Russell v. Burris, s. 97-3922
| Citation | 146 F.3d 563 |
| Decision Date | 29 September 1998 |
| Docket Number | 97-4033 and 97-4038,Nos. 97-3922,s. 97-3922 |
| Parties | Ron RUSSELL, Kent Ingram, William R. Austin, and Associated Industries of Arkansas Political Action Committee, Appellants, v. Troy BURRIS, In His Official Capacity as Chairperson of the Arkansas Ethics Commission; Rita Looney, In Her Official Capacity as a Member of the Arkansas Ethics Commission; Tom Alexander, In His Official Capacity as a Member of the Arkansas Ethics Commission; Ben Allen, In His Official Capacity as a Member of the Arkansas Ethics Commission; Jack Kearney, In His Official Capacity as a Member of the Arkansas Ethics Commission; and Citizens for Clean Government, Appellees. American Civil Liberties Union of Arkansas, James Madison Center for Free Speech, Shrink Missouri Government PAC, and Zev David Fredman, Amici Curiae on Behalf of Appellants. Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah, and Vermont, Amici Curiae on Behalf of Appellees. Ron RUSSELL, Kent Ingram, William R. Austin, and Associated Industries of Arkansas Political Action Committee, Appellees, v. Troy BURRIS, In His Official Capacity as Chairperson of the Arkansas Ethics Commission; Rita Looney, In Her Official Capacity as a Member of the Arkansas Ethics Commission; Tom Alexander, In His Official Capacity as a Member of the Arkansas Ethics Commission; Ben Allen, In His Official Capacity as a Member of the Arkansas Ethics Commission; and Jack Kearney, In His Official Capacity as a Member of the Arkansas Ethics Commission, Appellants, Citizens for Clean Government, Intervenor as Defendant. James Madison Center for Free Speech, Shrink Missouri Government PAC, and Zev David Fredman, Amici Curiae on Behalf of Appellees. Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah, and Vermont, Amici Curiae on Behalf of Appellants. Ron RUSSELL, Kent Ingram, William R. Austin, and Associated Industries of Arkansas Political Action Committee, Appellees, v. Troy BURRIS, I |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
Robert D. Smith, III, Little Rock, AR, argued, for Appellants.
Brian G. Brooks, Little Rock, AR, argued (Shirley E. Guntharp, on the brief), for Appellees.
Nancy Northup, New York City, argued (Burt Neuborne, Kenneth N. Weine, and Scott C. Trotter, on the brief), for Intervenor.
Before WOLLMAN, BEAM, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.
In 1996, the people of Arkansas, by voter initiative, approved a campaign finance reform measure entitled Initiated Act I. Prior to Act I, Arkansas law limited individuals and political action committees to contributions of $1,000 per candidate during each election cycle. Act I reduced the contribution limit to $300 for the offices of governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, treasurer, auditor, attorney general, and commissioner of state lands, see Ark.Code Ann. § 7-6-203(a), § 7-6-203(b), and to $100 for all other state public offices, see Ark.Code Ann. § 7-6-203(a)(1), § 7-6-203(b)(1).
Act I also created a special category of political action committee (PAC), see Ark.Code Ann. § 7-6-201(9), § 7-6-201(10), known as a small-donor PAC. See Ark.Code Ann. § 7-6-201(12). Under Act I, a small-donor PAC may accept no contribution larger than $25, see Ark.Code Ann. § 7-6-201(12)(B), and it may contribute no more than $2,500 per election to any candidate, see Ark.Code Ann. § 7-6-203(d). Act I authorized as well the creation of a campaign fund-raising entity known as an independent expenditure committee. See Ark.Code Ann. § 7-6-201(14). An independent expenditure committee may, like any person, make unlimited independent expenditures (that is, ones not coordinated with a candidate) to advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for office. See Ark.Code Ann. § 7-6-201(13), § 7-6-201(14). Such a committee, however, may accept no more than $500 from any person annually. See Ark.Code Ann. § 7-6-203(k). Finally, Act I authorized local governments to set reasonable limitations on fund-raising for campaigns for local offices. See Ark.Code Ann. § 7-6-224. Ron Russell, Kent Ingram, William Austin, and the Associated Industries of Arkansas Political Action Committee challenged each of these Act I provisions in the district court, as well as a pre-Act I provision limiting contributions to any one PAC to $200 annually, see Ark.Code Ann. § 7-6-201(9)(B).
Following a bench trial, the district court held that the contribution limits of $300 for certain statewide offices and of $100 for state judicial offices were unconstitutional because they violated the First Amendment's prohibition against limitations on the freedom of speech. See Russell v. Burris, 978 F.Supp. 1211, 1222, 1224, 1229 (E.D.Ark.1997). The trial court, however, upheld the $100 contribution limit as to all other offices and the $200 contribution limit to PACs. Id. at 1223, 1225, 1229. The trial court also held that the differential treatment for ordinary PACs and small-donor PACs did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Id. at 1227, 1229. The trial court declined to reach the merits on the other two issues, finding that the plaintiffs did not have standing to contest the limit on contributions to independent expenditure committees, id. at 1217, 1229, and that the provision authorizing relevant actions by local governments was not ripe for a constitutional challenge. Id. at 1217-18, 1229.
All parties appeal the rulings unfavorable to their litigating positions. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Standing is, of course, a threshold issue in every case before a federal court: If a plaintiff lacks standing, he or she cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction. See Boyle v. Anderson, 68 F.3d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1173, 116 S.Ct. 1266, 134 L.Ed.2d 214 (1996). In order to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, one must meet three requirements. First, a plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact," and such an injury must be concrete, particularized, and either actual or imminent. Id. at 1100-01. Second, a would-be litigant must make out a causal connection between the alleged injury and the conduct challenged. Id. at 1100. Third, he or she must show that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Id.
The trial court determined that each of the plaintiffs had Article III standing as to all but one of their challenges, see Russell, 978 F.Supp. at 1217, and the defendants do not contest that determination here. The plaintiffs maintain, however, that the trial court erred in finding that they did not have Article III standing to challenge the provisions of Act I relating to independent expenditure committees.
The trial court found that the plaintiffs did not face a credible threat of present or future prosecution with respect to this part of their claim, and thus could show no actual or imminent "injury in fact," because none of them "could think of an independent expenditure committee to which they had contributed in the past or to which they planned to contribute." Id. Indeed, one plaintiff testified, "Well, in all honesty, I'd have to tell you it would take a stretch of my imagination to figure out why I'd want to contribute anything to an independent committee." Another simply testified that he did not know if he would ever contribute to such a committee.
We are mindful that where "plaintiffs allege an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest which is clearly proscribed by statute, courts have found standing to challenge the statute, even absent a specific threat of enforcement." United Food & Commercial Workers International Union v. IBP, Inc., 857 F.2d 422, 428 (8th Cir.1988). But the plaintiffs have not demonstrated any such intention: They have indicated neither that they would contribute to a specific independent expenditure committee nor that, but for the limitations of Act I, they would form an independent expenditure committee. Standing may not be predicated merely upon a conjectural or hypothetical injury or, as one of the plaintiffs here would have it, upon a stretch of the imagination. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). We therefore affirm the trial court's determination that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the provisions relevant to independent expenditure committees.
"Where at all possible, government must curtail speech only to the degree necessary to meet the particular problem at hand, and must avoid infringing on speech that does not pose the danger that has prompted regulation." Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 265, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986). Government attempts to limit campaign contributions, therefore, are " ' "subject to the closest scrutiny." ' " Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 636 (8th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033, 116 S.Ct. 2579, 135 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1996), quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam ), itself quoting NAACP...
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