Rotella v. Pederson
| Decision Date | 14 July 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-10731,97-10731 |
| Citation | 144 F.3d 892 |
| Parties | Mark ROTELLA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William M. PEDERSON, M.D., William M. Pederson, M.D.P.A., Leslie H. Secrest, M.D., Leslie H. Secrest, M.D.P.A., John M. Zimburean, M.D., John M. Zimburean, M.D.P.A., Larry W. Arnold, M.D., Larry W. Arnold, M.D.P.A., Bradford M. Goff, M.D., Bradford M. Goff, M.D.P.A., Fred L. Griffin, M.D., Fred L. Griffin, M.D.P.A. Angela M. Wood, M.D., Angela M. Wood, M.D.P.A., Gary Lee Etter, M.D., Gary Lee Etter, M.D.P.A., Grover Lawlis, M.D., Grover Lawlis, M.D.P.A., Dallas Psychiatric Associates, A Partnership, Defendants-Appellees. 1 |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Robert Franklin Andrews, Andrews & Cirkiel, Fort Worth, TX, Richard Phillips Hogan, Jr., Kevin Hampton Dubose, Holman, Hogan, Dubose & Townsend, Houston, TX, Martin J. Cirkiel, Round Rock, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Tom B. Renfro, Joseph F. Cleveland, McLean & Sanders, Fort Worth, TX, for Pederson, Secrest, Zimburean, Arnold, Goff, Griffin and Dallas Psychiatric Associates, Defendants-Appellees.
Debora M. Alsup, Thompson & Knight, Austin, TX, John H. Martin, Thompson & Knight, Jane Politz Brandt, Dallas, TX, for Wood and Etter.
Charles T. Frazier, Jr., Andrea M. Kuntzman, Cowles & Thompson, Dallas, TX, for Lawlis.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
Before REAVLEY, DeMOSS and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant, Mark Rotella ("Rotella"), appeals from the district court's order granting summary judgment for defendants based on its finding that Rotella's claims were barred by limitations. We affirm.
On February 19, 1985, Rotella, then age sixteen, was admitted to Brookhaven Psychiatric Pavilion ("Brookhaven"). Defendants-appellees are physicians and professional associations which had treating privileges at Brookhaven during Rotella's hospital stay. Although Rotella was initially admitted involuntarily on the request of his mother and his prior therapist after a suicide threat, he signed for a voluntary admission rather than face an involuntary commitment proceeding. He was discharged sixteen months later, on June 16, 1986, shortly after his eighteenth birthday. Rotella made several requests for release pursuant to Texas law. Each time he withdrew his request prior to the expiration of the 96 hour waiting period, except one occasion when he was advised that his application was not properly submitted and he would have to make another application. He characterizes the withdrawals of his requests for release as coerced.
In April of 1994, Wendy Edelman, another former patient at Brookhaven, contacted Rotella and urged him to file a lawsuit against the doctors who had treated them at Brookhaven because the doctors had based their decisions to keep patients hospitalized on economic rather than medical criteria.
In June 1994, Brookhaven's parent company, Psychiatric Institutes of America ("PIA"), and PIA's Texas Regional Director, Peter Alexis pleaded guilty to charges of fraud and conspiracy. The underlying fraud related to doctors extending the length of stay for patients in psychiatric hospitals beyond medical necessity in order to maximize health insurance benefit payments.
In July 1994, Defendants-Appellees filed suit in Texas state court against Rotella and his attorney alleging that Rotella slandered them by telling third parties that they "received a $10,000 bonus for each bed filled over the Christmas holidays." Rotella filed a counterclaim asserting civil rights violations and state law causes of action arising out of his treatment at Brookhaven in 1985-86. He alleged that in-patient treatment was generally inappropriate for his condition and that specific treatments, such as the use of restraints and limitations on his movements and privacy, were inappropriate and abusive.
The state court granted summary judgment for defendants on Rotella's state claims, finding that they were barred by limitations and denied defendants' motions for summary judgment on the civil rights claims. Rotella's counterclaim was then severed and, on March 3, 1997, was removed to federal court.
