Sheth v. Webster
| Decision Date | 06 July 1998 |
| Docket Number | 97-6064.,No. 97-6063,97-6063 |
| Parties | Sulata Umed SHETH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jimmie WEBSTER, Officer, Defendant-Appellant. Sulata Umed SHETH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Tyrone WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
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Michael E. Upchurch, W. Austin Mulherin, Frazer, Greene, Upchurch & Baker, LLC, Mobile, AL, for Webster.
Daniel L. McCleave, McCleave, Roberts & Shields, P.C., Mobile, AL, for Sheth.
James B. Rossler, Mobile, AL, for Williams.
Before TJOFLAT and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and PROPST*, Senior District Judge.
Mobile Police Officer Jimmie Webster (Webster) and Mobile Police Sergeant Michael Tyrone Williams (Sergeant Williams) separately appeal from the rulings of the district court. The district court denied these defendants' motions for summary judgment based on assertions of discretionary function immunity from the state law torts of assault and battery, false arrest and malicious prosecution. The district court also denied Webster qualified immunity from some of the federal claims asserted against him. We affirm the denial of summary judgment on the federal and state law claims with respect to Officer Webster. We reverse the denial of summary judgment on the state law claims with respect to Sergeant Williams.
Officer Webster originally arrived at the Beverly Motel, owned by plaintiff, at about 7:30 a.m. on October 28, 1994, to help settle a dispute between a disgruntled motel occupant, Avon Williams, and the motel manager, Kimberly Wetjen. Avon Williams was seeking a refund of a portion of the rent paid by his co-occupant of the room, Aquilla Thomas, and the manager had refused. Thomas had requested that the money not be refunded to Avon Williams. Webster suggested that the manager refund the rent, but told Avon Williams that, perhaps, the claim was a civil matter that he ought to pursue in court.
Ms. Sulata Umed Sheth, the owner of the motel, arrived at 10:00 a.m. Avon Williams approached Sheth and again requested that the motel refund the rent to him. Sheth refused, citing Thomas's instructions not to refund the rent to Avon Williams and the dishevelment of the room in which Avon Williams stayed. Officer Webster was once more dispatched to the scene. Avon Williams was loudly and combatively demanding that Ms. Sheth hand over Aquilla Thomas's money. Webster advised the plaintiff to refund the money. In reply, the plaintiff informed Webster that Thomas did not want the rent that she had paid to be refunded to Avon Williams and that Avon Williams had apparently damaged his room. Webster reiterated his belief that the matter was civil in nature and ought to be resolved in small claims court.
As the district court reported:
Despite Officer Webster's statements concerning the nature of the dispute, Officer Webster argued with her Sheth concerning Williams' entitlement to the money. The plaintiff eventually offered to charge Williams for the day and refund the balance if Williams removed his belongings from the room. The plaintiff overheard Williams say that he intended to leave his stuff in the room, and the plaintiff told Williams that he could not leave his items in the room and have his money refunded. Officer Webster responded that, because he was being evicted, Williams need not remove his belongings from the room. The plaintiff told Officer Webster that she was not evicting Williams, but if Williams wanted a refund, then he must remove his belongings. The plaintiff further explained that she could not clean and relet the room with Williams' belongings in it.
Contradicted, Officer Webster stared at Sheth for a moment and then chided her that, being of Indian ethnicity, "you don't know our laws." The plaintiff verbally stood her ground, responding, "Police officers don't know all the laws, either, but I know some laws and my rights." At Sheth's reply, Officer Webster became enraged and violent. He shoved the plaintiff, who stumbled. He pushed again. The plaintiff cried to Webster that he was hurting her. He threw her back again. According to one witness, he kneed the plaintiff in the stomach. Sheth fell back against a Coke machine, five to twelve feet from where she stood.
