Rock v. Mills
| Citation | 8 N.E. 401,142 Mass. 522 |
| Parties | ROCK v. INDIAN ORCHARD MILLS. |
| Decision Date | 22 October 1886 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
This was an action of tort, to recover for personal injuries while in defendant's employ. At the trial in the superior court, before BACON, J., upon evidence, the substance of which appears in the opinion, the plaintiff asked the court to instruct the jury as follows:
“If the jury are satisfied that the defendant ran the machine on which plaintiff was injured, in the location it was in at the time of the injury, without fencing or otherwise guarding it, so that they exposed the plaintiff, while in their employment, to danger of which they gave no sufficient notice, then the defendant was negligent.
“If the jury shall be satisfied that this machine and card-grinder could as well have been placed in another portion of the room, and that, by so doing, the plaintiff would have been relieved from risk or danger from the winder while going to or from the wash-room in the course of his employment, and that the defendant failed to so place it, then the defendant was negligent.”
The court refused to give these instructions. The jury found for defendant, and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.
W.H. Brooks, for plaintiff.
The defendant was bound to provide a reasonably safe place in which to work. Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 572;Sullivan v. India Manuf'g Co., 113 Mass. 396. If a gate was one of the “safe-guards which science and experience suggest” should have been constructed in front of the winder, the evidence offered should not have been excluded. Cayzer v. Taylor, 10 Gray, 274. The court erred in its instructions. The first request,indeed, embodied what this court said in the first trial of Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co.
George M. Stearns, for defendant.
The defendant was not bound to fence or guard the winder machine as to this plaintiff. Sullivan v. India Manuf'g. Co., 113 Mass. 396;Taylor v. Carsew Co., 140 Mass. 150; S.C. 3 N.E.Rep. 21; Moulton v. Gage, 138 Mass. 390;Leary v. Boston & A.R.R., 139 Mass. 580; S.C. 2 N.E.Rep. 115. The exclusion of evidence as to the practicability of placing the machine in better position and the second request for ruling, raise the same question. Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 592.“At the close of the judge's charge the plaintiff excepted to *** portions of the judge's charge.” He did not state his objections or define his exceptions, or point out to the court the defects or errors claimed to exist. A general exception like this does not lie. Curry v. Porter, 125 Mass. 94;McMahon v. O'Connor, 137 Mass. 216;Wright v. Wright, 139 Mass. 177. The charge was unexceptional. If, in stating the law relative to the defendant's obligation to fence or place its machinery, the judge omitted any qualifying or modifying considerations, the plaintiff should have pointed out the error. Whitford v. Southbridge, 119 Mass. 564; also cases cited under fourth point.
The plaintiff, who is a boy 13 years old, was injured, when in the employment of the defendant, by getting his hand in a machine called a “winder.” This is a machine about four feet and four inches long, and two feet and ten inches high, consisting of three smooth steel cylinders, two large ones, with one small one between them, on which cotton is wound. They revolved about 15 to 20 times a minute. The gears and pulleys connected with them were covered, but there was no fence or other protection against danger from the other parts of the machine. A machine called a “card-grinder” stood about four and a third feet from the winder and the plaintiff was required to pass between these machines in doing his work. The plaintiff had been in the employment of the defendant three weeks and three days when he was injured, and, in the course of his work had to pass this machine about six times a day, but he did not work on it. It is clear that the winder was not a peculiarly dangerous machine, and that the defendant could not be held liable merely because it neglected to fence it. Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 572;Sullivan v. India Manuf'g Co., 113 Mass. 396.
It was the duty of the defendant to give suitable instructions to the plaintiff, having reference to his age and capacity, so as to enable him to understand the dangers, whatever they were, of the employment in which he was engaged; and, as nothing appears to the contrary, we must assume that the court gave appropriate instructions to the jury upon this point.
The defendant was not required by law to fence this machine, but had the right to use it in the manner in which it did; and, if it sufficiently instructed the plaintiff as to the dangers of the machine, he took the risk of these dangers, and cannot recover because the machinery might have been set up so as to be less dangerous. The issue before the jury was whether the defendant had given the plaintiff such instructions, and the court rightly rejected evidence offered by the plaintiff to show that a gate might have been put up, at slight expense, in front of the winder, or that the winder or the card-grinder might as well have been put in another part of the room. Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co., ubi supra; Sullivan v. India Manuf'g Co., ubi supra. For the same reasons the court rightly refused the two requests for instructions presented by the plaintiff. Having instructed the jury that the defendant was required to give the plaintiff suitable notice and instructions as to the dangers of the work he was set to do, the court was not obliged to give the first instruction requested in the words of the request, because it implies that the defendant was guilty of negligence if it did not fence the machine, and therefore would mislead the jury. The second calls for a ruling that the defendant was liable if it could have placed the winder in another part of the room. Neither of them could properly be given.
The exceptions taken to the charge of the presiding justice remain to be considered. The bill of exceptions states that, after the charge, the plaintiff excepted to “portions of the judge's charge,” and then proceeds to give certain detached...
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