Brigham v. Fayerweather

• Decision Date: 25 February 1887
• Parties: BRIGHAM v. FAYERWEATHER and another.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

144 Mass. 48

10 N.E. 735

BRIGHAM v. FAYERWEATHER and another.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

February 25, 1887

COUNSEL

T.G. Kent and G.T. Dewey, for defendants.

Upon this report the defendants have a right to assume, for the purposes of this discussion, that no advantage was taken of the incapacity of the mortgagor. The fact that there was fraud and undue influence was alleged, but not proved. The defendants have been precluded by the ruling from proving the utmost fairness. The plaintiff admitted, as the report shows that nearly, if not quite, the whole amount of the debt was due, which was equivalent to a negative fraud. The only ground on which a court of equity interferes to set aside a contract or deed of an idiot, lunatic, or person non compos mentis, is fraud, overreaching, taking advantage of circumstances. 1 Story, Eq. § 227; Frazer v. Frazer, 2 Del.Ch. 260; Coleman v. Frazer, 3 Bush, 300. Leaving out of view cases of mistake or misapprehension there is no other title but fraud under which this court has any equity jurisdiction to set aside a deed. The deed of an insane person is not void, but voidable. Carrier v Sears, 4 Allen, 336, and case; Howe v. Howe, 99 Mass. 88. If a contract is made with a lunatic or insane person in good faith, without taking any advantage of his position, it is valid. Price v. Berrington, 3 Macn. & G. 486; Molton v. Camroux, 2 Exch. 487; Campbell v. Hooper, 3 Smale & G. 153; Ashcraft v. De Armond, 44 Iowa, 229. This is especially true if the person dealing with the insane person did not know of his insanity. Niell v. Morley, 9 Ves. 478; Molton v. Camroux, supra.

The presence and participation of the plaintiff, who was the son of the mortgagor, and the devisee of the premises mortgaged, at the time the mortgage was made, is a good reason why the deed should not be set aside, even though the mortgagor was insane. Sergeson v. Sealey, 2 Atk. 412.

The mortgagor was not a lunatic, an idiot, or an insane person, but simply a person whose mind had been weakened by old age, sickness, and infirmity. The verdict is not to be stretched,--the finding of the jury is to be taken in connection with the allegations of the bill. This distinction is not only obvious, but it is recognized by courts of equity. Ex parte Barnsley, 3 Atk. 168, and cases cited; In re Barker, 2 Johns.Ch. 232. Cases of insanity, and of weakness of mind amounting to incapacity, are treated as analogous, the difference being only in degree; but, in either case, the aid of this court is invoked to set aside a deed or other contract only on the ground of imposition or overreaching. 1 Story, Eq. 234; Coleman v. Frazer, 3 Bush, 300; Osmond v. Fitzroy, 3 P.Wms. 129; Longmate v. Ledger, 2 Giff. 157; Marshall v. Billingsly, 7 Ind. 250; Allore v. Jewell, 94 U.S. 506; Mann v. Betterly, 21 Vt. 326. Fraud must be clearly proved to warrant the court to set aside a conveyance, 1 Story, 200; Atlantic Delaine Co. v. James, 94 U.S. 214. Even if the deed was fraudulent, it would not necessarily be set aside, but would be permitted to stand as a security for what is really due. Wharton v. May, 5 Ves. 69; Purcell v. McNamara, 14 Ves. 106; Pickett v. Loggon, Id. 244; Dunn v. Chambers, 4 Barb. 376.

Frank P. Goulding, for plaintiff.

The question of law raised is whether a court of equity might properly decree a deed to be set aside, made by a person who was not, at the time it was made, of sufficient mental capacity to transact the business of executing such deed, and made under the circumstances disclosed in the report. It is submitted that no equitable circumstance or condition is shown favorable to the defendant. The fact that the plaintiff was present at the making of the mortgage is immaterial. The defendants were not induced to do or omit doing anything whatever on the faith of the mortgage, and when it is set aside they are in statu quo. This broadly distinguishes the case from the English cases, and from some American cases, where courts of equity have refused to set aside conveyances made to persons who in good faith and without notice have parted with their purchase money, made present loans or expenditures in reliance on the deed sought to be impeached, and where the grantees cannot be restored to their former position. Campbell v. Hooper, 3 Smale & G. 153; Niell v. Morley, 9 Ves. 478; Price v. Berrington, 3 Macn. & G. 486; Selby v. Jackson, 6 Beav. 192, and like cases.

The devisee has a right to hold the estate at law as against a deed made by this testator while non compos, and the defendants, seeking to enforce this mortgage, it is within the equitable jurisdiction of the court to set aside the deed, on the ground of the incapacity of the mortgagor, independently of any question of actual fraud. Pom.Eq. § 946; Story, Eq. §§ 235-238; Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray, 279.

The answer admits the great age of the mortgagor, and the jury have found that she was non compos. In the absence of other proof, the dealing with a non compos is sufficient to found the jurisdiction of a court of equity to set aside the conveyance. The question of jurisdiction is not raised by the answer, but, if it was, the jurisdiction could be maintained readily, not only on the ground of constructive fraud, but also upon the equity for quieting title. Clouston v. Shearer, 99 Mass. 209. It is too late to raise the point that the issue on which the jury have found for the plaintiff is immaterial. No such defense is made in the answer, and, after the verdict, the defendant made a motion for a new trial, and came to this court on a bill of exceptions, making no suggestion that the issue was immaterial. Clouston v. Shearer, 99 Mass. 209.

OPINION

C. ALLEN, J.

It is settled in this commonwealth that the deed of an insane person is ineffectual to convey a title to land, good against the grantor or against his heirs and devisees, unless it is confirmed by the grantor himself, when of sound mind, or by his legally constituted guardian, or by his heirs or devisees. Valpey v. Rea, 130 Mass. 384, and cases there cited. And such deed may be disaffirmed without returning the consideration money, or placing the other party in statu quo. Chandler v. Simmons, 97 Mass. 508, 514, 515. Nor is it material that the grantee acted in good faith in taking the deed, and without knowledge of the grantor's insanity, because he who deals with an insane person, as with an infant, does it at his peril. Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray, 279, 282. It was said in Seaver v. Phelps, 11 Pick. 304, 306: "The fairness of the defendant's conduct, cannot supply the plaintiff's want of capacity." Again: "We are aware that...