141 N.E.2d 294 (Ohio 1957), 34858, Katz v. Department of Liquor Control of Ohio

Docket Nº34858.
Citation141 N.E.2d 294, 166 Ohio St. 229
Opinion JudgeHERBERT, J.
Party NameKATZ et al., d/b/a Century Grill, Appellees, v. DEPARTMENT OF LIQUOR CONTROL OF OHIO, Appellant.
AttorneySanford D. Katz and Max Arnovitz, doing business as Century Grill, hereinafter referred to as appellees, appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County from an order of the Board of Liquor Control revoking their D-1, D-2, D-3 and D-3a permits. That court reversed the order of the Board ...
Judge PanelZIMMERMAN, STEWART, BELL, TAFT and MATTHIAS, JJ., concur.
Case DateMarch 20, 1957
CourtSupreme Court of Ohio

Page 294

141 N.E.2d 294 (Ohio 1957)

166 Ohio St. 229

KATZ et al., d/b/a Century Grill, Appellees,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF LIQUOR CONTROL OF OHIO, Appellant.

No. 34858.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

March 20, 1957

Syllabus by the Court.

Under the provisions of Section 119.12, Revised Code, as amended in 1953, 125 Ohio Laws 488, an administrative agency may appeal from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, rendered on appeal from a decision of such agency, only upon questions of law relating to the constitutionality, construction or interpretation of statutes and rules and regulations of the agency, but when such appeal is perfected the reviewing court has jurisdiction to review and determine the correctness of the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas that the order of the agency is not supported by any reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the entire record

Sanford D. Katz and Max Arnovitz, doing business as Century Grill, hereinafter referred to as appellees, appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County from an order of the Board of Liquor Control revoking their D-1, D-2, D-3 and D-3a permits. That court reversed the order of the Board of Liquor Control, finding

Page 295

that 'there is no evidence to show that the appellants conducted a game of chance on the permit premises; that there is insufficient evidence to show that appellants had knowledge that someone else was conducting a game of chance on the permit premises; that the order of the Board of Liquor Control is not supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the entire record and is not in accordance with law.'

The Department of Liquor Control, hereinafter referred to as appellant, appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. Appellees filed a motion in the Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal, claiming that the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal by an administrative agency pursuant to Section 119.12, Revised Code, where the only question presented is one of fact. A majority [166 Ohio St. 230] of the Court of Appeals sustained appellees' motion, and the appeal was accordingly dismissed.

The allowance of a motion to certify the record brings the cause to this court for review.

C. William O'Neill and William Saxbe, Attys. Gen., and S. Noel Melvin, Columbus, for appellant.

Isadore Topper and Joel Krupman, Cleveland, for appellees.

HERBERT, Judge.

The decision in this case hinges entirely on the construction of the provisions of Section 119.12, Revised Code, which were amended following the decision of this court in Corn v. Board of Liquor Control, 1953, 160 Ohio St. 9, 113 N.E.2d 360. That case held that an administrative agency did not have the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals from an adverse judgment rendered by the Court of Common Pleas under Section 154-73, General Code, Section 119.12, Revised Code, as it was then in effect. The...

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51 practice notes
  • 339 N.E.2d 820 (Ohio 1975), 75-497, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Kosydar
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio
    • December 31, 1975
    ...of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent. See, e. g., Katz v. Department of Liquor [44 Ohio St.2d 216] Control (1957), 166 Ohio St. 229, 141 N.E.2d 294. If that inquiry reveals that the statute coveys a meaning which is clear, unequivocal and definite, at that point the int......
  • 358 N.E.2d 1090 (Ohio 1976), 76-311, State v. Herbert
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio
    • December 30, 1976
    ...look to the language of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent. See, e. g., Katz v. Department of Liquor Control (1957), 166 Ohio St. 229, 141 N.E.2d 294. If that inquiry reveals that the statute conveys a meaning which is clear, unequivocal and definite, at that point the i......
  • 673 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 1996), 69470, In re Senders
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals of Ohio
    • April 1, 1996
    ...101, 106 [65 O.O.2d 296, 298-299, 304 N.E.2d 378, 381-382]; Katz v. Dept. of Liquor Control (1957), 166 Ohio St. , 231 [2 O.O.2d 54, 55, 141 N.E.2d 294, 295-296]. Words are not absolutes, however. Because their meanings may vary according to context, custom and usage (American Oil Co. v. St......
  • 706 N.E.2d 363 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 1997), 71811, Waddell v. LTV Steel Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals of Ohio
    • December 3, 1997
    ...Kendall, supra, 20 Ohio St.3d at 63-64, 20 OBR at 362, 485 N.E.2d at 1050, quoting Katz v. Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control (1957), 166 Ohio St. 229, 231, 2 O.O.2d 54, 55, 141 N.E.2d 294, 295-296.ct. "Legislative intent is determined primarily from the language of the statute itself. 'Wher......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
51 cases
  • 339 N.E.2d 820 (Ohio 1975), 75-497, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Kosydar
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio
    • December 31, 1975
    ...of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent. See, e. g., Katz v. Department of Liquor [44 Ohio St.2d 216] Control (1957), 166 Ohio St. 229, 141 N.E.2d 294. If that inquiry reveals that the statute coveys a meaning which is clear, unequivocal and definite, at that point the int......
  • 358 N.E.2d 1090 (Ohio 1976), 76-311, State v. Herbert
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio
    • December 30, 1976
    ...look to the language of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent. See, e. g., Katz v. Department of Liquor Control (1957), 166 Ohio St. 229, 141 N.E.2d 294. If that inquiry reveals that the statute conveys a meaning which is clear, unequivocal and definite, at that point the i......
  • 673 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 1996), 69470, In re Senders
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals of Ohio
    • April 1, 1996
    ...101, 106 [65 O.O.2d 296, 298-299, 304 N.E.2d 378, 381-382]; Katz v. Dept. of Liquor Control (1957), 166 Ohio St. , 231 [2 O.O.2d 54, 55, 141 N.E.2d 294, 295-296]. Words are not absolutes, however. Because their meanings may vary according to context, custom and usage (American Oil Co. v. St......
  • 706 N.E.2d 363 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 1997), 71811, Waddell v. LTV Steel Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals of Ohio
    • December 3, 1997
    ...Kendall, supra, 20 Ohio St.3d at 63-64, 20 OBR at 362, 485 N.E.2d at 1050, quoting Katz v. Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control (1957), 166 Ohio St. 229, 231, 2 O.O.2d 54, 55, 141 N.E.2d 294, 295-296.ct. "Legislative intent is determined primarily from the language of the statute itself. 'Wher......
  • Request a trial to view additional results