144 F.3d 173 (1st Cir. 1998), 97-2079, Testa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
|Citation:||144 F.3d 173|
|Party Name:||Louis R. TESTA, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., Defendant, Appellant.|
|Case Date:||May 21, 1998|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the First Circuit|
Heard May 4, 1998.
George R. Moore, with whom Bret D. Gifford and Devine, Millimet & Branch, P.A. were on brief, for Appellant.
Stewart S. Richmond, Jr., with whom Scott H. Harris and McLane, Graf, Raulerson & Middleton, P.A. were on brief, for Appellees.
Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, SELYA and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
Defendant-appellant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) insists that the jury verdict in this piscine personal injury case results from instructional error. After careful perlustration of the record, we conclude that Wal-Mart is fishing in an empty stream.
Plaintiff-appellee Louis R. Testa worked as a truck driver for Heavenly Fish, a wholesaler of tropical fish. On February 2, 1993, Testa arrived at a brand new Wal-Mart retail outlet in Hinsdale, New Hampshire, with merchandise in tow. He parked his van on the delivery ramp behind the store and alerted Wal-Mart to his arrival. A Wal-Mart employee helped Testa unload his ichthyic cargo. In the process, Testa slipped on the snow-and-ice-coated ramp, fell, and injured himself.
Wal-Mart photographed the ramp that day and proceeded to conduct a full investigation of the incident. Before the month was out, a Wal-Mart employee prepared an internal report noting, inter alia, that Testa had threatened to sue.
On April 24, 1995, Testa made good on his word. Invoking diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), Testa sued Wal-Mart in New Hampshire's federal district court. Wal-Mart denied that it had committed any actionable negligence. It pointed out that the mishap occurred on the day of the Hinsdale store's grand opening and, anticipating a huge turnout, it wanted the staff's attention focused exclusively on customer service. To that end, it asserted that Rachelle Manning, an invoice clerk, informed all vendors on February 1 that Wal-Mart would not accept
deliveries the following day. Thus, Wal-Mart explained, it did not bother to clear the ramp on February 2 because it believed that no deliveries would be forthcoming. In addition to this defense, Wal-Mart also suggested that Testa had assumed the risk of using the icy ramp and that his negligence caused (or at least contributed to) the occurrence of the accident.
The trial itself was brief but jury deliberations were protracted. Eventually, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $55,112. This appeal ensued.
II. THE JURY'S QUESTION
After nearly five hours of deliberation, the jury sent a note to the judge which read in pertinent part: "Your Honor, can we please have a review of the law 'negligence', and [its] relation to proximate cause?" 1 The judge consulted with counsel and responded to this query by re-reading his original charge on negligence and proximate cause. The judge asked the jury if the supplemental instruction satisfied their request and the foreperson responded affirmatively.
The error that Wal-Mart perceives is less with what the judge said than with what he did not say. Over Wal-Mart's objection, Judge Devine declined to re-read his charge on comparative negligence as part and parcel of the supplemental instruction. In this vein, the judge noted that "you don't get to comparative negligence until or unless [the jurors] establish that there is negligence existing on the part of the defendant, and their question specifically asks for negligence and proximate cause." Based on this scenario, Wal-Mart maintains that the trial court erred by refusing to include language anent comparative negligence in the supplemental instruction.
We ordinarily review jury instructions to discern whether they adequately illuminate the law applicable to the controverted issues in the case without unduly...
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