Smith v. Gale

• Decision Date: 11 April 1892
• Citation: 12 S.Ct. 674,36 L.Ed. 521,144 U.S. 509
• Parties: SMITH v. GALE et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

144 U.S. 509

12 S.Ct. 674

36 L.Ed. 521

SMITH v. GALE et al.

April 11, 1892.

STATEMENT BY MR. JUSTICE BROWN.

This was an action originally brought by Gale, in the district court of Minnehaha county, against the widow and heirs of Daniel G. Shillock, Samuel A. Bentley, and Byron M. Smith, to quiet the title of the plaintiff to certain lands of which it was averred the defendants unjustly claimed to have title in fee.

The following facts are abstracted from the finding of the court:

Both parties claimed title from Margaret Frazier, who, on the 1st day of July, 1864, became grantee of the land in fee by a patent of the United States of that date.

Plaintiff's chain of title was as follows:

(1) Power of attorney, Margaret Frazier to William H. Grant, executed December 9, 1868, authorizing him to sell and convey all her real estate in the territory of Dakota, etc., and to execute a warranty deed of conveyance in her name.

(2) Warranty deed, Margaret Frazier by William H. Grant, her attorney in fact, to Louisa E. Gale, wife of the plaintiff Artemas Gale, executed October 12, 1870, for a consideration of $160. Under this deed the court found that Mrs. Gale entered into possession; caused the property to be surveyed and the boundaries to be marked; and thence, to the time of her decease, continued in open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession, which possession was continued by Artemas Gale, her husband, and his grantees hereinafter mentioned, who have been, and at the time of the trial were, in actual possession of said premises.

(3) Will of Louisa E. ale, who died June 27, 1880, devising this property to her husband, Artemas Gale, the plaintiff. This will was probated July 29, 1880, and filed for record July 5, 1883.

This suit was begun September 27, 1882. During its pendency, and on August 1, 1883, plaintiff Gale conveyed the lands in question to Helen G. McKennan by warranty deed for a valuable consideration, and on August 14, 1883, Helen G. McKennan conveyed an undivided half of the same to Melvin Grigsby.

The defendants' chain of title was as follows:

(1) Warranty deed, Margaret Frazier to Oscar Hodgdon, dated May 29, 1872, for a consideration of $500. This deed was executed 18 months after the deed to Louisa E. Gale. The court found that there was no other evidence, offered or submitted, tending to prove that any consideration was paid for such transfer, or that the grantee, Hodgdon, did not then have actual notice or knowledge of the prior conveyance of Frazier to Gale, or that at the time Hodgdon was an innocent purchaser of the said property for a valuable consideration, without notice of the outstanding title in Louisa E. Gale.

(2) Quitclaim deed by Oscar Hodgdon to defendant Byron M. Smith, executed June 20, 1874, the property being then in the actual and open possession of Louisa E. Gale.

(3) Warranty deed, Margaret Frazier to Daniel G. Shillock and to Samuel A. Bentley, executed May 14, 1873. Subsequent to this conveyance Shillock died, leaving a widow and heirs, who, with Smith and Bentley, were made defendants.

It was claimed by defendants that the power of attorney from Frazier to Grant was obtained for the purpose of enabling the latter to locate land scrip owned by Frazier, and selling the land so located; that it was not intended to be used in conveying the land in question; that such use of it was fraudulent; and that Gale and his wife, well knowing these facts, procured Grant to make a deed, under and by virtue of said power of attorney, to Louisa E. Gale. In this connection, however, the court found that Mrs. Gale was an innocent purchaser for a valuable consideration of the property in controversy; that if said power of attorney was procured from Margaret Frazier by fraud, and if the conveyance by Grant to Gale was fraudulently made, the said Louisa E. Gale and Artemas Gale were neither of them cognizant of such facts, and had no knowledge or notice whatever of such alleged fraud; and that Helen G. McKennan was also an innocent purchaser for valuable consideration of said property, and, at the time of the conveyance from Artemas Gale to her, had no notice or knowledge whatever of the pendency of this action, or of the ground upon which Smith claimed an interest in the property.

