Dailey v. Vought Aircraft Co., 96-11180

• Citation: 141 F.3d 224
• Decision Date: 12 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-11180,96-11180
• Parties: Ollie DAILEY, Plaintiff, Noemi Alessandra Collie, Appellant, v. VOUGHT AIRCRAFT COMPANY, Defendant. Ollie Dailey, Plaintiff, Noemi Alessandra Collie, Appellant, v. International Union, United Aerospace Workers, Local 848, Defendant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Page 224

141 F.3d 224

Ollie DAILEY, Plaintiff, Noemi Alessandra Collie, Appellant, v. VOUGHT AIRCRAFT COMPANY, Defendant.

Ollie Dailey, Plaintiff, Noemi Alessandra Collie, Appellant, v. International Union, United Aerospace Workers, Local 848, Defendant.

No. 96-11180.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

May 12, 1998.

Frank P. Hernandez, Dallas, TX, for Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before JOLLY, SMITH and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

DENNIS, Circuit Judge:

Noemi Alessandra Collie, an attorney-at-law, appeals from an order by the district court disbarring her from practice in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas until the payment of monetary sanctions imposed upon her and her client for violations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Subsequent to filing this appeal, Collie paid the sanctions and was reinstated to practice by the district court. We reverse and vacate the district court's disbarment order. This appeal is not moot because the disbarment on the attorney's record may affect her status as a member of the bar and have other collateral consequences. Because the attorney was not given notice of the charges made or opportunity for explanation and defense prior to disbarment, she was deprived of procedural due process required by the United States Constitution and the district court's own local rules.

I.

Appellant attorney Noemi Collie filed three separate lawsuits on behalf of plaintiff Ollie Dailey against Dailey's employer, Vought Aircraft Company (Vought). The first lawsuit concerned claims of race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII. After a bench trial, the district court rejected Dailey's claims and entered final judgment for Vought. On motion by Vought, after considering written responses of the parties, the district court found that Collie and Dailey violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(1) and (b)(3) by repetitiously asserting essentially the same claims in two other lawsuits. The district court imposed sanctions by ordering Collie and Dailey to pay the costs and attorney's fees Vought incurred in defending the actions. Dailey appealed the sanctions order. This Court affirmed. See Dailey v. LTV Aerospace & Defense Co., Nos. 95-10156 & 95-10437 (5th Cir.1996).

Subsequently, on June 18, 1996, the district court ordered Collie and Dailey to pay the imposed sanctions of $8,478.92 within eleven days. After the sanctions were not paid timely, the district court, on July 18, 1996, disbarred Collie pending their payment, without giving Collie notice or an opportunity to be heard with respect to her disbarment. Collie moved the district court for reconsideration and petitioned the chief judge of the district for relief under local rules. The district court denied reconsideration but amended its order to allow Collie to continue representing clients in five particular cases. The chief judge denied Collie's appeal.

Collie appealed to this court from the decisions of the district court and the chief judge of the district on September 19, 1996. The next day Collie moved this court to stay the district court orders. This court denied the stay. Collie paid the monetary sanctions on September 23, 1996. The district court, after receiving notice of the payment, issued an order reinstating Collie to practice in the Northern District of Texas on October 7, 1996.

II.

Because Collie paid the monetary sanctions in full and was reinstated to practice before the Northern District of Texas, we consider first whether her appeal is moot. Matter of Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 805 F.2d 1175, 1180-81 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005, 107 S.Ct. 3228, 97 L.Ed.2d 734 (1987). The grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts found in Article III of the United States Constitution extends only to actual "cases" and "controversies". U.S. Const., art. III, sect. 2; Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 1253, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990). These terms serve to limit the federal judicial power in two ways. 15 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 101.01, 101-14 (3d ed.1997). First, federal courts may only address questions presented in an adversary context and in a form amenable to resolution through the judicial process. Id. Second, the judiciary's role is constrained to the extent necessary to prevent intrusion upon areas which are more appropriately handled by the other two branches of the federal government. Id. The term justiciability serves to give expression to this dual limitation imposed upon the federal courts by the case or controversy requirement. Id.

