Thomas v. City of Indianapolis

• Decision Date: 05 December 1924
• Docket Number: 23,738,24,070,24,071,24,072
• Citation: 145 N.E. 550,195 Ind. 440
• Parties: Thomas et al. v. City of Indianapolis et al. Landemeier et al. v. City of Indianapolis. Moseman et al. v. City of Indianapolis. Dillon et al. v. City of Indianapolis
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

145 N.E. 550

195 Ind. 440

Thomas et al. v. City of Indianapolis et al.

Landemeier et al. v. City of Indianapolis.

Moseman et al. v. City of Indianapolis.

Dillon et al. v. City of Indianapolis

Nos. 23,738, 24,070, 24,071, 24,072

Supreme Court of Indiana

December 5, 1924

1. MASTER AND SERVANT.---Interfering, with Employees.---"Picketing".---When Lawful.---Injunction.---In the absence of legislation on the subject, peaceful "picketing" is not unlawful, but where it is accompanied by force, intimidation or coercion it is unlawful, and will be enjoined by a court in the exercise of its equitable powers. p. 444.

2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.---Ordinances.---Anti-Picketing.---Validity.---Statute.---Under the authority conferred upon city councils by 8655, cl. 47 Burns 1914, to pass ordinances to preserve peace and good order, a council has the power to pass an ordinance prohibiting "picketing" in labor disputes when accompanied by violence, threats, intimidation and coercion p. 445.

3. MASTER AND SERVANT.---Labor Disturbances.---"Picketing" Defined.---"Picketing" has been defined as the maintenance of an organized espionage on the works or place of business of an employer and those going to and from them p. 446.

4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.---Ordinances.---"Anti-Picketing".---Validity.---Statute.---An ordinance prohibiting "picketing" generally, whether accompanied by violence, threats or intimidation or not, is not an unreasonable exercise of the power given to city councils by 8655, cl. 47, Burns 1914 to enact ordinances to preserve peace and good order. p. 447.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.---Rights of Individuals Subservient to Public Welfare.---It is a fundamental principle that the rights of individuals are subservient to the welfare of the general public. p. 449.

6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.---Free Speech.---Peaceable Assemblage.---Right to Use Public Streets.---The rights of a person to free speech, peaceable assemblage, the use of public streets, and other similar rights and privileges, are all subject to such reasonable regulations as the governing body of the government may make for the general good. p. 450.

7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.---Ordinance Prohibiting "Picketing".---Statute.---A city ordinance prohibiting "picketing" does not infringe upon the constitutional rights of citizens to free speech, peaceable assemblage, or the use of the public streets, deprive them of their liberty without due process of law, nor violate 1 of the Bill of Rights of the State Constitution. p. 450.

8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.---Ordinance Prohibiting "Picketing".---Not Class Legislation.---Statute.---A city ordinance prohibiting "picketing", passed pursuant to the authority given to city councils by 8655, cl. 47, Burns 1914, to preserve peace and good order, is not class legislation. p. 450.

9. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.---Ordinance Prohibiting "Picketing".---Does not Prevent Employees from Striking.---A city ordinance prohibiting "picketing" does not prevent employees from striking or from presenting their side of a labor controversy to others. p. 451.

10. CRIMINAL LAW.---Ordinance Prohibiting "Picketing".---Conflict with Criminal Statutes.---Statutes.---A city ordinance prohibiting "picketing", passed pursuant to the authority given city councils by 8655, cl. 47, Burns 1914, to preserve peace and good order, is not invalid under 1946 Burns 1914, Acts 1905 p. 584, 78, prohibiting the enactment of ordinances prescribing punishment for the violation thereof when such violation constitutes a criminal offense under a statute. p. 451.

11. CRIMINAL LAW.---Criminal Offense.---Violating City Ordinance.---Punishment May be for Both.---If a violation of a city ordinance constitutes a criminal offense under the state law, the violator may be prosecuted for both. p. 451.

12. CRIMINAL LAW.---Several Offenses Growing out of Same Transaction.---Where more than one criminal offense grows out of the same facts, and no one of such offenses is necessarily included in the other, there may be a conviction on each offense. p. 451.

No. 23,738 from the Johnson Circuit Court; Fremont Miller, Judge.

Nos. 24,070, 24,071 and 24,072 from Marion Circuit Court (34,348, 34,349, 34,350); Harry O. Chamberlain, Judge.

