Duncan v. Record Pub. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 September 1927
• Docket Number: 12275.
• Citation: 143 S.E. 31,145 S.C. 196
• Parties: DUNCAN v. RECORD PUB. CO. et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

143 S.E. 31

145 S.C. 196

DUNCAN v. RECORD PUB. CO. et al.

No. 12275.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

September 21, 1927

On Petition for Rehearing January 12, 1928.

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Richland County; W. H Townsend, Judge.

Action by T. C. Duncan against the Record Publishing Company and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Verdict should be so excessive as to warrant inference of improper motive, to authorize review on ground that denial of new trial was abuse of discretion.The judge's charge, the verdict, the order refusing a new trial, and the exceptions follow:

Judge's Charge.

This is an action brought by plaintiff to recover damages from the defendants because of the publication by defendants of an alleged libel of and concerning the plaintiff. A libel is a false and malicious defamation, expressed either by writing or printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, tending to impeach the honesty or integrity or reputation of a person, and thereby to expose him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or to cause him to be shunned or avoided, or to deprive him of the benefits of public confidence, and to injure him in his office, business, or social standing.

To constitute an actionable libel, the writing must make a false charge or insinuation against the plaintiff; it must be inspired by malice; it must tend to impeach the reputation of the plaintiff, and to injure him in his office, business, or in the estimation of the public. To render a defamatory statement actionable, it is not necessary that the false charge be made in a direct, open, and positive manner. A mere insinuation is as actionable as a positive assertion, if it is false and malicious, and the meaning is plain.

A libel consists of written words, which impute to a party crime, immorality, vice, or dishonorable conduct, or that he is suspected of misconduct, or which have a tendency to injure him in his office, profession, calling, or trade. All words which hold a party up to contempt, hatred, scorn, or ridicule, or which tend to deprive him of friendly intercourse and society, such as imputation of scoundrelism, or want of integrity in the discharge of the duties of an office or employment, or unfitness for such duty or office, are libelous, if written and published of a party.

Where the words written and published of another are capable of two meanings, one of which is slanderous and the other is not, it is the duty of the jury to ascertain from the evidence, by the greater weight thereof, taking into consideration all the facts and surrounding circumstances attending the uttering of the publication, in what sense the words were uttered or published. In ascertaining the sense in which the words were published, and the meaning intended to be conveyed and conveyed to readers, the jury are entitled to take into consideration both the ordinary meaning of the words, the time, place, setting, and surrounding circumstances attending and accompanying the publication thereof, including also the official position and duties of the party about whom the publication was made at that time, as they may find the same to be from the evidence by the greater weight thereof, and ascertain and determine from all of the evidence, what meaning should be given to the publication.

It is for the jury to determine from the evidence, by the greater weight thereof, the sense in which words were published. To charge one who holds a public position directly or indirectly with offering or inviting himself to be bribed from the performance of his official duty is libelous. You are not to assume that the publication had a libelous meaning, and to reject an innocent meaning as a matter of course, or vice versa, but you are to decide under all of the evidence what was the meaning of the publication.

The plaintiff has alleged in paragraph 8 of the complaint that defendants purposed and intended to charge, and to convey to the public the charge, that the plaintiff was susceptible to bribery; that plaintiff, by his letter of March 28, 1923, to defendant Robertson, was inviting defendant Robertson to approach and influence plaintiff in the discharge of his duties on the Canal Commission in a corrupt way; that plaintiff was dishonest and corrupt in the discharge of his public and official trusts and duties; that plaintiff was betraying the interest of the public and of the state in his official position; that plaintiff's integrity was impeached, and that he was unworthy of the confidence of the public and of the business world.

The defendants have denied that they purposed or intended to make or convey any such charges, and this throws upon plaintiff the burden of proving the affirmative of such intention or purpose on the part of the defendants by the greater preponderance or greater weight of the testimony. Unless you find from the preponderance of the testimony that defendants did intend or purpose to make and convey one or more of such charges by the publication in question, then your verdict must be for the defendants.

It is admitted, or undisputed in this case, that the Record Publishing Company is now, and was at the times mentioned in the complaint, a corporation engaged in the business of publishing and circulating a daily newspaper, known as the Columbia Record, in the city of Columbia, in this county and state, and that the defendant Robertson was, when this action was commenced, a citizen and resident of this county; that the plaintiff is a citizen and resident of Union county, in this state, and that he has been for the past six or seven years and still is a member of the state Senate from Union county; that the act of the General Assembly of this state creating the Canal Commission, which was charged with the duty and responsibility of controlling, safeguarding, and enforcing the rights and interests of the state in the property commonly known as the Columbia Canal, was passed during the session of 1923, and approved on the 26th of March, 1923 [33 St. at Large, p. 828]; and that the plaintiff was on the 23d day of March, 1923, appointed a member of said commission, and has since that time, and up to the time of the commencement of this action, been acting in the discharge of his duties in such official position; that the defendant, Robertson, then and at the times mentioned in the complaint, was largely interested financially, and through the Columbia Railway, Gas & Electric Company, a corporation largely controlled by him, in said Columbia Canal property, as to which interests there had been, and was then pending litigation under the direction or oversight of said commission; that during the forenoon of the 11th of March, 1924, the plaintiff, as senator from Union county, delivered a speech in the Senate, of which the report published in the State newspaper of March 12th, introduced in evidence and attached as an exhibit to the answer, is substantially correct; that on the afternoon of March 11, 1924, during the sitting of the General Assembly of this state, the defendants published in the Columbia Record, an article concerning the plaintiff in terms as follows:

"Facsimile of a Letter from Senator T. C. Duncan to Edwin W. Robertson, of Columbia.

Senator Duncan is a member of the Canal Commission. He was s appointed a member of the commission on March 23, 1923. The act creating the commission was passed by the General Assembly during the session of 1923, and was approved March 26, 1923. Senator Duncan's letter is dated March 28, 1923. The loan solicited was not granted. The first meeting of the Canal Commission was held in Columbia April 13, 1923.

After five days return to T. C. Duncan, Union, S.C. To E. W. . Robertson, c/o Loan & Exchange Nat. Bank.

Personal.

T. C. Duncan, Union, S.C. To E. W. Robertson, Columbia, S.C. March 28, 1923.

Dear Sir: I would like to secure a loan of $25,000.00-for three years-interest payable semiannually. I have security worth six times the amount of loan

desired.

I will be glad for you to have your representative to inspect t the property that I would offer as collateral-I can make loan from a bank, but I do not desire the constant renewal of paper. I have Building & Loan stock that will mature in three years, by means of which loan will be paid at maturity.

If there is any one in the state who could handle the above matter, you are the individual-I would thank you for your early reply.

Very truly, [Signed] T. C. Duncan."

It is admitted that the first copy published in the Record of the letter of plaintiff to defendant E. W. Robertson undertook and purported to be and was a facsimile or photographic copy of the envelope and letter.

Plaintiff contends and alleges that in and by the publication hereinabove set forth, including headlines, style, and manner of publication, and the circumstances attending and surrounding the same, the defendants purposed and intended to charge and to convey to the public the charge that this plaintiff was susceptible to bribery; that he was by said letter inviting the defendant E. W. Robertson to approach and influence him in the discharge of his duties on said Canal Commission in a corrupt way; that plaintiff was dishonest and corrupt in the discharge of his public and official trusts and duties; that he was betraying the interests of the public and of the state in his official position; that plaintiff's integrity was impeached, and that he was unworthy of the confidence of the public and of the business world; that the said publication and the insinuations and charges intended to be conveyed to the public and to be made against the...