The justiciability of an issue, in turn, is determined by the doctrines of standing, mootness, and ripeness. Id. § 101.01, 101-13. The Supreme Court has explained that "mootness [is] the 'doctrine of standing set in a timeframe [.] The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).' " United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1209, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980) (citation omitted); see also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, ----, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 1068, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997); Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477-78, 110 S.Ct. at 1253-54. Under this doctrine, although a justiciable controversy may have existed at the time litigation was commenced, the action must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction if the controversy ceases to exist at some point in the litigation. Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 149-51, 116 S.Ct. 2066, 2067, 135 L.Ed.2d 453 (1996) (per curiam); Church of Scientology of California v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12, 113 S.Ct. 447, 449-50, 121 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992); 15 MOORE ET AL., § 101.90, 101-165. Furthermore, a federal court is obligated to raise the issue, sua sponte, if the facts suggest mootness notwithstanding the silence of the parties with respect to the issue. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 245, 92 S.Ct. 402, 403-04, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971); MOORE ET AL., § 101.92, 101-168.

A case may become moot for several reasons. One such reason can be an intervening factual event which causes the plaintiff to no longer have a present right to be vindicated or a stake or interest in the outcome. Calderon, 518 U.S. at 149-51, 116 S.Ct. at 2067; MOORE ET AL., § 101.92, 101-169. An intervening event, however, will only render a plaintiff's action moot if the plaintiff is divested of all personal interest in the result or the effect of the alleged violation is completely eradicated and the event will not occur again. MOORE ET AL., § 101.93, 101-170. The availability of even partial relief is enough to prevent mootness. Id.; Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 12-14, 113 S.Ct. at 450; 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.2 (2d ed.1984).

Even if the plaintiff's primary injury has been resolved, the collateral consequences doctrine serves to prevent mootness when the violation in question may cause continuing harm and the court is capable of preventing such harm. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53-59, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1897-1901, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, TREATISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.13 (2d ed.1992); M OORE ET AL., § 101.99, 101-190. As long as the parties maintain a "concrete interest in the outcome" and effective relief is available to remedy the effect of the violation, the size of the dispute is irrelevant. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 571, 104 S.Ct. 2576, 2584, 81 L.Ed.2d 483 (1984). Although the collateral consequences doctrine is most often used to enable review of expired criminal sentences, it frequently has been applied in the civil context. WRIGHT ET AL., § 3533.3; MOORE ET AL., § 101.00, 101-190.

In Connell v. Shoemaker, 555 F.2d 483, 486-487 (5th Cir.1977), the Commanding Officer at Fort Hood prohibited military personnel from renting residential property owned or managed by the appellants, the Connells, for 180 days in response to allegations that appellant Ted Connell had discriminated against black military personnel in renting apartments. The appellants filed suit in December 1974 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the 180 day prohibition. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the appellee on the ground of mootness as the appellee had lifted the prohibition after the 180 day time period had expired and Ted Connell had given his assurance that there would be no future acts of discrimination.

This Court reversed because the "continuing practical consequences of the Army's determination of discrimination [were] sufficient to negate mootness." Id. at 486. Specifically, the "imputation of bigotry implicit in the Army's widely publicized sanctions" could only harm the appellants' reputations and concomitantly their livelihoods as the success of the businesses in which the appellants held interests depended on the maintenance of a favorable public image. Id. at 487. The moral stigma of the sanction imposed by the appellee harmed the aspirations of Ted Connell as a local politician. Id.

This Court applied the collateral consequences doctrine to defeat a claim of mootness in Umanzor v. Lambert, 782 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir.1986). Umanzor, a citizen of El Salvador, was deported from the United States on October 14, 1983. Before his deportation, Umanzor had applied for political asylum; his request was denied. This Court relied on the collateral consequences doctrine in rejecting the argument that Umanzor's release from the custody of the airline transporting him to Central America mooted the appeal of his habeas corpus claim. Specifically, we noted that aliens who have been arrested and deported are ineligible for visas for purposes of readmission into the United States for five years and are guilty of a felony if...