Town of Gilbert v. Maricopa County, 1 CA-CV 06-0309.

• Citation: 141 P.3d 416,213 Ariz. 241
• Decision Date: 15 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 06-0309.,1 CA-CV 06-0309.
• Parties: The TOWN OF GILBERT, a municipal corporation; Howard Dendurent, Linda Abbott, Susan Brechbill, residents of the Town of Gilbert, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. MARICOPA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona; Donna Davis, Marci Sale, Tony Hyland, as members of Islands Against Annexation and representing the interest of others similarly situated, Defendants/Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona

141 P.3d 416

213 Ariz. 241

The TOWN OF GILBERT, a municipal corporation; Howard Dendurent, Linda Abbott, Susan Brechbill, residents of the Town of Gilbert, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. MARICOPA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona; Donna Davis, Marci Sale, Tony Hyland, as members of Islands Against Annexation and representing the interest of others similarly situated, Defendants/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 06-0309.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B.

August 15, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Perkins Coie Brown & Bain, P.A. By Paul F. Eckstein, Jessica L. Everett-Garcia, Lauren J. Lowe, Phoenix, Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees.

Andrew P. Thomas, Maricopa County Attorney By Bruce P. White, Deputy County Attorney, Kevin S. Costello, Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, Meagher & Geer, P.L.L.P. By Gary L. Lassen, Thomas H. Crouch, Aaron S. Peterson, Scottsdale, Ryan Rapp & Underwood, P.L.C. By Ian A. Macpherson, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellant Maricopa County.

Shughart Thomson & Kilroy, P.C. By Thomas K. Irvine, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellants Davis, Sale and Hyland.

League of Arizona Cities and Towns By David R. Merkel, General Counsel, Tempe, Attorney for Amici Curiae.

OPINION

PORTLEY, Judge.

¶ 1 Maricopa County, Donna Davis, Marci Sale, and Tony Hyland (collectively "Appellants") appeal the trial court's finding that House Bill 2145 ("HB 2145" or "the legislation") is unconstitutional. They request that we reverse the trial court's decision and declare the legislation constitutionally valid. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 The underlying facts of the case are undisputed. Rural Metro is a private company that provides fire and emergency response services. It advised the county island¹ residents within the Town of Gilbert ("Gilbert") that it would be discontinuing its services.² In response, the Arizona Legislature enacted HB 2145³ with an emergency provision, which was signed into law on February 13, 2006. See H.B. 2145, 47th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess., § 7 (Ariz.2006).

¶ 3 The legislation creates the process for county island residents to create a county island fire district to obtain fire and emergency services. 2006 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 2, §§ 2-4. It authorizes residents in a county island, which falls within the legislation's population-based classifications,⁴ to petition to create a fire district, and authorizes the board of supervisors to create the fire district and appoint the initial members to the district. Id. Finally, the legislation directs for the provision of fire and emergency services, and how the district can attempt to secure a company to provide those services. Id. at §§ 2, 4.

¶ 4 After county island residents within Gilbert filed their petition to create a county island fire district, Gilbert and several residents (collectively "Appellees") filed a complaint requesting injunctive relief and a declaration that HB 2145 was an unconstitutional special law.⁵

¶ 5 The trial court, after a show cause hearing, ruled that the legislation violated Article 4, Part 2, Section 19 of the Arizona Constitution,⁶ and granted injunctive relief. Appellants filed a notice of appeal, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003), 12-2101(B) (2003).

DISCUSSION

¶ 6 Appellants contend that HB 2145 does not violate the Arizona Constitution or, alternatively, that it is a constitutional special law. They also challenge the Appellees' standing to bring the suit, and question the ripeness of the case. We address the issues of standing and ripeness first because they are threshold issues.

I.

¶ 7 Appellants argue that the case is not ripe and the Appellees lack standing because Gilbert is not now obligated to provide fire protection and emergency medical services to the county island residents.⁷ We disagree.

¶ 8 Although the Arizona Constitution does not mandate "an actual `case or controversy' in order to establish standing," Bennett v. Brownlow, 211 Ariz. 193, 195, ¶ 14, 119 P.3d 460, 462 (2005), "as a matter of sound judicial policy, . . . persons seeking redress in the courts [must] first . . . establish standing, especially in actions in which constitutional relief is sought against the government," Bennett v. Napolitano, 206 Ariz. 520, 524, ¶ 16, 81 P.3d 311, 315 (2003). Standing is established with the showing of a personal, palpable injury. See Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65, 69-70, ¶¶ 16-17, 961 P.2d 1013, 1017-18 (1998) (denying the Searses standing because they "alleged only generalized harm rather than any distinct and palpable injury"). Moreover, "[a]ny person⁸ . . . whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder." A.R.S. § 12-1832 (2003). Ripeness is analogous to standing because the "doctrine prevents a court from rendering a premature judgment or opinion on a situation that may never occur." Winkle v. City of Tucson, 190 Ariz. 413, 415, 949 P.2d 502, 504 (1997).