Webster grabbed Sheth's arm and squeezed it. People around began to shout at Webster to stop, that he was hurting her. At least one witness told Webster that the plaintiff was sick. He twisted her arm around her back and locked handcuffs on her left wrist. Webster then dragged the plaintiff by the arm to his car. She "begged Officer Webster not to arrest her and place her in the car." She told him that she was claustrophobic and taking medication for an illness. Apparently, this was of no avail, because, with the help of Sergeant Williams, a latecomer on the scene, the plaintiff was shoved in the rear of the car.
Several minutes later, the plaintiff sought to use the restroom. Webster and Sergeant Williams initially declined to let her.2 After thirty minutes, the officers permitted the plaintiff to use the restroom, but did not remove the plaintiff's handcuffs. As a consequence, a maid at the plaintiff's motel accompanied the plaintiff to the bathroom to remove the plaintiff's garments and to otherwise aid her. Soon after the plaintiff's return from the restroom, she was taken to the Metro Police Station to be "fingerprinted, photographed, and booked." She was acquitted of all charges.
Plaintiff filed her complaint in this action on December 22, 1995. She makes the following state law claims against both Webster and Sergeant Williams: assault and battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution and outrage. She also makes the following federal claims against both Webster and Sergeant Williams: excessive force and unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, denial of due process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and denial of equal ... protection in violation of the Fourth (sic) and Fourteenth Amendments.3
Each defendant-appellant filed a motion for summary judgment. The court will not repeat the well established standards applicable to the consideration of motions for summary judgment. The district court appropriately recited them. Our review is de novo.
The district court granted both defendants-appellants' motions for summary judgment on the merits as to the plaintiff's claim of outrage. With regard to the plaintiff's claims of assault and battery, false arrest, and malicious prosecution, the district court considered the defendants-appellants' assertions of discretionary function immunity under state law. The district court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that both Webster and Sergeant Williams acted willfully, maliciously and in bad faith with regard to their treatment of plaintiff. The district court thus concluded that it was not necessary to attempt to precisely define the term "discretionary function" under state law because, in any event, Webster and Sergeant Williams had "forfeited" discretionary immunity because they had acted willfully, maliciously and in bad faith. The district court denied both the defendants-appellants' motions with regard to the claims of assault and battery, false arrest and malicious prosecution.
The district court granted both defendants-appellants' motions as to the federal claims of denial of due process and equal protection. The district court denied Webster's motion as to unlawful search and seizure and excessive force. The district court granted Sergeant Williams' motion as to unlawful search and seizure and excessive force based upon qualified immunity.
Sergeant Williams appeals from the district court's denial of state law discretionary function immunity on the state law claims against him. Webster appeals from the district court's denial of qualified immunity as to federal law claims against him and from the district court's denial of discretionary function immunity as to the state law claims against him. The following issues are presented for appeal: (1) Does this court have jurisdiction to consider Webster's interlocutory appeal of denial of qualified immunity under federal law? (2) Is Webster entitled to such immunity? (3) Does this court have jurisdiction to consider an interlocutory appeal of a denial of discretionary function immunity under Alabama law? (4) Are Webster and Sergeant Williams entitled to such immunity?
Since both the district court and the defendants rely on the facts as alleged by the plaintiff, there are, at this stage, no disputed facts. We thus conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider Webster's appeal of denial of qualified immunity with regard to the federal claims against him. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). This is not a case such as is addressed in Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) where the court "resolved a fact related dispute." Id. at 307, 115 S.Ct. 2151. In Johnson, the defendants contended that "we didn't do it." Id. at 308, 115 S.Ct. at 2154. The issues appealed here concern "not which facts the parties might be able to prove, but, rather, whether or not certain given facts showed a violation of `clearly established' law." Id. at 311, 115 S.Ct. at 2155, citing Mitchell. "A qualified immunity ruling ... is ... a legal issue that can be decided with reference only to undisputed facts and in isolation from the remaining issues of the case." Id. at 313, 115 S.Ct. at 2156, quoting Mitchell. ...
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