Bridges v. Wixon
Decision Date | 27 September 1944 |
Docket Number | No. 10450.,10450. |
Citation | 144 F.2d 927 |
Parties | BRIDGES v. WIXON, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
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Lee Pressman, Congress of Industrial Organizations, of Washington, D. C., Carol King, of New York City, and Gladstein, Grossman, Sawyer & Edises, Richard Gladstein, and Aubrey Grossman, all of San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.
Tom C. Clark, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward G. Jennings, Sp. Asst. to the Atty. Gen., and John Ford Baecher, Atty., Department of Justice, of Washington, D. C., and Frank J. Hennessy, U. S. Atty., of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.
Osmond K. Fraenkel and Benedict Wolf, both of New York City, for National Lawyers Guild, as amicus curiae.
Before WILBUR, GARRECHT, MATHEWS, STEPHENS, and HEALY, Circuit Judges.
The appellant, in custody of the respondent under a warrant for deportation, sought release by habeas corpus in the District Court for the Northern District of California. That court issued an order to show cause and, upon the showing made by the return and traverse, denied the petition and remanded the petitioner to the custody of the respondent. From that order the petitioner appeals to this court. The appellant attached to his petition for a writ a transcript of the entire proceedings before the Inspector who ordered deportation, the record of petitioner's appeal before the Appeal Board set up by the Attorney General, which recommended against deportation, and the final order of the Attorney General upon a review of the Appeal Board's decision ordering the deportation of the petitioner.
While the power of the District Court and of this court in such an application is well settled, in view of the wide range of the argument it is well to state again the limits of the court's authority in the premises.
The statute providing for deportation of undesirable aliens by the Attorney General provides that:
"In every case where any person is ordered deported from the United States under the provisions of this chapter, or of any law or treaty, the decision of the Attorney General shall be final." 8 U.S.C.A. § 155(a).
Thus the court has no power derived from Congress to review or to inquire into the truth of the charge against the alien, nor into the manner in which the decision has been reached by the Attorney General. The right of the court to consider the validity of the order of deportation at all is derived directly from the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits a deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law.
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 255, 25 S. Ct. 644, 49 L.Ed. 1040, stated the rule controlling the court in such a case as follows:
This last statement is subject only to a court review upon the question of due process under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
In Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275, 33 S.Ct. 31, 32, 57 L.Ed. 218, it is said, (Mr. Justice Pitney writing the opinion):
"It is entirely settled that the authority of Congress to prohibit aliens from coming within the United States, and to regulate their coming, includes authority to impose conditions upon the performance of which the continued liberty of the alien to reside within the bounds of this country may be made to depend; that a proceeding to enforce such regulations is not a criminal prosecution within the meaning of the 5th and 6th Amendments; that such an inquiry may be properly devolved upon an executive department or subordinate officials thereof, and that the findings of fact reached by such officials, after a fair though summary hearing, may constitutionally be made conclusive, as they are made by the provisions of the act in question."
In Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 133, 44 S.Ct. 260, 68 L.Ed. 590, it is said (Mr. Justice Brandeis writing the opinion):
In United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 110, 47 S.Ct. 302, 305, 71 L.Ed. 560 ( ) it is said:
"But we find it unnecessary to consider this question a question of burden of proof, as we think that the record taken as a whole and without the aid of any statutory presumption presents some evidence supporting the deportation order."
We have consistently followed the decisions of the Supreme Court in this circuit upon this subject. In Whitty v. Weedin, 9 Cir., 68 F.2d 127, 130, in considering an appeal from a decision of the trial court denying release by habeas corpus where the defendant was held under a deportation warrant, it is said:
This decision was followed and quoted in a similar case: Monji Uyemura v. Carr, 9 Cir., 99 F.2d 729. See also, our decision in Chin Share Nging v. Nagle, 9 Cir., 27 F.2d 848; Mui Sam Hun v. United States, 9 Cir., 78 F.2d 612.
The Supreme Court applied the rule in the late case of Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 342, 53 S.Ct. 152, 153, 77 L.Ed. 350, wherein it is said:
"The Circuit Court of Appeals properly negatived the asserted absence of any evidence to support the action of the Secretary of Labor, and therefore refused, as we do, to review that officer's findings." citing cases
Under the Fifth Amendment, as these authorities clearly show, deprivation of liberty in the execution of the deportation statute without due process of law is not countenanced and victims of such practice may come to the courts for relief by filing petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. The courts can act in no other manner.
The courts have uniformly held that Congress cannot authorize a deprivation of liberty without due process of law as provided in the Constitution by the device of making the fact findings of an administrative board conclusive on the courts. That is to say, findings made without supporting evidence or without a hearing before the administrative body or officer are held by the courts to be void. Hence, on this purely collateral proceeding in habeas corpus, the validity of the order of the Attorney General for detention for deportation may be questioned but only to the extent necessary to determine whether there has been a denial of due process by the Attorney General. The parties recognize the rule, but their argument of facts in some instance extends far beyond our power of examination. In effect they ask us to do what is condemned in Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 54 S.Ct. 315, 78 L.Ed. 655, "pay lip service" to the statute.
The petitioner claims that the Attorney General applied an erroneous rule as to the Government's burden of proof and argues that the Government should establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt and that we are to judge whether or not this burden has been sustained. This whole contention is erroneous as the authorities hereinbefore cited indisputably show. The case of Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796, cited by appellant does not support this view and that decision has no application here. In that case the Supreme Court was reviewing a decision by a District Court and a Circuit Court of Appeals in equity revoking an order or decree admitting Schneiderman to citizenship. The rule there stated is for the guidance of federal courts exercising equity jurisdiction. The rule there applied by the courts is not applicable to a hearing on habeas corpus to determine whether or not the petitioner has had a fair hearing where the rule is that findings of the administrative body are conclusive if supported by...
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Bridges v. Wixon
...and remanded petitioner to the custody of respondent. 49 F.Supp. 292. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided vote. 9 Cir., 144 F.2d 927, 944. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because of the serious character of the questions which are As w......
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Harisiades v. Shaughnessy
...in his concurring opinion in Bridges v. Wixon, supra. Circuit Judge Wilbur discussed the ex post facto argument in Bridges v. Wixon, 9 Cir., 144 F.2d 927, at page 936 as follows: —"It is claimed that the act of 1940 is an ex post facto law in that it permits deportation for conduct prior to......
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United States v. Bridges
...... Bridges. February 8, 1943 Judge Welsh denies petition for habeas corpus, Ex. Parte Bridges, D.C., 49 F.Supp. 292. June 26, 1944 Court of Appeals affirms Judge Welsh, Bridges v. Wixon,. 9 Cir., 144 F.2d 927 rehearing denied, September. 27, 1944. June 18, 1945 Supreme Court reverses Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 65 S.Ct. 1443, 89 L.Ed. 2103. June 23, 1945 ......