U.S. v. Omene

• Decision Date: 08 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-10359,96-10359
• Parties: -2161, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3504, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4830 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Oghenerho OMENE, a/k/a Harlims Oghenerho Omene; a/k/a Greg Hotep; a/k/a Harlims Roosevelt Omene; a/k/a Wilson Omene; a/k/a Imoyin Omene; a/k/a Wilson Imoyin Omene, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1167

143 F.3d 1167

81 A.F.T.R.2d 98-2161, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3504,

98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4830

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Oghenerho OMENE, a/k/a Harlims Oghenerho Omene; a/k/a Greg

Hotep; a/k/a Harlims Roosevelt Omene; a/k/a

Wilson Omene; a/k/a Imoyin Omene;

a/k/a Wilson Imoyin Omene,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 96-10359.

United States Court of Appeals,

Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Aug. 15, 1997.

Memorandum Jan. 28, 1998.

Order and Opinion May 8, 1998.

Mark D. Flanagan, Slenkovich & Flanagan, Palo Alto, California, for defendant-appellant.

Michael J. Yamaguchi, U.S. Attorney, David W. Shapiro, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Oakland, California, for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California; Saundra B. Armstrong, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-94-40067-SBA.

Before: THOMAS and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges, and SEDWICK, ^* District Judge.

ORDER

Appellee's request for publication is granted. The Memorandum filed January 28, 1998, is redesignated as an authored opinion by Judge Sedwick.

OPINION

SEDWICK, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Oghenerho Omene ("Omene") raised suspicions at the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") office in Hayward, California, by filing, as a tax preparer, tax returns with unusual similarities. An IRS investigation resulted in the identification of 302 tax returns that appeared to be part of a scheme to file false returns. After his arrest, Omene admitted that he had filed a large number of tax returns while doing business as Ancient One and Rapid Return Service.

One month before trial, Omene moved, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 15, to take three depositions in Nigeria. The motion, which was renewed at trial, was denied. At trial the government called 16 witnesses and introduced hundreds of exhibits, including the 302 tax returns and numerous other documents linking Omene to the filing of false returns and the receipt of fraudulently obtained refunds. Near the conclusion of the government's case, counsel for Omene informed the court that his client's intention to testify posed an ethical problem and asked to discuss the matter ex parte.

The next morning Omene and his attorney met with the judge. Explaining that he had an "overwhelming" belief his client would give perjurious testimony, defense counsel asked to withdraw. He advised the court that he could not explain further without disclosing confidential communications, although he also stated that Omene had not changed his story during the course of the representation. Counsel indicated that he was caught in a quandary between his obligation to assist his client and his ethical responsibilities as a lawyer. He also stated that even if the motion were granted, the problem would persist. The district judge denied the motion to withdraw on the grounds that the defendant's rights to testify and to the assistance of counsel do not extend to giving false testimony with the aid of counsel, the interests of justice in continuing with a trial which had all but reached the conclusion of the government's case weighed against withdrawal, and there was a means of accommodating Omene's desire to testify by allowing him to give his testimony in narrative form as to those aspects which counsel felt would be perjurious while counsel continued to assist Omene in all other respects.

After denying the motion to withdraw, the district judge explained to Omene that he had an absolute right to testify, but should consider carefully his lawyer's advice not to do so. She explained that if Omene did not testify no inference could be drawn from that fact, but that if he did testify, the jury might draw negative inferences from what he said, or did not say. She advised Omene that his testimony would be largely in narrative form, and that the jury might or might not draw a negative inference from that mode of presentation. She also advised him that his lawyer would continue to represent him, but would not be able to argue evidence which the lawyer did not believe to be true. Professing to understand everything the judge told him, Omene expressed a desire to testify.

