Jiggetts v. Grinker

• Decision Date: 15 June 1989
• Citation: 148 A.D.2d 1,543 N.Y.S.2d 414
• Parties: In re Application of Barbara JIGGETTS, et al., etc., Plaintiffs-Respondents-Appellants, v. William J. GRINKER, etc., et al., Defendants-Appellants-Respondents, and Ocean Park Co., et al., Defendants. Black Child Development Institute-New York Affiliate, Inc., et al., Amici Curiae.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 414

543 N.Y.S.2d 414

148 A.D.2d 1

In re Application of Barbara JIGGETTS, et al., etc Plaintiffs-Respondents-Appellants, v. William J. GRINKER, etc., et al., Defendants-Appellants-Respondents and Ocean Park Co., et al., Defendants Black Child Development Institute-New York Affiliate, Inc. et al., Amici Curiae.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

June 15, 1989.

Andrew Goldberg, of counsel (on behalf of Bronx Legal Services, as attorney), for plaintiff-respondent-appellant Dorothy Hughes.

Alan G. Krams, of counsel (Fay Leoussis with him on the brief; Peter L. Zimroth, New York City, attorney), for defendant-appellant-respondent Grinker.

Robert J. Schack, New York City, of counsel, Robert Abrams, attorney, for defendant-appellant-respondent Perales.

Thomas H. Moreland, of counsel (Jeffrey S. Trachtman, New York City, Shirley Traylor and Juan Cartagena with him on the brief; Kramer, Levin, Nessen, Kamin & Frankel and Community Service Society of New York, New York City, attorneys), for Black Child Development Institute-New York Affiliate, Inc., Citizen's Committee for Children, Coalition for the Homeless, Committee for Hispanic Children and Families, Inc., Community Service Society of New York, Emergency Alliance for Homeless Families and Children, Interfaith Assembly on Homelessness and Housing, New York Housing Conference, Puerto Rican Before KUPFERMAN, P.J., and SULLIVAN, ROSS, CARRO and SMITH, JJ.

Ass'n for Community Affairs, Inc., Puerto Rican Family Institute, and Settlement Housing Fund, as amici curiae.

SMITH, Justice.

Defendant-appellant, William J. Grinker, Commissioner of the New York City Department of Social Services (the "City Commissioner") and defendant Cesar Perales, Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services (the "State Commissioner") appeal from the order, dated March 15, 1988, and amended order dated June 15, 1988 and entered June 16, 1988, of the Supreme Court, New York County (Karla Moskowitz, J.), which, inter alia, (1) denied the City and the State Commissioners' motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, (2) directed the City Commissioner to pay shelter allowances to six plaintiffs in amounts equal to their actual rents, (3) directed the City Commissioner to pay all rent arrears for six plaintiff-households, although those arrears were for rents in excess of their shelter allowances, (4) ordered the State Commissioner to reimburse the City Commissioner proportionally for payments made pursuant to its order, and (5) granted certification of a plaintiff class, directing the defendants to provide notice to such class.

Plaintiffs cross-appeal from such orders in so far as they failed to deny in their entirety defendants' motions to dismiss, dismissed certain of their statutory and regulatory claims, and determined that plaintiffs' constitutional claims had been withdrawn.

This is a class action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief brought on behalf of families residing in New York City who have children, who receive public assistance in the form of Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("ADC") and whose shelter costs exceed the maximum shelter allowance payable to them under the state commissioner's shelter allowance schedules. Plaintiffs contend that because the state defendant's schedule for rent allowances has not kept pace with increased shelter costs, thousands of families receiving public assistance are forced to rent apartments with rents above their shelter grants. As a result, claim plaintiffs, many families like themselves fall behind in rent payments, are evicted and become homeless. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Social Services Law, Section 350(1)(a), inter alia, prohibits defendants from maintaining such low shelter allowance maxima levels.

FACTS

Barbara Jiggetts commenced this action on February 26, 1987 naming as defendants the City and State Commissioners and her landlord, Ocean Park Company. She later withdrew as a party to the proceedings. When the action was commenced, Ms. Jiggetts resided with her three minor children at 120 Beach 19th Street, Far Rockaway, an apartment building subsidized by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (H.U.D.). When Ms. Jiggetts and her husband moved into their apartment in October of 1980, their monthly rent was $264.85. In 1982, when her third child was two months old, Mr. Jiggetts deserted the family and in 1983 Barbara Jiggetts turned to public assistance.

