe and chronicle the execution of the warrant. 3 The reporters' participation was part of a two-week, news-gathering activity by the newspaper.
During the early morning hours, the officers proceeded to the address listed in police reports, as well as probation and court records, as the fugitive's home. Upon entering the residence, the officers encountered a man dressed only in undergarments who was very angry because of the intrusion. The confrontation between the man and the officers ultimately resulted in the officers subduing the man on the floor. In the meantime, a woman dressed in a sheer nightgown emerged from the back of the house. These two individuals were later identified as the Wilsons. The subject of the warrant, the Wilsons' son, was not present. Throughout these events, the reporters observed and photographed what transpired. 4
The Wilsons subsequently brought this action against the federal and state officers who comprised the arrest team that entered their home; the team's supervisor, Harry Layne; and others not pertinent to this appeal. The Wilsons asserted that their constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the officers' actions in three ways: (1) the officers used excessive force in attempting to execute the arrest warrant; (2) the officers lacked probable cause to believe that the fugitive would be found at the Wilsons' home; and (3) the officers permitted representatives of the media to enter the Wilsons' home to observe and photograph the execution of the arrest warrant. Ruling on the officers' motion for summary judgment, the district court dismissed the allegations of excessive force and lack of probable cause, concluding that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the Wilsons demonstrated that the amount of force the officers employed was reasonable and that the officers possessed probable cause to believe that the fugitive they sought would be found at the Wilsons' home. However, the district court rejected the officers' assertions that allowing the reporters to enter the Wilsons' home without their consent did not violate their constitutional rights. Furthermore, the district court refused to accept the officers' alternative argument that, at a minimum, they were entitled to qualified immunity because in April 1992, the law was not clearly established that permitting members of the media to accompany law enforcement officers into a private residence during the execution of an arrest warrant was unconstitutional. The officers appeal this latter ruling. 5
Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for civil damages to the extent that "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." E.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525, 530 (4th Cir.1997) (en banc). Qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). It protects law enforcement officers from "bad guesses in gray areas" and ensures that they are liable only "for transgressing bright lines." Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir.1992). Thus, although the exact conduct at issue need not have been held to be unlawful in order for the law governing an officer's actions to be clearly established, the existing authority must be such that the unlawfulness of the conduct is manifest. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th Cir.1992) (). The law is clearly established such that an officer's conduct transgresses a bright line when the law has "been authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court, the appropriate United States Court of Appeals, or the highest court of the state." Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d 1157, 1161 (4th Cir.1980); see Cullinan v. Abramson, 128 F.3d 301, 311 (6th Cir.1997) (), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1560, 140 L.Ed.2d 792 (1998); Jenkins ex rel. Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 826 n. 4 (11th Cir.1997) (en banc) (), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 412, 139 L.Ed.2d 315 (1997).
In analyzing an appeal from the rejection of a qualified immunity defense, our first task is to identify the specific right that the plaintiff asserts was infringed by the challenged conduct. See Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429, 433 (4th Cir.1996). The court then must consider whether, at the time of the claimed violation, that right was clearly established and " 'whether a reasonable person in the official's position would have known that his conduct would violate that right.' " Id. (quoting Gordon v. Kidd, 971 F.2d 1087, 1093 (4th Cir.1992)). Our review of the denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is de novo. See Pritchett, 973 F.2d at 313.
The constitutional right that the Wilsons claim the officers violated, defined at the appropriate level of specificity, is their Fourth Amendment right to avoid unreasonable searches or seizures resulting from the officers' decision to permit...
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