Cause No. 23,738 was a suit by John R. Thomas and others against the City of Indianapolis and others. From a judgment for defendants, the plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Causes Nos. 24,070, 24,071 and 24,072 were prosecutions by the City of Indianapolis against the several defendants for the violation of a city ordinance. From judgments of conviction, the respective defendants appealed. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Joseph O. Carson, William H. Faust, J. Herbert Hartman and M. L. Clawson, for appellants.

James M. Ogden, William J. Bailey, Samuel Ashby, Thomas D. Stevenson, Harry E. Yockey, Dixon H. Bynum and Miller, Barnett & Barnett, for appellees.

Gause J. Ewbank, J., not participating.

OPINION

Gause, J.

All of the above cases were consolidated for purposes of briefing in this court, and may be disposed of by one opinion.

Cause No. 23,738 is an action in which appellants sought to enjoin the appellees, the city of Indianapolis, the mayor of said city, the chief of police, and certain other officers from enforcing against appellants and others a certain ordinance of said city known as an "Anti-Picketing" ordinance.

The other causes are appeals from convictions for violations of said ordinance.

The question presented in all of said cases is as to the validity of said ordinance.

The ordinance, omitting the title, is as follows:

"Be it ordained by the Common Council of the City of Indianapolis, Indiana:

"Section 1. Whoever shall watch, beset or picket the premises of another, where any person is employed, or any approach thereto, or any place or approach thereto, where such employe lodges or resides, for the purposes of inducing any such employe, by compulsion, threats, coercion, intimidation, or by any act of violence, or by putting such employe in fear, to quit his or her employment or to refrain from seeking or freely entering into employment, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined in any sum not less than Ten Dollars ($ 10.00), nor more than Three Hundred Dollars ($ 300.00), to which may be added imprisonment not exceeding sixty (60) days.

"Section 2. Whoever shall watch, beset or picket the premises of another, or any approach thereto for the purpose of inducing others to refrain from entering such premises, or from patronizing, transacting business with or negotiating with the owner or occupant of such premises shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined in any sum not less than Ten Dollars ($ 10.00), nor more than Three Hundred Dollars ($ 300.00) to which may be added imprisonment not exceeding sixty (60) days.

"Section 3. Whoever, in association or agreement with one or more persons, shall assemble, congregate or meet together in the vicinity of any premises where other persons are employed or upon the streets, approaches or places adjacent thereto, for the purpose of inducing any such employe, by compulsion, threats, coercion, intimidation, or by any act of violence or by putting such employe in fear, to quit his or her employment therein or to refrain from seeking or freely entering into employment therein, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined in any sum not less than Ten Dollars $ 10.00), nor more than Three Hundred Dollars ($ 300.00), to which may be added imprisonment not exceeding sixty (60) days.

"Section 4. Whoever, in association or agreement with one or more persons, shall assemble, congregate or meet together in the vicinity of the premises of another, or upon the streets, approaches or places adjacent thereto, for the purpose of inducing others to refrain from entering such premises or from patronizing, transacting business with or negotiating with the owner or occupant thereof, of such premises, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined in any sum not less than Ten Dollars ($ 10.00), nor more than Three Hundred Dollars ($ 300.00), to which may be added imprisonment not exceeding sixty (60) days.

"Section 5. Whoever, for the purpose of compelling, coercing, or inducing any persons to quit his or her employment or to refrain from seeking or freely entering into employment, shall utter to or within the hearing of such person or persons, any derogatory or opprobrious or indecent epithets or languages or gestures or threats of violence, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined in any sum not less than Ten Dollars ($ 10.00), nor more than Three Hundred Dollars ($ 300.00), to which may be added imprisonment not exceeding sixty (60) days."

The first objection appellants make to the ordinance in question is that the city council had no authority, under the city charter, to pass the same.

Clause 47 of § 8655 Burns 1914, Acts 1905 p. 219, provides that city councils shall have the power to pass ordinances "To preserve peace and good order, * * *, quell riots and disperse disorderly assemblages. * * *."

Appellants assert that this ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive and not within the power granted by the above statute. They take the position that picketing is not per se unlawful, and that this general grant of power in the statute is not sufficient to authorize such an ordinance.

Counsel refer to the case of Karges Furniture Co. v Amalgamated, etc., Union (1905), 165 Ind. 421, 75 N.E. 877, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 788, 6 Ann. Cas. 829, in which it was held that the mere act of picketing, in a labor dispute, was not within itself unlawful, if not accompanied by unlawful means. It should be borne in mind that the court was, in that case, speaking of what was lawful in the absence of any legislation upon the subject, and no ...