Nulta v. Lochridge

Decision Date26 October 1891
Citation12 S.Ct. 11,35 L.Ed. 796,141 U.S. 327
PartiesMcNULTA v. LOCHRIDGE
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

This was a motion to dismiss a writ of error or affirm the judgment of the court below upon the following state of facts:

In July, 1887, Lochridge, the defendant in error, began two suits in the circuit court of Christian county, Ill., Against McNulta, the plaintiff in error, as receiver of the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company, to recover damages for the death of James and Mary E. Molohon, alleged to have been occasioned by the negligent management of an engine at a public crossing. At the time the cause of action arose Thomas M. Cooley was receiver of the road under an order made by the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Illinois in a suit to foreclose a mortgage upon the road. Judge Cooley having resigned his receivership, plaintiff in error, John McNulta, was appointed his successor, and was in possession of and operating the road at the time the suits were brought. Demurrers analogous to that of a corporation sole, overruled, and the suits were subsequently consolidated by agreement of parties, tried, and a verdict rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $6,000. This judgment was subsequently affirmed by the appellate court of the third district, (32 Ill. App. 86,) and again by the supreme court of the state, (27 N. E. Rep. 452.) Defendant thereupon sued out this writ, and assigned as error—First, that the supreme court erred in holding that, under the act of congress below cited, the plaintiff was entitled to maintain the action, when it appeared from the record that McNulta was not the receiver when the cause of action accrued; and, second, in holding that under said act McNulta could be sued as receiver with respect to any act or transaction which occurred before his appointment, without previous leave of the court of the United States by which he was appointed. Defendant in error thereupon moved to dismiss upon the ground that no federal question was involved.

G. L. Burnett, for plaintiff in error.

J. W. Patton, for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 328-329 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice BROWN, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

The substance of the first assignment of error is that under the act of March 3, 1887, plaintiff was not entitled to maintain a suit against McNulta, as receiver, for a cause of action which accrued when the road was in possession of and operated by a former receiver. This is clearly not a federal question, but a question of general law, viz., whether one person holding the office of receiver can be held responsible for the acts of his predecessor in the same office. The substance of the second assignment is that the supreme court of Illinois erred in holding that such suit could be maintained against the present receiver for the acts of his predecessor without the previous leave of the court appointing him.

1. Plaintiff in error relies in this connection upon the act of congress of March 3, 1887, (24 St. 552) determining the jurisdiction of the circuit courts, which provides, in section 3, that 'every receiver or manager of any property appointed by any court of the United States may be sued in respect of any act or transaction of his in carrying on the business connected with such property without the previous leave of the court in which such receiver or manager was appointed.' It is difficult to see what right can be claimed by the receiver under this act. The right he claims is immunity from suit without the prior leave of the court appointing him; but this is a right not given by the statute, but in obedience to a general and familiar principle of law recognized by this court in Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, and Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126. The right conferred by the statute to sue without the prior leave of the court is not given to the defendant, but to the plaintiff; and the only question which could properly arise under the act in this case is whether the receiver so sued could be held liable for the acts of a prior receiver. The act does not deprive any one of the right to sue where such right previously existed, but gives such right in certain cases; and it was for the court to say whether the plaintiff's cause of action fell within the statute, or whether the defendant was entitled to the exemption given him by the general law. Had the supreme court of Illinois decided that under this act the defendant could not be sued without the prior leave of the federal court, the plaintiff might doubtless have obtained a writ of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
171 cases
  • In re Commercial Financial Services, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Oklahoma
    • August 21, 2000
    ...at 379. The Vany court does not provide a citation to such "act of congress." However, the Supreme Court, in McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891), refers to the statute as "the act of congress of March 3, 1887, (24 St. 552)." Id. at 330, 12 S.Ct. 11. The stat......
  • In re Markos Gurnee Partnership
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • April 27, 1995
    ...as claims against the estate administered by the receiver, rather than claims against the receiver personally. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891), was another negligence suit against a railroad operated by a court appointed receiver. However, the receiver w......
  • Robinson v. Trustees of New York
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • April 5, 1945
    ...carrying on the business connected with such property without the previous leave of the court that appointed him. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796.Texas & Pacific R. v. Cox, 145 U.S. 593, 12 S.Ct. 905, 36 L.Ed. 829. This section applies to a trustee in bankruptc......
  • Phoenician Mediterranean Villa, LLC v. Lisa M. Swope, Esquire, Tr. of the Bankr. Estate of J&S Props., LLC (In re J&S Props., LLC)
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • September 28, 2017
    ...Cir. 1943) ; McRanie v. Palmer , 2 F.R.D. 479, 481 (D. Mass. 1942). This immunity was recognized long ago in McNulta v. Lochridge , 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891), when the Supreme Court held that equity receivers cannot be held personally liable in suits by third parties—th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Chapter Five Litigation in Chapter 15 Cases
    • United States
    • American Bankruptcy Institute Chapter 15 for Foreign Debtors
    • Invalid date
    ...doctrine but is instead reason for not applying § 959 exception to Barton doctrine).[369] Ch. 866, § 3, 25 stat. 433, 436 (1887).[370] 141 U.S. 327 (1891).[371] Id. at 332 ("Actions against the receiver are in law actions against the receivership or the funds in the hands of the receiver, a......
  • Bankruptcy & The Benefit Corporation.
    • United States
    • American Bankruptcy Law Journal Vol. 96 No. 1, January 2022
    • January 1, 2022
    ...respect to "acts or transactions in carrying on business connected with such property " Id. [section] 959(a); see McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327 (1891) (noting that [section] 959(a) creates official liability only and therefore does not open trustees to suit in state court). Some courts......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT