Greaser v. State, Dept. of Corrections

Decision Date01 June 1998
Docket Number97-1405,Nos. 97-1398,s. 97-1398
Citation145 F.3d 979
Parties77 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 441 Eunice GREASER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF MISSOURI, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; Dora Schriro; George Lombardi; Sarah Schuette; Gerald Higgins; Kelly Lock; Michael Groose; Appeals from the United States Vernon Heath; Lawrence Bax; Cecil R. District Court for the Riley; James Cregger, Bill Keeth; Western District of Missouri. Robert Walling, Defendants-Appellees, Carl White, Defendant, Phillip Higgins, Defendant-Appellee. Eunice GREASER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE OF MISSOURI, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; Dora Schriro; George Lombardi; Sarah Schuette; Gerald Higgins; Kelly Lock; Michael Groose; Vernon Heath; Lawrence Bax; Cecil R. Riley; James Cregger, Bill Keeth, Defendants-Appellants, Robert Walling, Defendant, Carl White; Phillip Higgins, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

James W. Riner, Jefferson City, MO, argued, for Plaintiff.

Sara L. Trower, Jefferson City, MO, argued, for Defendants.

Before WOLLMAN and HANSEN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, 1 District Judge.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Eunice Greaser appeals from the judgment entered by the district court 2 on the jury's verdict in favor of the Missouri Department of Corrections and various individually named employees of the Department (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the Department") in her Title VII retaliation claim. The Department cross-appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in denying costs pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d). In addition, the Department moves for revocation of Greaser's in forma pauperis status. We affirm.

I.

Greaser began working for the Missouri Department of Corrections in 1980. After serving as a correctional officer at the Renz Correctional Center for four years, Greaser left to care for her seriously ill husband. She returned to employment with the Department in 1986 as a correctional officer at the Central Missouri Correctional Center.

In 1990, Greaser was subjected to inappropriate comments made by a co-worker, Robert Walling. As a result of these comments, Greaser filed an internal sexual harassment grievance against Walling. The Department investigated the situation and, having found reason to believe Greaser's allegation, demoted Walling and transferred him to another correctional facility. 3

After filing the grievance against Walling, Greaser continued to work for the Department until 1995. During that time, Greaser sought various promotional opportunities within the Department. Although she was a candidate for approximately thirty positions at twelve different correctional institutions and interviewed with approximately seventy Department officials regarding these positions, Greaser was not offered a promotion. As a result, Greaser began to suspect that various Department officials were retaliating against her because of her 1990 grievance and Walling's subsequent demotion. This suspicion was also based on Greaser's belief that she was being mistreated by co-workers, supervisors, and Department officials.

In light of this perceived retaliation, Greaser initiated this claim alleging that the Department had retaliated against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. At trial, Greaser testified that she believed that she was denied promotions, given unfavorable duty assignments, and belittled and ostracized by various fellow employees and supervisors because of the grievance she had filed in 1990. The Department offered testimony indicating that Greaser was denied promotions not for retaliatory reasons but because she interviewed poorly. At the close of Greaser's case in chief, the district court entered judgment as a matter of law (JAML) in favor of in favor of Dora Schriro and another of the individually named defendants. The case against the other named defendants was submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict in favor of each defendant. The district court denied Greaser's motion for a new trial. Shortly thereafter, the Department sought costs in the amount of $6,798.99. Greaser objected to the Department's bill of costs and requested that she be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court rejected the Department's application for costs and ordered that the parties each bear their own costs. In addition, the court granted Greaser leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

On appeal, Greaser contends that the district court erred in denying her motion for a new trial because: (1) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; (2) the instructions were erroneous; and (3) the verdicts were inconsistent. In addition, she challenges the district court's grant of JAML in favor of Dora Schriro. The Department cross-appeals, challenging the district court's denial of costs and seeking revocation of Greaser's in forma pauperis status.

II.

We first address Greaser's contention that the district court improperly denied her motion for a new trial. We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. See Buchholz v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 120 F.3d 146, 148 (8th Cir.1997). A new trial is required only if the first trial resulted in a miscarriage of justice. See White v. Pence, 961 F.2d 776, 780 (8th Cir.1992). Moreover, we have recognized that "inaccuracies or errors at this stage of the proceeding should not form the basis for setting aside verdicts, unless prejudicial error is shown." Buchholz, 120 F.3d at 148 (quoting Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Miller, 402 F.2d 134, 143 (8th Cir.1968)).

A.

Greaser first contends that a new trial is necessary because the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Where a motion for a new trial is based on such a claim, "the district court's denial of the motion 'is virtually unassailable on appeal.' " Keenan v. Computer Associates Int'l, Inc., 13 F.3d 1266, 1269 (8th Cir.1994) (quoting Peterson ex rel. Peterson v. General Motors Corp., 904 F.2d 436, 439-40 (8th Cir.1990)).

The various individuals who interviewed Greaser testified that she was denied promotions not because of any retaliatory motive but because she did not interview well. These individuals testified that Greaser appeared to lack self-confidence and had difficulty answering the most basic of questions in a satisfactory manner. Moreover, a majority of these individuals testified that they did not know of the prior sexual harassment grievance filed by Greaser when they interviewed her or when they failed to recommend her for promotion.

Greaser would have us disregard this testimony and rely instead on her assurances to the jury that she interviewed well. She argues that the Department's claim that she interviewed poorly is entirely subjective and easy to manufacture. Thus, she asserts that such testimony is inherently suspect and must be "closely scrutinized for discriminatory abuse." O'Connor v. Peru State College, 781 F.2d 632, 637-38 (8th Cir.1986). The duty of close scrutiny was for the jury, however, and although the jury was at liberty to disbelieve the testimony of Department officials, it was also entitled to find that testimony credible, as it apparently did.

Similarly, Greaser's other arguments are little more than an invitation to determine the credibility of witnesses, which was again a task for the jury to perform. See Manatt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 122 F.3d 514, 518 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 697, 139 L.Ed.2d 641 (1998). We conclude that the jury's verdict does not constitute a miscarriage of justice and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.

B.

Greaser also asserts that she is entitled to a new trial because the district court improperly instructed the jury. Jury instructions are a matter generally within the broad discretion of the district court. See Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 845-46 (8th Cir.1997) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2510, 138 L.Ed.2d 1013 (1997). We will reverse only if the instructions when viewed in their entirety, contain "an error or errors that affected the substantial rights of the parties." Id. at 846 (quoting Hastings v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 975 F.2d 506, 510 (8th Cir.1992)). The instructions need not be technically perfect or even a model of clarity. See id. Furthermore, the fact that a trial court erred in giving or not giving a particular instruction to the jury does not automatically entitle a party to relief; the error must be prejudicial. See Stockmen's Livestock Market, Inc. v. Norwest Bank of Sioux City, N.A., 135 F.3d 1236, 1246 (8th Cir.1998).

Greaser concedes that she made no objection to the instructions. Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection." Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. The purpose of this rule "is to compel litigants to afford the trial court an opportunity to cure [a] defective instruction and to prevent litigants from ensuring a new trial in the event of an adverse verdict by covertly relying on the error." Dupre v. Fru-Con Engineering, Inc., 112 F.3d 329, 333 (8th Cir.1997) (quoting Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Star City Gravel Co., 592 F.2d 455, 459 (8th Cir.1979)). Thus, where no adequate objection is made to preserve a purported error in instructions, we review for plain error only. Plain error review is "narrow and confined to the exceptional case where error has seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings." Ryther, 108 F.3d at 847 (quoting Des Moines Bd. of Water Works Trustees v. Alvord, 706 F.2d 820, 824 (8th Cir.1983)). Having reviewed the challenged instructions, we conclude that no...

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