Meyers v. Gillis, 97-1750
| Decision Date | 27 April 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-1750,97-1750 |
| Citation | 142 F.3d 664 |
| Parties | Philip MEYERS, v. Frank D. GILLIS, Superintendent, et al.; The Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania; The District Attorney of Bucks County, Frank D. Gillis, Superintendent, The Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania and District Attorney of Bucks County, Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Troy E. Leitzel, Heather A. Castellino, Stephen B. Harris (Argued), Alan M. Rubenstein, Office of District Attorney, Doylestown, PA, for Appellant.
Christopher D. Warren (Argued), DeStafano & Warren, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, Thomas A. Bello, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellee.
Before: MANSMANN, ROTH and McKEE, Circuit Judges.
We are asked to decide if the district erred in granting Philip Meyers' petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court concluded that Meyers' trial attorneys rendered ineffective assistance when they gave Meyers incorrect advice as to his parole eligibility; that Meyers relied on that advice to his prejudice; and he was therefore entitled to habeas relief. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
On July 13, 1981, Philip Meyers killed Hugh Daily by striking him several times with a baseball bat. Meyers was subsequently charged with criminal homicide (first and second degree murder) and robbery. The robbery charge was dismissed following a preliminary hearing. Meyers was represented by two attorneys from the Bucks County Public Defender's Office. On October 21, 1981, following discussions with defense counsel, the Commonwealth withdrew the first degree murder charge and Meyers entered a plea of guilty to second degree murder in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas. At that time, Pennsylvania imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a conviction of second degree murder. Therefore, a defendant convicted of second degree murder could only be paroled if the governor, upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons, first commuted the life sentence to a term of imprisonment for a period of years. See Pa. CONST. art. 4, § 9. Dick Thornburgh was governor at the time of Meyers' plea, and he had a history of not commuting life sentences. After a sentencing hearing on November 9, 1981, Meyers was sentenced to the required period of life imprisonment.
On November 30, 1981, Meyers filed a motion to withdraw his plea nunc pro tunc and for appointment of new counsel. However, the sentencing court did not act on that motion for nearly seven years, and Meyers eventually filed a pro se petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act, 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 9541 et seq. ("PCHA"). The PCHA petition challenged the effectiveness of Meyers' trial counsel and the validity of his guilty plea.
The Court of Common Pleas conducted evidentiary hearings on the PCHA petition on May 26, 1989, and December 19, 1989. At the hearings, Meyers testified that his trial counsel had advised him that if he pled guilty to second degree murder he would get life imprisonment but would be "eligible for parole in seven years." App. at 32. He also testified that he had no idea that the plea subjected him to a mandatory life sentence without parole eligibility. Id. at 40. Meyers' testimony was corroborated by one of his trial attorneys. She testified:
I think [Meyers] clearly misunderstood discussions that we had concerning the amount of time that he was going to do. We did have discussions with him concerning the amount of time that we expected that he would do. And quite frankly we based that on our knowledge, at the time, of the amount of years that people were serving in a state institution on homicide cases, be they first degree or second degree prior to the time. The sentences were being commuted at that time by the Governor at the time. That's why I remember the statistics showed that people who were incarcerated on second degree murder were being paroled several years prior to the time or sentences being commuted.
On August 8, 1991, the Court of Common Pleas dismissed Meyers' petition for post-conviction relief. The state court ruled that Meyers' plea was valid. The judge found Meyers' testimony "not to be credible, to the extent that he indicated that he was not fully and completely advised of the requisite constitutional and statutory rights in his 1981 guilty plea colloquy." App. at 105. The court also found that Meyers received effective assistance of counsel because "the advice counsel gave defendant regarding real time he would be incarcerated was accurate at the time it was given." Id. at 111. Accordingly the court did not make specific findings concerning whether Meyers would have pled guilty had his trial attorneys specifically informed him that his plea required that he be sentenced to life in prison without parole. On October 29, 1993, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently denied allocatur.
On November 28, 1994, Meyers filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal district court. He raised the same basic claims he had presented at the PCHA hearings in state court. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on July 17, 1994. During that hearing, Meyers testified that his trial attorneys had advised him that they had reviewed a report which showed that Milton Shapp (who had been governor of Pennsylvania prior to Dick Thornburgh) had commuted the sentences of people convicted of second degree murder. App. at 134. However, Shapp was not governor when counsel was advising Meyers on how to proceed. Meyers further testified that he did not recall his attorneys ever using the term "commutation" during their discussions. Id. at 136. He stated "if I had known I was never eligible for parole, I would not have plead [sic] guilty." Id. at 146.
By order dated September 6, 1995, the district court granted habeas relief. However, the court did not rely upon Meyers' claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Rather, the court sustained Meyers' attack on the guilty plea colloquy. The court ruled that the colloquy was invalid under Pennsylvania law because the factual basis for the plea was not established until after the plea had been accepted. The Commonwealth appealed from that order, and we reversed. Meyers v. Gillis, 93 F.3d 1147 (3d Cir.1996). We held that the record fairly supported the state court's finding that a factual basis had been established prior to entry of the guilty plea. Id. at 1150. Moreover, we noted that establishing a factual basis for a guilty plea is not a condition precedent to acceptance of the plea, and the initial failure to establish the factual basis did not amount to a due process violation. Id. at 1151. Since the district court had not addressed Meyers' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we remanded the case so the court could address that issue.
On remand, the district court again granted Meyers' petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This time, the court focused on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found that Meyers had been told that he would be eligible for parole despite pleading guilty to second degree murder, that the advice was grossly misleading, and but for this misleading advice, there was a reasonable probability that Meyers would have pled not guilty and gone to trial. D. Ct. Op. at 46. Accordingly, the court held that Meyers was entitled to relief under Strickland 1 and its progeny. This appeal followed.
A criminal defendant is entitled to reasonably effective assistance of counsel. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. However, a defendant is only entitled to habeas relief for a violation of that right if he or she establishes ineffectiveness as well as resultant prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. This applies to representation during the plea process as well as representation during a trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); see also, Bivens v. Groose, 28 F.3d 62, 63 (8th Cir.1994). Furthermore, several other courts have held that a defendant may be entitled to habeas relief if counsel provides parole eligibility information that proves to be grossly erroneous and defendant can show that he would not have plead guilty in the absence of the erroneous information. See, e.g., Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir.1988); Czere v. Butler, 833 F.2d 59, 63 n. 6 (5th Cir.1987): O'Tuel v. Osborne, 706 F.2d 498, 500-01 (4th Cir.1983); Cepulonis v. Ponte, 699 F.2d 573, 577 (1st Cir.1983); Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 65 (4th Cir.1979).
Meyers' representation will not be deemed ineffective unless it "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65. Here, the state court found that the advice given to Meyers was accurate and concluded that trial counsels' representation was therefore not deficient. App. at 111. 2 The district court disagreed and concluded that trial counsels' advice was "grossly misleading." Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court ordinarily must presume that state court findings of fact are correct. See Jackson v. Byrd, 105 F.3d 145, 147 (3d Cir.1997). However, this presumption of correctness does not apply if the state court's findings are not fairly supported by the record. Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 864 (3d Cir.1994). The district court found that the record did not support the state court's conclusion that the "advice counsel gave defendant regarding the possible real time he would be incarcerated was accurate at the time it was given." D. Ct. Op. at 40. We agree. The state court's finding is clearly inconsistent with this record.
The record is replete with instances where Meyers was informed...
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