¶ 9 After HB 2145 was enacted, county island residents filed their petition with the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors to form a county island fire district. The Board of Supervisors created the Gilbert County Island Fire District and appointed members to the initial district board on May 1, 2006. The creation of the county island fire district statutorily requires Gilbert to provide fire protection and emergency medical services to the county island residents. See 2006 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 2, § 2 (amending A.R.S. § 48-261(H)) ("On formation of the [county island fire] district, the surrounding city or town shall provide fire protection services and emergency medical services to the district."). Therefore, the matter is ripe for adjudication.

¶ 10 Appellants argue that Gilbert is not required to provide fire protection and emergency medical services unless and until the district cannot secure a private company to provide the services. They, however, only focus on A.R.S. § 48-805(E)(3), disregarding A.R.S. § 48-261(H). The statutes should be read in conjunction with one another, giving meaning to both. See Johnson v. Mohave County, 206 Ariz. 330, 333, ¶ 11, 78 P.3d 1051, 1054 (App.2003) ("[C]ourts construe seemingly conflicting statutes in harmony when possible. . . . [G]iving effect to all statutes involved." (citation omitted)). When the rules of statutory construction are followed, it is clear that Gilbert is statutorily required to provide the services once the district is formed, and not only if the fire district cannot secure a private provider. Moreover, if the fire district cannot secure a private provider, Gilbert remains responsible for providing the services. See 2006 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 2, § 4 (amending A.R.S. § 48-805(E)) ("If there are no responsive and qualified bidders . . . or if the service provider withdraws . . . the fire protection and emergency medical services shall be provided by the adjacent city or town."). Consequently, Gilbert has standing to challenge the constitutionality of HB 2145.

II.

¶ 11 We next address whether the legislation is constitutional. We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. City of Tucson v. Pima County, 199 Ariz. 509, 515, ¶ 18, 19 P.3d 650, 656 (App.2001). Although, "[a] strong presumption in favor of a statute's constitutionality exists . . . . [we] will not refrain from declaring a legislative act an unconstitutional special or local law when the facts so require." Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, 166 Ariz. 143, 148, 800 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1990) (citations omitted). We will "accept the . . . findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, [however] we [will] draw our own legal conclusions." Burnette v. Bender, 184 Ariz. 301, 304, 908 P.2d 1086, 1089 (App.1995).

A. Does HB 2145 Violate the Arizona Constitution, Article 4, Part 2, Section 19?

¶ 12 House Bill 2145 states in pertinent part that:

For a county island fire district formed pursuant to § 48-261, subsection H, the following apply:

1. The district may be formed only in county islands that are located in an area that is within the 911 service provider district in which the largest city has a population of more than three hundred ninety-five thousand persons but less than five hundred thousand persons and that is located within the municipal planning area of a town with a population of one hundred thousand or more persons as designated in the land use map of the municipality's general plan. The district may only be formed if the district contains all of the county islands that are prescribed in this paragraph and after compliance with the petition requirements prescribed by § 48-261, subsection H.

2006 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 2, § 4 (amending A.R.S. § 48-805(E)).⁹

¶ 13 Appellants argue that the legislation does not violate our constitution, which states in pertinent part that "[n]o local or special laws shall be enacted . . . [w]hen a general law can be made applicable." Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 19(20). A special law "applies only to certain members of a class or to an arbitrarily defined class which is not rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose." State Comp. Fund v. Symington, 174 Ariz. 188, 192, 848 P.2d 273, 277 (1993) (quoting Ariz. Downs v. Ariz. Horsemen's Found., 130 Ariz. 550, 557, 637 P.2d 1053, 1060 (1981)).

¶ 14 A law is general, as opposed to special, if: "(1) the classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective, (2) the classification is legitimate, encompassing all members of the relevant class, and (3) the class is elastic, allowing members to move in and out of it." Long v. Napolitano, 203 Ariz. 247, 253, ¶ 14, 53 P.3d 172, 178 (App.2002). All three prongs of the test must be satisfied in order for the law to be...