Illinois Cent Co v. City of Decatur
Decision Date | 09 January 1893 |
Docket Number | No. 56,56 |
Parties | ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO. v. CITY OF DECATUR |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Proceedings by the city of Decatur, Ill., to assess a special tax for the cost of grading and paving a street in said city on contiguous property, including land forming part of the right of way of the Illinois Central Railroad Company. Judgment of the county court confirming the assessment was affirmed by the supreme court of the state. 18 N. E. Rep. 315. The railroad company brings error. Affirmed.
Statement by Mr. Justice BREWER:
On February 10, 1851, an act was passed by the general assembly of Illinois incorporating the Illinois Central Railroad Company. By it the company was made the beneficiary of the land grant from congress to the state, of September 20, 1850, (9 St. p. 466.) The twenty-second section was in these words:
By section 27 it was provided that 'this act shall be deemed a public act, and shll be favorably construed, for all purposes therein expressed and declared, in all courts and places whatsoever.'
In 1887, proceedings were had in the county court of Macon county to defray the cost of grading and paving a certain street in the city of Decatur. Under those proceedings two separate parcels of land belonging to the Illinois Central Railroad Company, and forming part of its right of way, were assessed to the amount of $262.70. The company objected to this assessment on the ground that by its charter it was exempted from all taxation, of every kind, except as therein provided for, and that there was no provision permitting such an assessment. This objection was overruled, and a judgment entered by the county court against the two parcels of land. Exception was taken, and an appeal allowed to the supreme court of the state. In that court the ruling of the county court was sustained, and the judgment affirmed, and the case is now brought here for review by writ of error.
B. F. Ayer, for plaintiff in error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 191-197 intentionally omitted] E. S. McDonald and Hugh Crea, for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice BREWER, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.
The single question in this case is whether this special tax for a local improvement is within the exemption from taxation granted to the railroad company by section 22 of the act of 1851.
Between taxes—or 'general taxes,' as they are sometimes called, by way of distinction, which are the exactions placed upon the citizen for the support of the government, paid to the state as a state, the consideration of which is protection by the state and special taxes or special assessments, which are imposed upon property within a limited area for the payment for a local improvement, supposed to enhance the value of all property within that area, there is a broad and clear line of distinction, although both of them are properly called taxes, and the proceedings for their collection are by the same officers, and by substantially similar methods. Taxes proper, or general taxes, proceed upon the theory that the existence of government is a necessity; that it cannot continue without means to pay its expenses; that for those means it has the right to compel all citizens and property within its limits to contribute; and that for such contribution it renders no return of special benefit to any property, but only secures to the citizen that general benefit which results from protection to his person and property, and the promotion of those various schemes which have for their object the welfare of all. 'The public revenues are a portion that each subject gives of his property in order to secure or enjoy the remainder.' 13 Montesq. Sp. Laws, c. 1; Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 664; Opinions of Judges, 58 Me. 591; Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28, 47; Judd v. Driver, 1 Kan. 455, 462; Association v. Wood, 39 Pa. St. 73, 82; Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1, 10.
On the other hand, special assessments or special taxes proceed upon the theory that, when a local improvement enhances the value of neighboring property, that property should pay for the improvement. In Wright v. Boston, 9 Cush. 233, 241, Chief Justice Shaw said: 'When certain persons are so placed as to have a common interest among themselves, but in common with the rest of the community, laws may justly be made, providing that, under suitable and equitable regulations, those common interests shall be so managed that those who enjoy the benefits shall equally bear the burden.' In McGonigle v. Allegheny City, 44 Pa. St. 118, 121, is this declaration: 'All these municipal taxes for improvement of streets rest, for their final reason, upon the enhancement of private properties.' In Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 123, 133, it was stated that the principle is 'that the territory subjected thereto would be benefited by the work and change in question.' In Cooley on Taxation (page 416) the matter is thus discussed by the author:
These distinctions have been recognized and stated by the courts of almost every state in the Union, and a collection of the cases may be found in any of the leading text-books on taxation. Founded on this distinction is a rule of very general acceptance, that an exemption from taxation is to be taken as an exemption simply from the burden of ordinary taxes, taxes proper, and does not relieve from the obligation to pay special assessments. Thus, in an early case, (In re Mayor, etc., of New York, 11 Johns. 77, 80,) under a statute which provided that no church or place of public worship 'should be taxed by any law of this state,' the court observed: 'The word 'taxes' means burdens, charges, or impositions put or set upon persons or property for public uses and this is the definition which Lord Coke gives of the word 'talliage,' (2 Inst. 532;) and Lord Holt, in Brewster v. Kidgell, Carth. 438, gives the same definition, in substance, of the word 'tax.' The legislature intended by that exemption to relieve religious and literary institutions from these public burdens, and the same exemption was extended to the real estate of any minister, not exceeding in value fifteen hundred dollars. But to pay for the opening of a street, in a ratio to the 'benefit or advantage' derived from it, is no burden. It is no talliage or tax, within the meaning of the exemption, and has no claim upon the public...
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