Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp.

Citation1998 WL 248013,144 F.3d 151
Decision Date01 December 1997
Docket NumberNo. 97-1704,97-1704
Parties73 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,412, 4 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 993, 12 NDLR P 283 John M. HODGENS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellee. . Heard
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

Patricia E. Andrews, for appellant.

Barbara L. Sloan, Attorney, C. Gregory Stewart, General Counsel, J. Ray Terry, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, Gwendolyn Young Reams, Associate General Counsel, and Lorraine C. Davis, Assistant General Counsel, on brief, for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, amicus curiae.

Lynette Labinger, Roney & Labinger, Christopher M. Mulhearn, Tate & Elias on brief, for Rhode Island Affiliate American Civil Liberties Union, amicus curiae.

Neal J. McNamara, for appellee.

Corrie L. Fischel, Ann Elizabeth Reesman, and McGuiness & Williams on brief for Equal Employment Advisory Council, amicus curiae.

Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge, and STAHL, Circuit Judge.

BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.

This is the first time we have had occasion to construe the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2619 (1994), which established important rights that protect millions of American employees.

Plaintiff John Hodgens sued his former employer, General Dynamics Corporation ("General Dynamics" or "GD"), for allegedly terminating his employment because he took necessary medical leave that was protected under the FMLA. His complaint further alleged that his discharge constituted discrimination based on his disability (high blood pressure and atrial fibrillation), in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1994). The district court granted GD's motion for summary judgment. The court found that Hodgens's leave was not protected under the FMLA because he did not have a "serious health condition," as required by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). And the court rejected his ADA claim on the ground that his medical condition, after taking account of mitigating treatment, did not constitute a disability within the meaning of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Although we rely on different reasoning, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

Facts

We recount the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Hodgens, as we must when we review a grant of summary judgment. See DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997). From 1964 until 1985, Hodgens worked for General Dynamics at its Quincy, Massachusetts location. The facility was closed and Hodgens was laid off in 1985. In approximately February 1988, General Dynamics hired Hodgens as a Senior Planner at its Quonset Point (R.I.) facility. He worked in the program planning area until September 1991.

His performance was evaluated quite highly during his years in program planning. GD's evaluation system (as applied to his positions with the company) consisted of an annual ranking, covering the period beginning March 1 of one year through the end of February of the next. Similarly situated employees (in the same or similar job titles, pay grades, etc.) were placed in "peer" or "rank" groups and then numerically "ranked" based on performance. The employees in a particular rank group were evaluated by all supervisors of such employees, at a meeting where performance was discussed and rankings determined by consensus. During the three years in which Hodgens worked in program planning, he was ranked first (among four or five) in his peer group.

In September 1991, the program planning function at Quonset Point was eliminated and Hodgens was reassigned to the production control area, where he worked until his termination in July 1994. Unlike program planning--where Hodgens had tracked costs and performed a data auditing function, not requiring a deep knowledge of construction procedures--production control was "hands on" work, requiring familiarity with the details of submarine hull and components manufacturing. Because Hodgens had not previously done this type of work, he was at a disadvantage relative to his co-workers who did have such experience. As a result, Hodgens's performance fell. In 1992, he was ranked eighth of ten; the employees who ranked ninth and tenth were laid off that year as part of a reduction in force ("RIF"). In 1993, Hodgens ranked seventh of eleven in his rank group. Hodgens was concerned about his performance in production control, and especially worried about the possibility that his low performance might lead to his being laid off if there were to be another RIF.

For his first two years in production control, Hodgens performed sound dampening functions (a process by which submarines are soundproofed). He performed this part of his duties in a satisfactory manner; his last evaluation covering the period 1993-94 stated that he did an "excellent job in sound dampening." At some point during this period, however, GD decided to change its employees' responsibilities from specializing in a particular function to include all aspects of a project. Hodgens was assigned to "Module 82," an area on the Seawolf submarine. His duties included monitoring and facilitating the work on the module, filling work orders, maintaining proper material flow, and solving production problems. He worked on Module 82 between April and the beginning of August 1993.