At trial Omene testified in narrative form. His testimony indicated that he set up a Nevada corporation named Ancient One International, Inc. intending to go into the import/export business with his brother Wilson Omene ("Wilson"), a resident of Lagos, Nigeria. To generate income for the import/export business, Omene testified, Ancient One was used as a tax preparation business. Omene explained that the tax preparation business would prepare the tax return and offer the customer a discounted refund amount in advance in exchange for the assignment of the refund check to be issued by the IRS. Neither Omene nor his brother knew anything about preparing tax returns, so Greg Hotep and Matthew Edema, two men living in Nigeria who had experience in filling out tax returns, were recruited to help in the business. Because advertising the business in California received marginal results, solicitation of clients was turned over to the three men in Nigeria, who obtained more than 300 customers. Omene told the jury that Hotep and Edema sent him blank, but signed, tax returns, along with the relevant information to be included on the tax return. Omene filled in the returns with the information provided and filed them with the IRS. Omene testified that he would pick up the refund checks, which were typically sent to post office boxes opened by Omene and send them to Lagos, New York or England for endorsement by the taxpayers as instructed by Hotep and Edema. Some of the endorsed checks would then be returned to Omene to be deposited into checking accounts opened in California by Omene.

The jury did not believe Omene. It convicted him on numerous counts of filing false tax returns in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287 and making false representations regarding social security numbers in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408. The jury was not alone in finding that Omene lied. In her statement of reasons for Omene's sentence, the district court wrote that:

The Court finds that the defendant repeatedly provided false testimony, under oath, during the course of the trial. This false testimony included the defendant's assertion that he was acting on behalf of persons in Nigeria, that he believed that the tax returns were genuine, and that he did not sign the endorsements on the refund checks. In addition to this false alibi, much of defendant's other testimony was clearly false. It is apparent to the Court that the defendant intentionally testified falsely in an attempt to mislead the jury.

On appeal, Omene contends that the district court erred by denying his Rule 15 motions. He also asserts that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel.

RULE 15 MOTIONS

Hoping to corroborate his account of events, one month before trial Omene moved, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 15, to take the depositions of Wilson, Hotep, and Edema in Nigeria. Attached as an exhibit to the motion was a report from a defense investigator detailing a telephone conversation he had with a person who claimed to be Wilson. The district court denied the motion in a written decision on April 23, 1996, finding that Omene had not presented sufficient evidence to establish that the person who identified himself to the defense investigator was Wilson; there was no reason to believe that the individual would be available in Lagos, to be deposed; it "appear[ed] unlikely" that the individual's testimony would be material since he stated to the investigator that he lacked personal knowledge of the day-to-day operations of the tax preparation business; based on evidence presented by the government the State Department advised that travel to Nigeria could be dangerous; and the motion was not timely because Omene filed it only one month before trial when he knew, at least a year in advance, that the testimony of Wilson, Hotep and Edema would be relevant to his defense. During trial the district court denied Omene's renewed Rule 15 motion.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15(a) provides in pertinent part:

Whenever due to exceptional circumstances of the case it is in the interest of justice that the testimony of a prospective witness of a party be taken and preserved for use at trial, the court may upon motion of such party and notice to the parties order that testimony of such witness be taken by deposition and that any designated book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material not privileged, be produced at the same time and place.

Fed.R.Crim.P. 15(a). "Whether to grant or deny a motion to depose a proposed witness in a criminal trial is discretionary." Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764, 767 (9th Cir.1981). "The district court retains broad discretion in granting a Rule 15(a) motion, and considers the particular circumstances of each case to determine whether the 'exceptional circumstances' requirement has been satisfied." United States v. Farfan-Carreon, 935 F.2d 678, 679 (5th Cir.1991). The district court's denial of Omene's motions to take depositions in Nigeria, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 15(a), is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1569 (9th Cir.1989).

Omene argues that the district judge abused her discretion when she denied his Rule 15 motions. Omene says two primary factors guide a trial court's determination whether the exceptional circumstances contemplated by Rule 15(a) exist: witness unavailability and the offer of material testimony. Omene confuses the prerequisites for taking a deposition under Rule 15 with the prerequisites for admitting a deposition into evidence. See United States v. Sines, 761 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir.1985). Rule 15(a) does not require any conclusive showing of "unavailability" or "material testimony" before a deposition can be taken in a criminal case. Rule 15(a...