Brady v. Fort Bend County
| Decision Date | 02 July 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-20886,96-20886 |
| Citation | 145 F.3d 691 |
| Parties | 49 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1014 Kenneth Craig BRADY, et al., Plaintiffs, Kenneth Craig Brady; Bobby Lee Evans; William E. Fortenberry; James Arthur Leach; Stephen Leon Skinner; Guy "Nubbin" Chamblee, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, v. FORT BEND COUNTY, et al., Defendants, Fort Bend County, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee. Antonio O. ROSAS, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. FORT BEND COUNTY, et al., Defendants, Fort Bend County, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
John M. Zavitsanos, Joseph Y. Ahmad, Ahmad & Zavitsanos, Houston, TX, for Brady, Rosas, Evans, Fortenberry, Leach, Skinner and Chamblee.
William S. Helfand, Kevin D. Jewell, Magenheim, Bateman, Robinson, Wrotenbery & Helfand, Houston, TX, for Fort Bend County.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before KING, EMILIO M. GARZA and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Fort Bend County appeals the district court's entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs Kenneth Craig Brady, Guy "Nubbin" Chamblee, Bobby Lee Evans, William Fortenberry, James Leach, Stephen Leon Skinner, and Antonio O. Rosas based upon a jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs on their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that R. George Molina, the former sheriff of Fort Bend County, failed to rehire them based upon their exercise of their First Amendment rights of free speech and association. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court's judgment.
In 1992, R. George Molina, a Democrat, ran for sheriff of Fort Bend County, Texas, against the Republican incumbent, Perry Hillegeist. At that time, plaintiffs Kenneth Craig Brady, Guy "Nubbin" Chamblee, Bobby Lee Evans, William Fortenberry, James Leach, Stephen Leon Skinner, and Antonio O. Rosas (collectively, the Plaintiffs) worked under Hillegeist as deputy sheriffs in the Fort Bend County Sheriff's Department. Brady was the lieutenant of the detective bureau of the sheriff's department. Chamblee was a detective sergeant in narcotics. Evans was a patrol sergeant. Fortenberry was the lieutenant in charge of the county jail, and Leach was a sergeant supervised by Fortenberry. Skinner was a patrol deputy. Rosas was the sergeant who supervised the warrants division.
Each of the Plaintiffs supported Hillegeist's bid for re-election. Although their levels of participation varied, the Plaintiffs generally supported Hillegeist by attending rallies, posting signs, and campaigning door-to-door. Molina won the election in November 1992. That month, he appointed a transition team to determine which of the sheriff's department's current employees would be reappointed under his administration. The transition team met on November 4, 1992, and on December 1 or 2, 1992. On December 4, 1992, Molina delivered letters to the Plaintiffs stating that they would not be rehired on January 1, 1993. On December 31, 1992, Molina was sworn into office. Under Texas law, the Plaintiffs' terms as deputies expired automatically when Hillegeist's tenure of office expired on December 31, 1992. See Abbott v. Pollock, 946 S.W.2d 513, 517 (Tex.App.--Austin 1997, writ denied); El Paso County Sheriff's Deputies' Ass'n v. Samaniego, 802 S.W.2d 727, 728 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1990, writ denied). On January 1, 1993, Molina, now officially occupying the office of sheriff, reaffirmed his decision not to rehire the Plaintiffs and signed letters to this effect.
On February 16, 1993, Brady sued Fort Bend County (the County) and Molina in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Molina failed to rehire him on the basis of his political support for Hillegeist in the sheriff's race and that this action constituted a violation of the First Amendment. Evans, Fortenberry, Leach, Skinner, and Chamblee subsequently joined as plaintiffs in the action. On June 30, 1993, the County moved for summary judgment, and Molina also moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied both motions. Molina appealed, and a panel of this court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment. See Brady v. Fort Bend County, 58 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir.1995). The court then granted Molina's suggestion of rehearing en banc. See id.
On July 21, 1994, while en banc consideration of Molina's appeal in Brady's suit was pending, Rosas filed a separate action against the County and Molina. The County and Molina both moved to dismiss. The district court denied their motions, and Molina filed another appeal. The Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Molina as a party defendant in both the Brady and Rosas suits. As a result, this court dismissed both appeals. The Rosas and Brady suits were then consolidated at the district court level.
On June 3, 1996, trial commenced. The County moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the Plaintiffs' case and at the close of the evidence. The district court denied these motions. On June 19, 1996, the jury returned a verdict in favor of all of the Plaintiffs, awarding damages for back pay to all of the Plaintiffs, back benefits to all of the Plaintiffs except Chamblee, Evans, and Skinner and mental anguish to all of the Plaintiffs. 1 The County moved for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or remittitur. The district court granted the County's motion in part and set aside the jury's award of mental anguish damages as to all of the Plaintiffs except Skinner on the ground that insufficient evidence supported these awards. It denied the motion in all other respects. On August 15, 1996, the district court entered final judgment consistent with the jury's verdict except that it awarded mental anguish damages only to Skinner. The district court also awarded the Plaintiffs prejudgment interest on back pay and attorney's fees of $751,370.75. Additionally, the district court ordered reinstatement of the Plaintiffs but stayed the reinstatement pending appeal.
The County timely filed a notice of appeal, and all of the Plaintiffs except Skinner cross-appealed the district court's partial grant of the County's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of mental anguish damages.
The County appeals the district court's judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs on the following grounds:
1. As a matter of law, the County is not liable for Molina's hiring decisions because Molina was not a final policymaker regarding the County's employment policy.
2. First Amendment law should defer to a state's right to decide, as Texas has done, whether patronage practices will exist as part of political systems.
3. The County's interest in efficiency in the services that it provides through its employees outweighed the interests of the Plaintiffs in engaging in political activity in support of Hillegeist.
4. Molina's actions could not have violated the Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights because he merely failed to rehire them as opposed to discharging them before their terms expired.
5. The district court erred in instructing the jury that the County was required to prove that Molina possessed legitimate reasons for his failure to rehire the Plaintiffs by a preponderance of the evidence.
6. Insufficient evidence exists to support the jury's conclusion that Molina's decision not to rehire the Plaintiffs was based upon their political support for Hillegeist.
7. The district court erred in admitting certain testimony from one of the Plaintiffs' witnesses because the testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial.
8. The district court's award of attorney's fees is supported by insufficient evidence.
All of the Plaintiffs except Skinner contend on appeal that the district court erred in partially granting the County's motion for judgment as a matter of law and setting aside their awards of damages for mental anguish. We consider each of these issues in turn.
The County correctly observes that municipal liability for constitutional torts arises when the execution of an official policy or custom of the municipality causes the constitutional injury. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). It also recognizes that a single action by a municipal official possessing final policymaking authority regarding the action in question constitutes the official policy of the municipality and that the determination of whether a municipal official wields final policymaking authority regarding a particular action constitutes a question of state law. See McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 1736-37, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997). The County contends that Molina was not acting in a capacity as the County's final policymaker when it declined to rehire the Plaintiffs. In support of this contention, the County relies on the following passage from Justice Brennan's opinion in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986):
Municipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered. The fact that a particular official--even a policymaking official--has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion. The official must also be responsible for establishing final government policy respecting such activity before the municipality can be held liable.12
Id. at 484 & n. 12, 106 S.Ct. 1292 ().
The County argues that Molina is analogous to the hypothetical sheriff in Pembaur. The County concedes that, under Texas law, Molina constituted its final policymaker with respect to law enforcement and that his actions in this capacity could form a basis for county...
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