Neil v. State of Vermont
Citation | 144 U.S. 323,12 S.Ct. 693,36 L.Ed. 450 |
Parties | O'NEIL v. STATE OF VERMONT |
Decision Date | 04 April 1892 |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
J. C. Baker and A. H. Garland, for plaintiff in error.
W. C. Dunton, P. Redfield Kendall, and Geo F. Edmunds, for the State.
On the 26th of December, 1882, a grand juror of the town of Rutland, in the county of Rutland and state of Vermont, made a written complaint, on his oath of office, before a justice of the peace of that county, that John O'Neil, of Whitehall, N. Y., on December 25, 1882, at Rutland, at divers times, did 'sell, furnish, and give away intoxicating liquor, without authority,' and contrary to the statute; and, further, that O'Neil, at the March term, 1879, of the Rutland county court, had been convicted of selling, furnishing, and giving away intoxicating liquors against the law. Thereupon the justice issued a warrant for the arrest of O'Neil. He was arrested and brought before the justice, and pleaded 'Not guilty.'
The statute of Vermont under which the prosecution was instituted is embodied in sections 3800 and 3802 of chapter 169 of the Revised Laws of Vermont of 1880, (pages 734, 735,) in these words:
'Section 3800. No person shall, except as otherwise especially provided, manufacture, sell, furnish, or give away, by himself, clerk, servant, or agent, spirituous or intoxicating liquor, or mixed liquor of which a part is spirituous or intoxicating, or malt liquors or lager-beer; and the phrase 'intoxicating liquors,' where it occurs in this chapter, shall be held to include such liquors and beer.
'The word 'furnish,' where it occurs in this chapter, shall apply to cases where a person knowingly brings into or transports within the state for another person intoxicating liquor intended to be sold or disposed of contrary to law, or to be divided among or distributed to others.
'The words 'give away,' where they occur in this chapter, shall not apply to the giving of intoxicating liquor at private dwellings, or their dependencies, unless given to an habitual drunkard, or unless such dwelling or its dependencies become a place of public resort.
'But no person shall furnish or give away intoxicating liquor at an assemblage of persons gathered to erect a building or frame of a building, or to remove a building, or at a public gathering for amusement.
'Nothing in this chapter shall prevent the manufacture, sale, and use of wine for the commemoration of the Lord's supper, nor the manufacture, sale, and use of cider, or, for medical purposes only, of wine made in the state from grapes or other fruits, the growth of the state, and which is without the admixture of alcohol or spirituous liquor, nor the manufacture by any one for his own use of fermented liquor. 'But no person shall sell or furnish cider or fermented liquor at or in a victualing house, tavern, grocery, shop, cellar, or other place of public resort, or at any place, to an habitual drunkard.'
The complaint was in the form prescribed by section 3859 of the Revised Laws of Vermont, for offenses against section 3802; and section 3860 provides that under such form of complaint 'every distinct act of selling' may be proved, 'and the court shall impose a fine for each offense.'
The justice, after hearing the proofs of the parties, entered judgment finding O'Neil guilty of 457 offenses, second conviction, of selling intoxicating liquors in violation of chapter 169 of the Revised Laws, and adjudging that he pay to the treasurer of the state a fine of $9,140, and the costs of prosecution, taxed at $472.96, and be confined at hard labor in the house of correction at Rutland for the term of one month and that, in case such fine and costs should not be paid on or before the expiration of said term of one month's imprisonment, he should be confined at hard labor in the house of correction at Rutland for the further term of 28,836 days, to be computed from the expiration of said term of one month's imprisonment. From that judgment O'Neil appealed to the county court of Rutland county. The appeal was allowed, and he gave bail for his appearance.
In the county court O'Neil pleaded 'Not guilty,' and the case was tried by a jury. He did not take the point, either before the justice of the peace or the county court, that there was any defect or want of fullness in the complaint. Any such point was waived by the failure to take it. Besides, it did not involve any federal question. The question of the consolidation of several offenses in one complaint is purely a matter of state practice; and it is a familiar rule of criminal law that time need not be proved as alleged.
The jury found O'Neil guilty of 307 offenses 'of selling intoxicating liquor without authority, and contrary to the laws of Vermont, as of a second conviction for a like offense.' He filed exceptions, which state that, for the purpose of the trial, he admitted the following facts: 'The respondent, John ...
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