Wages v. State, 6 Div. 252.

• Decision Date: 19 March 1932
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 252.
• Citation: 141 So. 707,225 Ala. 2
• Parties: WAGES v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

141 So. 707

225 Ala. 2

WAGES v. STATE.

6 Div. 252.

Supreme Court of Alabama

March 19, 1932

L. L Wages was convicted of violating the Barber's Commission Act, Gen. Acts 1931, p. 615, and he appealed to the Court of Appeals, which court under Code 1923, § 7322, certifies to the Supreme Court the question of the validity of such act.

Questions answered.

For opinion of Court of Appeals conforming to answers to certified questions, see 141 So. 709.

Certification to the Supreme Court.

To the Honorable Supreme Court of Alabama:

KNIGHT J.

In reply to your inquiry as to whether or not the act of the Legislature of Alabama, entitled "An Act to define regulate and license barbers and barber colleges, and other like businesses in counties of the State of Alabama having a population of three hundred thousand or over, according to the last or any subsequent Federal Census; to create a barbers' Commission for said counties; and to provide a penalty for the violation of the provisions hereof," is a local law within the meaning of section 110 of the Constitution, and therefore void under section 106, no notice of the intention to apply therefor having been given as required by the latter provision of the Constitution. And whether or not the above referred to act offends section 45 of the Constitution, in that the subject of the act is not "clearly expressed in its title," for the reason that the title "would restrict the operation of the Act to certain designated counties, while the 'body' of the Act would make it applicable to all counties of the State."

We will consider the questions in the order submitted.

In passing upon the validity of the act in question this court will, of course, indulge all presumptions and intendments in favor of its constitutionality, and will accord to the lawmaking body of the state government sincerity of purpose and fairness in dealing with the people of the state. And we will not assume that the population classification was arbitrarily fixed, but rather that their action, in the given instance, was fairly taken and had for the purpose of meeting conditions, that it honestly thought existed, or might exist in the larger and more populous counties of the state.

This court has long committed itself, in line with the holdings of other courts, to the proposition that population classification, made the basis for enactments, would be sustained in cases where there is a substantial difference in population, and the classification is made in good faith, reasonably related to the purpose to be effected and to the difference in population which forms the basis thereof, and not merely arbitrarily. Acts passed as general laws, based upon such population classification, and meeting the above test, are valid in that respect, although at the time of their enactment they can and do only apply to one county or city in the state. State v. Gullatt, 210 Ala. 452, 98 So. 373; Board of Revenue of Jefferson County et al. v. Huey, 195 Ala. 83, 70 So. 744; State ex rel. Gunter et al. v. Thompson et al., 193 Ala. 561, 69 So. 461; State ex rel. Mims v. Bugg et al., 196 Ala. 460, 71 So. 699.

There is nothing in the recent case of Henry, as Treas. v. Wilson (Ala. Sup.) 139 So. 259, at present term, which conflicts, in fact, with the above announcement.

In the Henry Case, supra, it was specifically pointed out that even after a county attains the necessary population, with the exception of Montgomery county, the act under consideration could not of its "own force and effect" apply thereto without the aid of future legislation. Not so under the act now before the court. Eo instanti, any county in the state, upon attaining a population of 300,000 or more, would come under the influence of the act.

In the case of Town of Longview v. Crawfordsville, 164 Ind. 117, 73 N.E. 78, 80, 68 L. R. A. 622, 3 Ann. Cas. 496, it is said: "The marks of distinction on which the classification is founded must be such, in the nature of things, as will, in some reasonable degree, at least, account for or justify the restriction." The wisdom of the law and the necessity for its enactment and the classification adopted were addressed to the lawmaking body. It may be well said, this body understood and appreciated the necessity of furnishing protection to the people in the matters legislated upon in the act, in the larger and more populous counties of the state, which was not necessary or practicable in the smaller counties.

We cannot, therefore, hold that there was no basis for the population classification resorted to in the present case, nor that this classification was not made in good faith, and was not reasonably related to the purpose to be effected, nor does it appear that the classification was arbitrarily fixed. The act, in our opinion, is a general law, and as such no notice of the intended application for its passage was required.

Is the subject of the act clearly expressed in its title, as is mandatorily required by section 45 of the Constitution?

The title limits the operation of the act to the counties in the state having a population of 300,000, or over, according to the last or any subsequent federal census.

It is suggested that the title of the act is more restricted than its "body." In other words, that the enacting clauses apply to all counties of the state, while its title restricts the act, in its effect and field of operation, to counties with population of 300,000, or more. The third section creates a...