It was during this period that Hodgens began to experience medical problems, including chest pains, visual problems, and profuse perspiration. These began in approximately June or July 1993. On August 4, he began to see his doctor, Dr. Joanne Wilkinson. She was "most concerned" that his symptoms, coupled with his history of hypertension (high blood pressure or HBP), might indicate that he was suffering from angina, which could be extremely serious or even fatal. She therefore advised Hodgens to undergo a stress test and an electrocardiogram (EKG). Dr. Wilkinson continued to see Hodgens on frequent occasions throughout August, during which time she was unable either to make a diagnosis or to rule out angina. During some of these visits, Hodgens's blood pressure was "way up," and Dr. Wilkinson continued to treat Hodgens as if he had angina.

During the period of these visits, from August 4 until September 27, Hodgens did not return to work. According to him, this was because of his need for numerous visits to Dr. Wilkinson and other physicians for evaluation and treatment, and because he wanted to be sure he did not do anything that might aggravate any potential heart condition. Dr. Wilkinson testified at her deposition that she thought it was "reasonable" for Hodgens to stay home from work until he got the results of his stress test, although, if her patient had wanted to return to work during the interim, she would have been "comfortable" with that.

Dr. Wilkinson also treated Hodgens for hypertension, prescribing a combination of medications, and for acute anxiety reactions. As part of the treatment for the latter, Dr. Wilkinson referred Hodgens to a psychologist for counseling to help reduce his stress. According to Hodgens's testimony, he had never previously experienced the degree of stress that he experienced in Module 82. Dr. Wilkinson also referred Hodgens to Dr. Jacobs, an ophthalmologist, because of his visual problems. Dr. Jacobs determined that he was suffering from migraine auras.

On September 13, 1993, Dr. Wilkinson told Hodgens that the results of his EKG, MRI and stress test were normal. She was able to rule out a stroke or a serious neurological problem, but she was still unable to rule out the possibility of angina. Nevertheless, she cleared Hodgens to return to work as of September 20. He did not return on that day, however, because he felt ill in his car and had to return home. He did return to work on September 21. As a matter of General Dynamics policy, GD's company nurse had to examine any employee, such as Hodgens, who had been out of work for more than five days because of illness. During her examination, the nurse detected that Hodgens was experiencing atrial fibrillation (irregular heartbeat) and that his blood pressure was elevated. She therefore refused to allow him to return to work and suggested that he see his doctor immediately.

Hodgens did so, and Dr. Wilkinson diagnosed him as suffering from atrial fibrillation, a serious and potentially life-threatening heart condition. After treating him, by prescribing medication to thin his blood in order to prevent a stroke, Dr. Wilkinson told Hodgens he could return to work on September 27. She restricted him to working half-days during the first week, and to working a light-duty schedule for the following three weeks.

Hodgens returned to work on September 27. General Dynamics changed his assignment so that he was no longer part of a module; according to GD, Module 82 was nearing completion. Instead, until December 1993, Hodgens was assigned exclusively to performing sound dampening tasks.

Shortly thereafter, Hodgens had to take additional intermittent medical leave to deal with an ear problem. His hearing problem manifested itself on September 29, 1993, and he saw a physician six times in three months. On January 7, 1994, he had ear surgery on an outpatient basis. The surgery left him dizzy and fatigued; in order to recuperate, he required medication and bed rest for several days. He returned to work on January 11. In February, he was assigned to the machine shop (GD says this was in March). Here, his duties were, according to Hodgens, "low-level, demeaning, and not the type normally performed by Senior Planners." He was no longer performing sound dampening duties. Instead, another employee was assigned to those duties, an employee who Hodgens claims was less experienced and less qualified to perform them.

In April 1994, Hodgens asked his new supervisor for vacation leave to handle a family...

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