People ex rel. Thurber-Whyland Co. v. Barker
| Decision Date | 23 January 1894 |
| Parties | PEOPLE ex rel. THURBER-WHYLAND CO. v. BARKER et al., Commissioners of Taxes. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from supreme court, general term, first department.
Certiorari, on relation of the Thurber-Whyland Company, to Edward P. Barker and others, commissioners of taxes and assessments of the city of New York, to review an assessment. From a judgment of the general term (25 N. Y. Supp. 394) affirming the special term order dismissing the writ, relator appeals. Affirmed.
L. C. Waehner, for appellant.
William H. Clark, Corp. Counsel, (D. J. Dean and George S. Coleman, of counsel,) for respondents.
The relator complains of the amount of its assessment for purposes of taxation, because, as is alleged, its indebtedness was not deducted therefrom by defendants. It is a foreign corporation, having, according to the affidavit made by its president, a principal office at 76 Montgomery street, Jersey City, N. J., in which state it was organized under the laws thereof. Its office in New York is stated to be at 116 Reade street. It also appeared by the affidavit that the company was organized with a nominal capital of $3,000,000, of which $2,500,000 had been issued, $100,000 for cash, and the rest for property consisting of merchandise, trade-marks, good will, etc. On January 11, 1892, it owned merchandise within the state, exclusive of imported goods in original packages, of $500,000 in amount. It also had accounts and bills receivable owing to it within the state of New York of about $200,000, cash in bank about $20,000, and other personal property in the state of about $50,000, or a total of $750,000. It owed on the day above named, in New York city, open accounts of about $150,000, and bills payable $1,068,904.42, or a total indebtedness of $1,218,904.42. It was further stated in the affidavit that the balance of the capital was employed outside the city of New York, principally in the form of accounts receivable, amounting to about $1,400,000. The tax commissioners assessed the personal property of the relator at the sum of $500,000, after hearing the relator and considering its demands; and they decided that sum to be just, and the amount for which the personal estate of the relator was lawfully assessable for the year. The relator claimed that the indebtedness above set out should be deducted from the sum of $750,000, which it stated was the utmost amount of its property that could under any circumstances be regarded as invested in any manner in business in this state, and that, if such deduction were allowed, there was no sum remaining upon which to make any assessment. Objection was made by it to the addition of any part of the above-named sum of $1,400,000 to the sum of $750,000, because, as it alleged, the former sum was employed outside the city of New York, and was principally in the form of accounts receivable. The claim was that, as to such accounts, they had no situs in and of themselves, and were mere choses in action, and took in law the situs of their owner, and that situs was its domicile in New Jersey. It was, therefore, urged that no part of such sum could be regarded as invested in any manner in the business of the relator in the city of New York.
Prior to 1855, great numbers of persons doing business in this state, and having large amounts of moneys invested within its borders, nevertheless chose to reside just outside its confines. Although these persons were nonresidents of the state, yet they came daily within its boundaries for the purpose of doing business here, and had here large amounts of capital invested in their business; and yet, under our laws, they could not be reached for taxation. Their names could not be put upon an assessment roll, because they did not reside in any town or ward where an assessment could be made; and they had no agents or trustees who resided in the state, against whom any assessment on account of such property could be made. To reach the nonresident for the purpose of subjectingsuch property to taxation was the...
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... ... It also claims that the assessment of 1894 was void because of the refusal of the defendants to make any deduction whatever for any indebtedness. The reason for the difference in the two assessments is based by the defendants upon the decision of this court in People ex rel. Thurber-Whyland Co. v. Barker, reported in 141 N. Y. 118, 35 N. E. 1073. That case was decided here subsequent to the assessment of [147 N.Y. 35]1893 and prior to that of 1894. The defendants were of opinion that the decision in question covered this case, and obliged them to assess the relator without making any ... ...
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