On June 30, 1997 the district court denied Rotella's motion to reconsider summary judgment on the state law claims and, on reconsideration, granted summary judgment for defendants on the civil rights claims, finding that they were barred by limitations as well. Final judgment was entered for defendants and Rotella appealed.
After this case was briefed, the Texas Court of Appeals at Fort Worth handed down two opinions addressing limitations issues in the context of former psychiatric patients suing PIA and related doctors and entities. See Savage v. Psychiatric Institute of Bedford, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 745 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1998, writ requested); see also Slater v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 228 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1998, writ requested). While neither opinion directly disposes of every issue before this court, both support the district court's determination that Rotella's claims are time barred.
Statute of limitations
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment on the basis of limitations de novo. Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1046 (5th Cir.1996).
Rotella does not dispute that his suit was filed more than four years after he was discharged from Brookhaven, but posits several theories for tolling the statutes of limitations. Rotella bears the burden of proof on
each of his tolling theories. See Weaver v. Witt, 561 S.W.2d 792, 794, n. 2 (Tex.1977).
All health care liability claims must be brought within two years of "the occurrence of the breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care treatment that is the subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made is completed." TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp.1997). Rotella contends that his case is fundamentally one of fraud which is governed by a four year statute of limitations.
In Shannon v. Law-Yone, 950 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1997, writ denied), the Fort Worth Court of Appeals considered this limitations question in a context that was nearly identical to this case. Shannon was a voluntary inpatient at Brookhaven for six weeks during 1989. Shannon brought suit in 1993 alleging that Brookhaven doctors and other employees fraudulently induced him to lengthen his stay and coerced him into waiving a release that he requested resulting in emotional strain, trauma and anguish. The court held that Shannon's common law fraud claim is not a "health care liability claim" as defined by art. 4590i and it is therefore governed by the four-year fraud statute of limitations. Id. at 438. Making an "ERIE GUESS" AS TO HOW TEXAS COURTS WOULD RESOLVE THIS ISSUE BASED ON THE INTERMEDIATE TEXAS APPELLATE COURT OPINION IN SHANNON,2 we hold that the four-year statute of limitations applies to Rotella's fraud claims.
Rotella's claims were originally filed as counterclaims to a petition brought by defendants against him, his attorney and another former patient in state court. The original suit alleged that Rotella slandered defendants in 1994 by stating that the defendants "received a $10,000 bonus for each bed filled over the Christmas holiday." Under Texas law, an individual who has a counterclaim which is otherwise time-barred may file that counterclaim within thirty days of the date his answer is due, if the counterclaim "arises out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the basis of [the] action." § 16.069(a) TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. (Vernon 1986). Rotella claims that there is a "critical link" between the alleged 1994 statement and his 1984-86 stay at Brookhaven because the slander suit alleged that Rotella had harbored ill will toward his doctors since his Brookhaven treatment. He also argues that the counter claims "arose out of" the same occurrence because Rotella's lawyer was also named as a defendant in the slander suit and a reasonable juror could conclude that the slander suit was a preemptive strike to intimidate Rotella and his attorney and prevent them from filing suit against the defendants.
The district court rejected this argument, holding that Rotella's counterclaim did not arise from the same transaction and therefore could not be revived under § 16.069. Relying on Hobbs Trailers v. J.T. Arnett Grain Co., Inc., 560 S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Tex.1977)(addressing art. 5539c, the predecessor statute of § 16.069), the district court reasoned,
Appellees urge us to affirm the district court, arguing that Rotella's claims arose from his hospital stay, while the slander claim arose out of a statement made eight years later in a related but separate incident. Therefore, Appellees argue, § 16.069 does not control, because the counterclaims did not arise out of the same incident. In Leasure v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 722 S.W.2d 37 (Tex.App.--Houston[1st Dist.] 1986, no writ), a Texas court held that Leasure's counterclaims based on an audit that Peat Marwick had performed in 1976-77 did not arise from the same transaction or occurrence as Peat Marwick's original claim for malicious prosecution which was based on Leasure's 1980 lawsuit. Id. at 38-39. The court emphasized that Peat Marwick's claim, while it had some relationship to the 1976-77 Rotella cites two cases to rebut the holding in Leasure, neither of which convince us that the district court's reliance on Leasurewas misplaced....
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