Upon the day before the case was tried, Margaret Frazier filed a complaint, denying Gale's possession of the lands, averring the title to be in Smith, or in herself for the benefit of Smith, and asked leave of the court to intervene and be made a defendant. This was refused, and the court found as conclusions of law, from the facts above stated, that Artemas Gale, the plaintiff, was, at the time of the commencement of the action, the owner in fee; that McKennan and Grigsby were, at the time of the trial, the owners each of an undivided half in fee-simple; and that the warranty deed from Frazier to Hodgdon, and the quitclaim deed from Hodgdon to Smith, and the warranty deed of Frazier to Shillock and Bentley, were all of them void, and conveyed no title, right, interest, or estate in the said property; and upon these conclusions a decree was entered confirming the title in McKennan and Grigsby. From this decree of the district court both Smith and Frazier appealed to the supreme court of the territory, by which it was affirmed, (30 N. W. Rep. 138; 29 N. W. Rep. 661,) and Smith thereupon appealed to this court. Smith having died subsequent to the appeal, the case is now prosecuted by his executrix.

Enoch Totten and F. H. Mackey, for appellant.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 512-516 intentionally omitted] C. K. Davis, for appellees.

Mr. Justice BROWN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

This case was tried in the court of original jurisdiction without a jury, upon the amended and supplemental answers of Byron M. Smith, and the replies thereto of Gale, Grigsby, and McKennan, and was appealed to the supreme court of the territory, and thence to this court, upon exceptions of the defendant Smith to certain proceedingns upon said trial.

1. Error is alleged in the refusal of the court to permit Margaret Frazier to file an intervening complaint, and be joined with defendant Smith as a necessary party to the complete determination of the controversy. By section 89 of the Dakota Code of Civil Procedure, respecting parties to civil actions, 'the court may determine any controversy between the parties before it, when it can be done without prejudice to the rights of others, or by saving their rights; but, when a complete determination of the controversy cannot be had without the presence of other parties, the court must cause them to be brought in.' And by section 90: 'Any person may, before the trial, intervene, in any action or proceeding, who has an interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either party, or an interest against both. an intervention takes place when a third person is permitted to become a party to an action or proceedins between other persons, either by joining the plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or by uniting with the defendant in resisting the claims of the plaintiff, or by demanding any thing adversely to both the plaintiff and the defendant, and is made by complaint, setting forth the grounds upon which the intervention rests, filed by leave of the court,' etc. This complaint set forth, in substance, the issue of the patent to the complainant in 1864, and the conveyance to Hodgdon, May 29, 1872, and averred that Hodgdon had no knowledge or notice that any person was then in possession of the lands; denied that any person was in possession thereof; further alleged the execution of the deed from Hodgdon to Smith of June 20, 1874; and averred that plaintiff had falsely claimed that he or his wife were possession of the and, and that by reason thereof the deeds to Hodgdon and Smith were void. And 'this complainant avers that in case said Smith does not now have the legal title to said land, that the legal title to the whole thereof is now in this complainant, and that she now holds the same for the use and benefit of said Smith, his heirs and assigns, and for no one else.'

These provisions of the Dakota Code above cited are found in the Codes of several of the states, and appear to have been originally adopted from Louisiana, wherein it is held by the supreme court, interpreting a similar section, that the interest which entitles a party to intervene must be a direct interest, by which the intervening party is to obtain immediate gain or suffer loss by the judgment which may be rendered between the original parties. Gasquet v. Johnson, 1 La. 431. In Horn v. Water Co., 13 Cal. 62, the supreme court of California had occasion to construe a similar provision of the Code of that state, and held, speaking through Mr. Justice FIELD, now a member of this court, that 'the interest mentioned in the statute which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other parties must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and limmediate character that the intervener will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. * * * To authorize an intervention, therefore, the interest must be that created by a claim to or lien upon the property, or some part thereof, in suit, or a claim to or lien upon the property, or some part thereof, which is the subject of litigation.' In Lewis v. Harwood, 28 Minn. 428, 10 N. W. Rep. 586, the cases from Louisiana and California were cited with approval. In that case the persons who sought to intervene held attachments upon some property subsequent to those of the plaintiff in the suit. The suit was upon certain promissory notes executed to the plaintiff by the defendants, and the interveners claimed that the notes were without consideration and fraudulent; that the plaintiff's attachments were fraudulent; and that the suit and attachments...