Doe v. Dekalb County School Dist.

• Decision Date: 17 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-8915,97-8915
• Parties: 127 Ed. Law Rep. 52, 8 A.D. Cases 1475, 13 NDLR P 106, 23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1603 John DOE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEKALB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1441

145 F.3d 1441

127 Ed. Law Rep. 52, 8 A.D. Cases 1475,

13 NDLR P 106,

23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1603

John DOE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEKALB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 97-8915.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

July 17, 1998.

Genevieve L. Frazier, Tanya Andrews Eades, Chambers, Mabry, McClelland & Brooks, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Chip Rowan, Rowan & Neis, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before ANDERSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and PAINE ^*, Senior District Judge.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

The Dekalb County School District (the "School District" or "District"), seeks to vacate a permanent injunction prohibiting it from transferring a teacher, John Doe, who is infected with HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. The School District wishes to transfer Doe from a classroom of children with severe behavioral disorders, because it fears that Doe might have blood-to-blood contact with one of his sometimes-violent students, thereby transmitting HIV. After conducting a bench trial, the district court granted Doe a permanent injunction under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., blocking his transfer. The School District, however, argues that the district court failed to make adequate findings of fact regarding the effect of Doe's illness on his qualifications and that Doe has not suffered an "adverse employment action." We REVERSE, VACATE the injunction, and REMAND for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

The School District has three distinct levels of special education programs for children with significant behavioral disorders. First, the District maintains "interrelated" classrooms for students with mild disorders; the District "mainstreams" these students for most of each school day. Second, the District has "self-contained" classrooms for children who are too "disordered" to participate in the interrelated program. Third, the District operates "psychoeducation" classrooms for students with the most severe behavioral problems. From 1992 to 1995, John Doe was a teacher at the District's Shadow Rock Psychoeducational Center ("Shadow Rock"). ¹

Children enrolled in the District's psychoeducation classes are often aggressive. As the District established at trial, these children frequently engage in acts of violence such as biting, hitting, scratching, and kicking. Some children also attempt to bring dangerous items such as razors to school or to attack their classmates or teachers with objects such as pencils. Because of these potential dangers, psychoeducation teachers must be able to physically restrain their pupils; for example, a psychoeducation teacher may have to "basket hold" several students each day. Often, these confrontations result in injuries to teachers. Although the number of scrapes and bruises suffered by teachers is unclear, psychoeducation teachers commonly file workman's compensation claims for significant injuries, and, at least once, a teacher has suffered a severe bite that drew blood and required medical attention.

In February 1995, Doe told Shadow Rock's principal that he was HIV-positive, and the principal in turn informed other school administrative personnel. Because District officials feared that violence and subsequent blood-to-blood contact between Doe and one of his psychoeducation students might lead to transmission of HIV, the District transferred Doe to an "interrelated" classroom at a different school in April 1995. The parties dispute whether this transfer was "voluntary"; the District emphasizes that Doe signed a transfer form, while Doe argues that he had no choice but to sign and that he hoped that by doing so he might at least get to teach a "self-contained" rather than an "interrelated" class. While the district court's finding regarding this point is somewhat unclear, the court appears to have concluded that the transfer was involuntary. In any case, Doe spent the months after his transfer trying to convince the District to return him to his psychoeducation class, or, as an alternative, to assign him to a group of "self-contained" children.

Although Doe would prefer to teach a psychoeducational rather than an interrelated class, his transfer does not appear to represent a demotion. Doe's salary, benefits, and seniority all remain the same. Doe also enjoys the same relative level of prestige within the school system and the larger community. In addition, while Doe lacks a certificate from the State of Georgia in interrelated teaching, his transfer does not seem likely to render obsolete his investment in his own education. Although Doe's teaching experience has focused on psychoeducation, he does not have a particularly specialized educational background. Doe holds a bachelor's degree in psychology from New York University and a master's degree in special education from Georgia State University.

Doe, however, does have a Georgia certificate in psychoeducational teaching but not in interrelated instruction. To obtain an interrelated certificate, Doe would have to complete ten credit hours of coursework. In order to reduce any inconvenience this additional study might pose to Doe, the District has allowed Doe three years to become certified and promised to pay his educational expenses. In addition, the District has suggested that Doe might be able to count his ten hours concerning interrelated teaching toward the continuing education total that he would have to achieve in any case to retain his current certification, though this point is not clear in the current record. Even without the interrelated certificate, Doe appears qualified to teach an interrelated class, since his interrelated pupils suffer from the same sort of disorders as his previous psychoeducational students--his new students are just easier to teach because they are less prone to misbehavior. As Doe concedes, his new interrelated position is less stressful. Significantly, Doe also agrees with the District that he will be more marketable as an interrelated teacher (once he obtains his certificate), with more long-term career opportunities, than he was before his transfer.

On August 1, 1995, Doe learned from the District's Executive Director of Personnel that he could not return to a psychoeducation setting or move to a self-contained classroom because of his HIV status. On August 3, 1995, Doe therefore timely filed a discrimination charge with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging that the District was discriminating against him on the basis of his HIV disability. After the EEOC issued Doe a right-to- sue letter, he brought this action in the district court under both the ADA and the Vocational Rehabilitation Act ("VRA") 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.

From July 28 through July 31, 1997, the district court held a bench trial on Doe's claims. On August 1, 1997, the district court ruled in Doe's favor and issued a short written order containing terse findings of fact and conclusions of law. After noting that the parties agreed that Doe's HIV infection rendered him disabled, the district court found that "[t]he risk that plaintiff will transmit HIV to students with severe behavior disorders, including children who are prone to bite, is remote and theoretical." R4-59 at 2, p 11. The court also found that Doe had suffered an adverse employment action. The district court, however, made no attempt to explain the basis for its conclusion regarding the risk of HIV transmission to Doe's psychoeducation students, nor did the court offer any rationale for its assessment that Doe's transfer was "adverse." ² Whatever its underlying reasoning, the district court issued a permanent injunction under the ADA requiring the School District to reinstate Doe as a psychoeducational instructor. ³

II. DISCUSSION

In order to prevail under the ADA, Doe must prove all three elements of his prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. ⁴ First, he must show that he has a disability. ⁵ Second, he must demonstrate that he is qualified to serve as a psychoeducation teacher, with or without some reasonable accommodation by the District, despite his disability. Third, he must show that he has suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability (i.e., that he has suffered employment discrimination). See Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 519, 523-24 (11th Cir.1996) (discussing the elements of a prima facie case under the ADA).

The School District contends that the district court made two critical errors in applying this framework. First, the District argues that the court did not properly find or balance relevant safety factors regarding Doe's continued qualification for a psychoeducation position, as required by School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987). Second, the District maintains that its transfer of Doe was not an "adverse employment action." We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its analysis of law de novo. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080, 1084 (11th Cir.1996). ⁶ We address each of the District's contentions in turn.

A. WHETHER DOE IS QUALIFIED

In Arline, the Supreme Court considered whether a woman suffering from tuberculosis was otherwise qualified to be an elementary schoolteacher. See generally Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 107 S.Ct. 1123 (applying the VRA). Rather than establishing some arbitrary rule regarding the relevance of contagious disease to teaching qualifications, the Court insisted that district courts undertake "individualized inquiry" in each case. Id. at 287, 107 S.Ct. at 1130. This inquiry must include:

(a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the...