Failla v. City of Passaic
| Decision Date | 29 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-5835,No. 96-5538,Nos. 96-5538,96-5539 and 96-5835,C,V,No. 96-5539,96-5538,96-5539,96-5835,s. 96-5538 |
| Citation | 146 F.3d 149 |
| Parties | 8 A.D. Cases 275, 13 NDLR P 9 William FAILLA, v. CITY OF PASSAIC; Passaic Police Department; Victor Jacalone, Chief of Police, Victor Jacalone, in his official capacity and individually, Appellant inity of Passaic and Passaic Police Department, Appellants inictor Jacalone, Appellant in |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Allan Roth (argued), Scarinci & Hollenbeck, Seacaucus, NJ, for Appellants City of Passaic and Passaic Police Department.
Peter W. Till (argued), Wilf & Silverman, Short Hills, NJ, for Appellant Victor Jacalone.
Michael Shen, Shneyer & Shen, P.C., Teaneck, NJ, for Appellee William Failla.
Jeffrey E. Fogel (argued), Ball Livingston, Nutley, NJ, for Appellee William Failla.
Before: SCIRICA, ROTH, and RENDELL Circuit Judges.
Appellants City of Passaic, Passaic Police Department, and Victor Jacalone appeal from a judgment entered upon a jury's determination that appellants violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination when they transferred appellee William Failla to a night shift which aggravated his back condition, and from the district court's orders denying their consolidated post-trial motions and their motion for reconsideration of the award of attorneys' fees to Failla. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the judgment entered against the City and the Police Department, vacate the judgment entered against Jacalone, and reverse the district court's order denying appellants' post-trial motions insofar as it imposes individual liability on Jacalone, but will affirm the order in all other respects. We will also affirm the order denying appellants' motion for reconsideration of the attorneys' fee award.
Failla served as a captain with the Passaic Police Department. In 1989, he suffered a work-related back injury for which he subsequently received a partial disability award pursuant to the Worker's Compensation Act. In 1991, Failla was transferred from day shift to night shift work. At trial, Failla testified that approximately one year prior to that transfer, Jacalone, then the Chief of the Passaic Police Department and Failla's immediate supervisor, advised Failla that he wanted to transfer Failla to the night shift. Failla stated that he informed Jacalone of his back pain, and that Jacalone responded that the night air would "do [him] good."
Failla testified that following his transfer to the night shift, his back pain worsened. Several of Failla's co-workers also testified to his apparent discomfort on the night shift. Failla claimed that both the night air and the more strenuous duties required of the night captain aggravated his back condition. Failla also offered expert medical testimony in support of his claims. The expert testified that the cold and dampness of the night air, as well as the increased stress associated with the busier night shift, aggravated Failla's back condition. Failla requested a transfer back to a day shift on at least six occasions between 1992 and 1993. However, Failla was not reinstated to a day shift until November 1993, after he filed this suit and after Jacalone retired.
While still working the night shift, Failla initiated this action against the City, the Police Department, and Jacalone in his official and individual capacities. Failla alleged several causes of action, many of which were dismissed prior to trial. Failla proceeded to trial on his claims against all three appellants based upon their alleged violation of the LAD, and against the City and the Police Department based on their alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 1 Failla contended that day shift work constituted a reasonable accommodation of his back condition.
At trial, the jury determined that Failla was not "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA, and judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the City and the Police Department on the ADA claim. The jury concluded, however, that Failla was "handicapped" within the meaning of the LAD, and that the City and the Police Department were liable for failing to accommodate Failla's handicap. The jury also concluded that Jacalone had engaged in discriminatory conduct within the scope of his employment, and the district court found him liable on that basis. The district court awarded Failla compensatory damages of $143,000, with costs. The district court denied appellants' subsequent motions for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative for a new trial, and awarded attorneys' fees to Failla. This appeal followed. 2
Appellants have appealed from multiple rulings of the district court, and different standards of review apply to different arguments that appellants have raised on appeal. Appellants' contention that Failla failed to establish a prima facie case under the LAD relates to their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and this court exercises plenary review over an order granting or denying a motion for judgment as a matter of law, applying the same standard as the district court. See Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir.1993). A court should grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law "only if viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, no jury could decide in that party's favor." Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 985 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3d Cir.1993). Appellants' arguments relating to Jacalone's individual liability turn on the district court's interpretation of the effect of the jury's answers to interrogatories. We exercise plenary review over the district court's determination that the jury's findings resulted in a verdict of individual liability against Jacalone. See Bradford-White Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 872 F.2d 1153, 1158 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993, 110 S.Ct. 542, 107 L.Ed.2d 539 (1989). Appellants' challenges to the district court's evidentiary rulings relate to their right to a new trial, and an abuse of discretion standard applies to the district court's decision to grant or deny a new trial. See Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir.1992). Where, however, the district court's decision rests on the application of legal precepts, we exercise plenary review. See id. (citing Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 921 (3d Cir.1986)). Finally, in considering appellants' arguments that the district court improperly awarded attorneys' fees, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1182-83 (3d Cir.1990). The district court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Appellants raise four arguments on appeal. They contend that Failla failed to establish a prima facie case under the LAD, that the district court wrongly imposed a verdict of individual liability against Jacalone, that the district court erroneously admitted evidence of a worker's compensation judgment, and that the district court improperly awarded attorneys' fees to Failla. We will address these in turn.
We first consider appellants' contention that Failla failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the LAD. The LAD prohibits discrimination against any person who is or has been "handicapped," unless the handicap precludes the performance of employment. See N.J.S.A. § 10:5-4.1. The regulations promulgated pursuant to the statute require employers to make reasonable accommodations to the limitations of a handicapped employee unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer. See N.J.A.C. § 13:13-2.5(b); see also Ensslin v. Township of North Bergen, 275 N.J.Super. 352, 646 A.2d 452, 458-59 (1994).
Appellants challenge two aspects of Failla's prima facie case under the LAD. First, appellants dispute the finding that Failla was "handicapped," arguing that the jury's determination that Failla was not disabled under the ADA precluded its determination that Failla was handicapped under the LAD. Second, appellants contend that Failla failed to demonstrate any need for an accommodation. We find these arguments unpersuasive.
The meaning and propriety of the jury's verdict with respect to the ADA claims on the one hand and the LAD claims on the other turns on a review of the statutory definitions of "disability" and "handicapped." Although the words are often treated interchangeably as a matter of common usage, we have expressed some skepticism as to whether the terms, as used in the ADA and LAD, are actually equivalent. See Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 956 (3d Cir.1996).
The ADA defines the term "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities...." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). The LAD, in contrast, applies to "handicapped" persons, defined by statute as those who suffer: from physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness including epilepsy, and which shall include, but not be limited to, any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical coordination, blindness or visual impediment, deafness or hearing impediment, muteness or speech impediment or physical reliance on a service or guide dog, wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or device, or from any mental, psychological, or developmental disability resulting from anatomical, psychological, physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the normal exercise of any bodily or mental functions or is demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques. Handicapped shall also mean suffering from AIDS or HIV infection.
N.J.S.A. § 10:5-5(q). In contrast...
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