Vernon Cnty. Bar Ass'n v. McKibbin

• Decision Date: 29 April 1913
• Citation: 141 N.W. 283,153 Wis. 350
• Parties: VERNON COUNTY BAR ASS'N v. MCKIBBIN.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

153 Wis. 350

141 N.W. 283

VERNON COUNTY BAR ASS'N

v.MCKIBBIN.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

April 29, 1913.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Vernon County; E. C. Higbee, Judge.

Special proceeding by the Vernon County Bar Association against George W. McKibbin to recall a license issued to the latter to practice law. From a judgment dismissing the petition, the Bar Association appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

The Bar Association of Vernon County petitioned for an order to show cause why the license, which was granted some two years before by the circuit court of La Crosse county, should not be revoked because such license was granted upon proof, only, that Mr. McKibbin had practiced law for two years in West Virginia, under a license duly issued to do so, but not by its highest court. The order was granted. Mr. McKibbin answered, alleging that, prior to the admission in La Crosse county, he was duly licensed to practice law in West Virginia and practiced therein from November 13, 1907, to April 27, 1910, supporting that by a certificate showing admission to the bar of the circuit court for Randolph county, W. Va. He further answered that, in due course, he graduated from the law department of U. S. Grant University in the state of Tennessee, and, thereafter, was duly admitted to the bar by the Supreme Court of that state and, subsequently, had two years practice in the state of West Virginia, and that the admission in La Crosse county was granted upon the circuit judge being satisfied by proofs of such facts.

The facts stated being conceded, the court held that the practice in West Virginia as a member of the bar of a circuit court to which he was admitted on proof of his having graduated at the law school in Tennessee and been admitted to practice law by the Supreme Court of that state, substantially, though not technically, satisfied the statute here as to competency for admission to the bar. Moreover, that the petitioner was without capacity to question respondent's right to enjoy his license, and that the court's jurisdiction to recall it lapsed with the term at which it is granted. Basing the result thereon the petition was dismissed.C. W. Graves and H. P. Proctor, both of Viroqua, for appellant.

W. F. & A. C. Wolfe, of La Crosse, for respondent.

MARSHALL, J.

A few general principles which need but to be stated to be recognized as sound and be appreciated, will disclose whether the learned circuit court decided rightly.

[1] An attorney is an officer of the court and, in a sense, of the state. The position is one of much dignity and responsibility. It is very important to the people and the court that the standard of admission to the place and retention thereof should be as high as practicable in law, and maintained as high as practicable in fact. Much power in that regard is vested in the court by the Constitution, incidental to its possession of judicial power and its duty to enforce, through careful administration, legislative tests of eligibility.

It has been aptly said by this court, that a bar is as essential, almost, as the bench, and a good bar is essential to a good bench and a good bench to a good bar. Matter of Goodell, 3 Wis. 232, 20 Am. Rep. 42. To that end it is recognized, in general, that the position of attorney is “subject to strict oversight and summary power of the court,”--Matter of Mosness, 39 Wis. 509, 20 Am. Rep. 55,--within the limits of reasonable legislative regulation, and that of judicial discretion where there is no written law on the subject. While using due caution to avoid doing injustice to any one who holds, even de facto, the position of member of the bar, the court should firmly perform its high judicial duty to protect itself, its bar and the public from the danger of any one holding the high and honorable position of attorney at law who is not legally as well as morally qualified therefor. To that end the court has ample power, which may be exercised quite summarily, the boundaries of due process of law not being transcended, as the decisions of this court referred to, bear witness. They are in harmony with the general trend of authority. Petition of Splane, 123 Pa. 527, 16 Atl. 481;In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646, 50 L. R. A. 519;People ex rel. Blackmer, etc., v. Campbell, 26 Colo. 481, 58 Pac. 591; In the Matter of the Application of Henry W. Cooper, 22 N. Y. 67; In the Matter of Application of Reginald Branch, 70 N. J. Law, 537, 57 Atl. 431; Weeks, Attorneys at Law, § 80; 4 Cyc. 900.

[2] From the very nature of the judicial duty mentioned no particular method is necessary to its activity. The court can act upon its own motion as to whether the name of a member of its bar should be stricken from the roll or on an application of any member of such bar, or even a private person. Whenever a state of facts shall have come properly to its attention, requiring exercise of the power, it may and ought to act in the matter, making its own rules for the case where there is no written regulation on the subject, being careful to accord to the subject due process of law.

[3] True, the court has some discretion...