Lewis v. United States
Citation | 13 S.Ct. 136,146 U.S. 370,36 L.Ed. 1011 |
Decision Date | 05 December 1892 |
Docket Number | No. 1,018,1,018 |
Parties | LEWIS v. UNITED STATES |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
A. H. Garland and Hebe J. May, for plaintiff in error.
Asst. Atty. Gen. Parker, for the United States.
This was a writ of error sued out to review a judgment of the circuit court of the United States for the western district of Arkansas, imposing a sentence of death upon Alexander Lewis, plaintiff in error, for the murder of one Benjamin C. Tarver, at the Cherokee Nation, in the Indian country.
It appears by the record that on the trial of the case, and after the accused had pleaded not guilty to the indictment, the court disrected two lists of 37 qualified jurymen to be made out by the clerk, one to be given to the district attorney, and one to the counsel for the defendant; and that the court further directed each side to proceed with its challenges independent of the other, and without knowledge on the part of either as to what challenges had been made by the other.
It further appears by the record that to this method of proceeding in that regard the defendant at the time excepted, but was required to proceed to make his challenges; that he challenged 20 persons from the list of 37 persons from which he made his challenges, but in doing so he challenged 3 jurors who were also challenged by the attorney for the government.
It further appears that the government, by its district attorney, challenged from the list of 37 persons 5 persons, 3 of whom were the same persons challenged by the defendant, and that this fact was made to appear from the lists of jurors used by the government in making its challenges and the defendant in making his challenges.
To the happening of the fact that both parties challenged the same three jurors the defendant at the time objected, but the court overruled the objection, and directed the jury to be called from the said two lists impaneled and sworn, to which the defendant at the time excepted.
The assignments of error ask us to consider the validity of the method of exercising his rights of challenge, imposed upon the defendant by the order of the court, and also the propriety of the instruction given by the court to the jury on the subject of the defense of an alibi, by giving prominence to the cautionary rules by which they should weigh this class of testimony, and particularly in saying to the jury that it was a defense often resorted to, and often attempted to be sustained and made effective by fraud, subornation, and perjury.
A leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after indictment found, nothing shall be done in the absence of the prisoner. While this rule has at times, and in the cases of misdemeanors, been somewhat relaxed, yet in felonies it is not in the power of the prisoner, either by himself or his counsel, to waive the right to be personally present during the trial. 'It would be contrary to the dictates of humanity to let him waive the advantage which a view of his sad plight might give him by inclining the hearts of the jurors to listen to his defense with indulgence.' Prine v. Com., 18 Pa. St. 103, per Gilbson, C. J. And it appears to be well settled that, where the personal presence is necessary in point of law, the record must show the fact. Thus in a Virginia case (Hooker v. Com., 13 Grat. 763) the court observed that the record showed that on two occasions during the trial the prisoner appeared by attorney, and that there was nothing to show that he was personally present in court on either day and added: Thereupon the judgment was reversed. And in the case of Dunn v. Com., 6 Pa. St. 384, it was held that the record in a capital case must show affirmatively the prisoner's presence in court, and that it was not allowable to indulge the presumption that everything was rightly done until the contrary appears. Ball v. U. S., 140 U. S. 118, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 761, is to the same effect.
In Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S., at page 578, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep., at page 204, it is said: And, further: So, too, in the case of Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U. S. 442, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 525, this language of the court in Hopt v. Utah is cited and approved.
In the case of Dyson v. State of Mississippi, 26 Miss. 362, 383, it was said: 'It is undoubtedly true that the record must affirmatively show those indispensable facts without which the judgment would be void,—such as the organization of the court; its jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties; that a cause was made up for trial; that it was submitted to a jury sworn to try it, (if it be a case proper for a jury;) that a verdict was rendered, and judgment awarded. Out of abundant tenderness for the right secured to the accused by our constitution to be confronted by the witnesses against him, and to be heard by himself or counsel, our court has gone a step further, and held that it must be shown by the record that the accused was present in court pending the trial. This is upon the ground of the peculiar sacredness of this high constitutional right. It is also true, as has been held by this court, 'that nothing can be presumed for or against a record, except what appears substantially upon its face." Continuing, the court said: 'This rule has reference to those indispensable requisites necessary to the validity of the record as a judicial proceeding.'
As already said, the record shows that at the trial of the case the court directed two lists of 37 qualified jurymen to be made out by the clerk, and one to be given to the district attorney and one to the counsel for the defendant; and the court further directed each side to proceed with its challenges, and without knowledge on the part of either as to what challenges had been made by the other. Although the record states that after the challenges the 12 jurors who remained were sworn, yet it clearly appears from the whole record, and the lists therein referred to, that after the challenges there remained, not only 12, but 15, jurors, and that by the mode adopted, which required the prisoner to challenge by list, he exhausted some of his challenges by challenging jurors at the foot of the list, and who were never reached to be sworn as jurors in the case. And the record does not disclose that at the time the challenges were made the jury had been called into the box, nor that they or the prisoner were present at the time the challenges were made. It does, indeed, appear that the clerk called the entire panel of the petit jury, but it does not appear that, when the jury answered to said call, they were present so that they could be inspected by the prisoner, and it is...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Buchanan, No. 317A89
...of his trial." Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 356 (1970) (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 13 S.Ct. 136, 36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892)). Through the Fourteenth Amendment these guarantees are required of the states as well. Pointer v. Texas, 380......
-
State v. Hodge
... ... Three weeks after the shootings, the defendant, who had returned to the United States from Costa Rica, was arrested. 8 ... At the defendant's trial, several ... right [that] must be exercised with full freedom, or it fails of its full purpose." Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378, 13 S. Ct. 136, 36 L. Ed. 1011 (1892) ... While the United ... ...
-
Basham v. United States
...guarantees a defendant's right to be present in the courtroom during the trial of his case, see Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370–72, 13 S.Ct. 136, 36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892), Basham seeks to assert the opposite right—the right to absent oneself from a capital trial at his whim. Although Basha......
-
Engberg v. State
...without being subject to the court's control." State v. Thompson, 68 Ariz. 386, 206 P.2d 1037 (1949); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378, 13 S.Ct. 136, 139, 36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892). While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cogni......
-
Defense Counsel, Please Rise': A Comparative Analysis of Trial In Absentia
...as long as his defense counsel was present. 108 The Court held that voluntary absence after the trial in a non- 102 Id . at 579. 103 146 U.S. 370 (1892). 104 Id . at 372. 105 200 U.S. 164, 175 (1906). 106 Cohen, supra note 92, at 170. 107 223 U.S. 442 (1912). 108 Id . 2013] ANALYSIS OF TRIA......
-
The Constitution and the rights not to procreate.
...244 (1986), Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1966), Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912), and Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892)). Professor Coleman relies on the same cases in the preembryo disposition context. See Coleman, supra note 1, at 92 n. 184. But th......
-
Mississippi Allows Peremptory Challenges for Fake, Race-Neutral Reasons in Violation of Batson's Equal Rights Rationale.
...(noting studies show prosecutors successfully use racial bias in jury selection). (106.) Id. (107.) Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (108.) See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (concluding complete elimination of peremptory challenges only s......
-
CHAPTER 10 THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
...Peter Arenella, Foreword: O.J. Lessons, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1233, 1241 (1996).[134] See Swain, 380 U.S. at 219; Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892) (quoting William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England *353 (1769)).[135] Underwood, Note 133, supra, at 771.[136] Barb......