White v. Boston & A.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 May 1887
• Citation: 144 Mass. 404,11 N.E. 552
• Parties: WHITE, per Pro Ami, v. BOSTON & A.R. CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

144 Mass. 404

11 N.E. 552

WHITE, per Pro Ami,

v.BOSTON & A.R. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 7, 1887.

Tort for personal injuries received by the plaintiff, by the fall of a portion of one of the porcelain shades of a lamp fixed in the upper part of the car of the defendant in which plaintiff was a passenger. At the trial in the superior court, before KNOWLTON, J., the following facts appeared: The plaintiff was a passenger on the train, and was a minor, about four years of age. The lady who accompanied and had charge of her testified that they took the train leaving Boston at 3:45 P.M., on April 9, 1885, to go to Faneuil. The lamps in the cars were not lighted. Before reaching Columbus-avenue station, which is the first station out of and two or three minutes' ride from Boston, she heard a crash over her head, and an instant afterwards several pieces of the porcelain shade fell from the upper part of the car into her lap. One struck the plaintiff on the face, and inflicted the injuries complained of. A witness testified that she saw a piece of the shade falling, and saw it strike the child; that it came from the porcelain shade of a lamp directly overhead, and in the top of the chandelier, which was a fixture in the car. There was also evidence that the conductor took down the remaining portion of the shade after the accident. Upon this evidence the defendant requested the court to rule that the plaintiff could not recover, but the court refused so to rule, and ruled that, upon the evidence, the question of the defendant's negligence was a question of fact for the jury. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant alleged exceptions.Samuel Hoar, for defendant.

“A presumption of negligence from the simple occurrence of an accident seldom arises, except” (1) “where the accident proceeds from an act of such a character that, when due care is taken in its performance, no injury ordinarily ensues from it in similar cases;” or (2) “where it is caused by the mismanagement or misconstruction of a thing over which the defendant has immediate control, and for the management or construction of which he is responsible.” Transportation Co. v. Downer, 11 Wall. 129 at 134. See Curtis v. Rochester & S.R. Co., 18 N.Y. 534, 536, 537;Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Metc. 1. It is submitted by the defendant that the foregoing is a complete and precise statement of the principle underlying the cases, in which it is sometimes loosely stated that a presumption of negligence arises from the mere proof that an accident had occurred. Feital v. Middlesex R. Co., 109 Mass. 398;Ware v. Gay, 11 Pick. 106; Carpue v. London & B.R. Co., 5 Adol. & E. (N.S.) 747; Welfare v. London & B.R. Co., L.R. 4 Q.B. 693; Smith v. Boston Gas-Light Co., 129 Mass. 318; Curtis v. Rochester & S.R. Co., ubi supra, and cases cited. See Le Barron v. East Boston Ferry Co., 11 Allen, 316;Kendall v. Boston, 118 Mass. 234;Transportation Co. v. Downer, 11 Wall. 129.

There is nothing in the case that will justify an inference that the accident could have been prevented by the exercise of the utmost care, skill, and diligence on the part of the defendant that human foresight could have dictated, for there is nothing from which we can infer that the accident happened through any act or omission of the defendant or its servants. “When the evidence tends equally to sustain either of two inconsistent propositions, neither of them can be said to have been established by legitimate proof.” Smith v. First Nat. Bank at Westfield, 99 Mass. 605, 612;Crafts v. Boston, 109 Mass. 519. It is therefore submitted that all the evidence in the case will not justify a presumption that the accident resulted from the negligence of the defendant. Kendall v. Boston, 118 Mass. 234;Blanchette v. Border City Manuf'g Co., 143 Mass. 21, 8 N.E.Rep. 430; Transportation Co. v. Downer, 11 Wall. 129; Welfare v. London & B.R. Co., L.R. 4 Q.B. 693.

Gaston & Whitney and Fred. E. snow, for plaintiff.

The sole question in this case is whether there are any facts stated in the bill of exceptions from which a jury would be authorized to find that the defendant failed to exercise that care and diligence which the law requires of it. It is well established that in certain cases the proof of an accident, without evidence directly connecting the accident with negligence of the defendant, affords a presumption of negligence against the defendant. Res ipsa loquitur. In such cases, the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case by proof of the accident. Ware v. Gay, 11 Pick. 106;Thomas v. Western Union Tel. Co., 100 Mass. 156; Feital v. Middlesex R. R., 199 Mass. 398; Kearney v. Railway Co., L.R. 5 Q.B. 411, and L.R. 6 Q.B. 759; Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181. See, also, collection of cases in Patterson's Railway Accident Law, 438-441. This presumption arises where the nature of the accident is such that it would not be likely to happen without negligence on the part of some one, and the causes of the accident are within the control of the defendant. See Byrne v. Boadle, 2 Hurl. & C. 722; Scott v. London Dock Co., 3 Hurl. & C. 596; Mullen v. St. John, 57 N.Y. 567;Feital v. Middlesex R. Co., 109 Mass. 398. The decision in the case of Kendall v. Boston, 118 Mass. 234, was put on the ground that the defendant did not appear to have any exclusive control of the place where the bust which fell was situated. In ...