At the time she commenced this action, the family received a monthly ADC grant consisting of a shelter allowance of $270, ¹ received as a two-party check, a non-shelter allowance of $266 and $50 in child support payments. Ms. Jiggetts also received $172 in food stamps each month. This constituted the family's sole income. Ms. Jiggetts had not been employed since February 1986. Her rent was $381.15, which was $111.15 more than the $270.00 she received in shelter allowance. She alleged that due to the difficulty in providing for food, clothing, utilities and other necessities on the non-shelter allowance and hospitalization In October of 1986 Ms. Jiggetts was served by her landlord, defendant Ocean Park Company, with a notice of dispossess demanding $1,055.55 which apparently included $666.00 in excess rent for six months, $235.00 in legal and late fees and approximately $115 in additional rent arrears for June 1986. She appeared pro se in Housing Court, Queens County and entered into a stipulation with the landlord to pay $1,401.70 which included rent for October 1986. By notice dated January 25, 1987 the NYCDSS agreed to pay the arrears pursuant to 18 NYCRR § 352.7 except for $666, constituting the amount of rent above her shelter allowance for six months. In February 1987, Ms. Jiggetts was served with a 72 hour notice of eviction.

                for surgery, she was unable to pay the extra $111.15 from the non-shelter portions of her grant in order to meet her full monthly rent.   Moreover, prior to June 1986, when the New York City Department of Social Services (NYCDSS) began to issue a check for shelter allowance in both her name and that of the landlord, Ms. Jiggetts had made only a partial payment of $155 towards her rent for one month
                

She alleged that her search for alternate permanent housing in New York City, at or below the amount of her shelter allowance, had been fruitless. She applied for federally subsidized housing assistance through the New York City Housing Authority but was advised that the Authority was not yet considering applications made after 1982.

On March 8, 1987 Jiggetts amended her complaint to include a request for certification as a class. By order dated March 10, 1987 (entered September 9, 1987) the Supreme Court, New York County (per K. Moskowitz, J.) directed that the NYCDSS pay the $1,552.45 in then accumulated arrears and other rent due and that upon such payment the judgment and warrant in the Housing Court be vacated.

In addition to Ms. Jiggetts there are six intervening-plaintiffs whose circumstances are similar to those of Ms. Jiggetts. Each intervenor has one or more children. Each originally rented an apartment which was within the level of the shelter allowance. Each received rent increases and, now, has rent payments in excess of the shelter allowance.

DECISION OF THE MOTION COURT

While recognizing that prior decisions by the Court of Appeals and by this Court have denied challenges to the statutory and regulatory scheme of shelter allowances at issue herein, the motion court distinguished those prior cases on the grounds that in them the court had not been required to address Social Services Law § 350. The motion court interpreted the language of § 350 and of § 344 as providing a legislative mandate that defendants provide levels of assistance which are "adequate" to meet the needs of indigent children.

The court reviewed several decisions from other jurisdictions [Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless v. Secretary of Human Services, 400 Mass. 806, 511 N.E.2d 603 (1987); State ex rel. Ventrone v. Birkel, 54 Ohio St.2d 461, 377 N.E.2d 780 (1978); later appeal 65 Ohio St.2d 10, 417 N.E.2d 1249 (1981); (1st Dist.Ct.App., 1976); City and County of San Francisco v. The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 57 Cal.App.3d 44, 128 Cal.Rptr. 712 (1976); Keller v. Thompson, 56 Haw. 183, 532 P.2d 664 (1975) ] wherein courts have directed that public assistance allowances conform to the needs of the poor based upon broad language of enabling statutes in those states. Similarly, the Court interpreted the use of the word "shall" in § 350 and § 344 as providing a legislative mandate to provide adequate shelter allowances for children, which mandate the Court could enforce.

As to the application for class certification, the IAS Court again recognized that this Court has denied such motions in similar situations, but found that certification was appropriate since, inter alia, (1) there are at least 100,000 public assistance households with children in New York City whose rents exceed the shelter maxima; (2) there are questions of law and fact common to the class (whether the law mandates allowances which meet their full shelter Finding that " § 350 may well set forth a legislative mandate regarding the care of children" and that "the current regulation is totally inadequate to provide adequate housing to plaintiffs and their children," the court directed defendants to promulgate regulations which satisfy current housing costs. Concluding that the equities clearly tip in plaintiffs' favor and that they face eviction and the dismal prospect of emergency shelters, an irreparable harm, the court granted a preliminary injunction to six of the named plaintiffs and intervenors, allowing them to stay in their homes, and required the defendants to pay their rent arrears and shelter allowances equal to their...