Taylor v. Singletary, 94-4931

• Decision Date: 05 August 1998
• Docket Number: No. 94-4931,94-4931
• Citation: 148 F.3d 1276
• Parties: 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1682 James E. TAYLOR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1276

148 F.3d 1276

11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1682

James E. TAYLOR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Secretary, Florida Department of

Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 94-4931.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

Aug. 5, 1998.

James E. Taylor, Belle Glades, FL, pro se and Henry Hunnefeld, Coral Gables, FL, for Petitioner-Appellant.

James Joseph Carney, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before TJOFLAT and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, and O'NEILL ^*, Senior District Judge.

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:

On June 25, 1986, petitioner was convicted in the Circuit Court of Indian County, Florida for conspiring to traffic in cocaine, trafficking in marijuana, and violating the Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The court sentenced him to a total of seventy years incarceration for these offenses. After exhausting his state remedies, petitioner applied to federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus setting aside his convictions. He contended that the circuit court denied him due process of law when it allowed the prosecutor to impeach him with testimony that petitioner gave pursuant to an informal immunity agreement at a federal drug-smuggling trial a few years earlier. ¹ The district court denied relief; we affirm.

I.

Before he was convicted in the Indian River circuit court, petitioner James Taylor made his living by providing aircraft for drug smugglers. As a result of his activities in the 1970s, he attracted the attention of, and became Taylor, represented by counsel, subsequently entered into immunity negotiations with the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida and signed an informal immunity agreement with the United States Attorney. The agreement states, in part:

an informant for, the FBI. In 1981, FBI agents asked Taylor to testify before a Southern District of Florida grand jury about two particular smuggling organizations. Taylor informed the agents that if subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury, he would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In response, the agents told Taylor that they would seek a statutory grant of immunity to force Taylor to testify, and suggested that he find a lawyer to help him negotiate an immunity agreement.

[T]he United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida agrees not to prosecute James Taylor for his heretofore disclosed participation, if any, in criminal activity involving the importation, possession and distribution of controlled substances in the Southern District of Florida during the period of June 1, 1977 through December 31, 1980. Furthermore, no information so disclosed by James Taylor during the course of his co-operation will be used against him.

In return, Taylor was to cooperate with the grand jury's investigation and to testify at trial if necessary. ²

Although the immunity agreement states: "This agreement is limited to the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida and cannot bind other federal, state of [sic] local prosecuting authorities," Pursuant to the immunity agreement, Taylor testified before the grand jury, implicating his drug-smuggling associates. He also testified in a criminal case that grew out of the grand jury investigation, the "Bancoshares" case. Taylor did not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination before the grand jury or at the Bancoshares trial.

Taylor claims that he asked Samuel Smargon, the Assistant United States Attorney who negotiated the agreement with Taylor's attorney, about his potential exposure to state prosecution, and that Smargon orally assured him that Florida authorities would not use any of Taylor's testimony under the agreement against him. Taylor's testimony is the only evidence of this alleged "side deal."

On January 15, 1986, the State Attorney for Indian River County filed a three-count information charging Taylor with conspiracy to traffic cocaine and the distribution of marijuana in violation of Florida law. On March 10, Taylor moved the Indian River circuit court to dismiss the information on the ground that it was based on evidence disclosed by him pursuant to his informal immunity agreement with the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida. Alternatively, he moved the court to conduct a hearing to determine whether the State Attorney had based the information on such evidence. Taylor cited Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972), as support for his motion. See id. at 460, 92 S.Ct. at 1665 (stating that a government entity seeking to prosecute a witness who has been immunized under the federal immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6003 (1994), has "the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony").

The court noted, however, that Kastigar concerned a witness who had been granted immunity under the federal immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6003 (1994), while Taylor was claiming immunity under an informal or "pocket" immunity agreement. It therefore held a "pre-Kastigar hearing" to determine whether Taylor was even entitled to Kastigar's protections. At the close of the hearing, the court cited United States v. Barker, 542 F.2d 479 (8th Cir.1976), in which the Eighth Circuit assumed without deciding that an informally-immunized defendant enjoys the same "Fifth Amendment protections" as does a statutorily-immunized defendant. The circuit court then reasoned that, because the rights provided under Kastigar also stemmed from the Fifth Amendment, an informally-immunized defendant must enjoy the same Kastigar protections as does a statutorily-immunized defendant. It concluded that "the Federal authorities did compel Defendant's testimony" by entering into an informal immunity agreement with Taylor, and that Taylor was entitled to a Kastigar hearing to determine whether the State Attorney had violated Taylor's constitutional rights by bringing an information based on the testimony given pursuant to that agreement.

The circuit court then held a full Kastigar hearing. After hearing testimony from both sides, the court ruled that the State Attorney was basing his prosecution solely on information gleaned from sources independent of Taylor's Bancoshares testimony. It therefore denied Taylor's motion to dismiss his information and proceeded to trial.

At trial, Taylor took the stand in his own defense. He did not assert his Fifth Amendment privilege at any time during his direct examination. On cross-examination, the prosecutor attempted to impeach Taylor with his Bancoshares testimony. Taylor's attorney immediately objected, arguing that because the court had ruled that Kastigar applied in Taylor's case, it could not allow the Bancoshares testimony to be used against Taylor in any way, including for impeachment. The court overruled the objection and allowed the prosecutor to use Taylor's Bancoshares testimony to attack his credibility. Taylor was convicted on all three counts of the information and sentenced accordingly.

Following the entry of judgment, Taylor appealed his convictions to the Florida District Court of Appeal, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred in allowing the state to cross-examine him using his Bancoshares testimony. The district court of appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment without After exhausting his state remedies, Taylor filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus. ³ The district court denied Taylor's petition, but on different grounds from those on which the state circuit court had relied. The district court concluded that the circuit court's emphasis on Barker was misplaced, and that subsequent decisions had clarified that a defendant who voluntarily enters into an informal immunity agreement is only protected to the extent established in the agreement itself. The district court thus looked to Taylor's agreement to determine the extent of Taylor's immunity from the use of his statements to impeach him in state court. Finding that by its plain terms the agreement did not bind state prosecutors or state courts, the district court rejected Taylor's petition.

comment. Taylor v. State, 514 So.2d 367 (1987) (table).

Taylor now appeals, presenting two grounds for setting aside his conviction. First, Taylor claims that because he testified at the Bancoshares trial in exchange for the promise of governmental benefits, his testimony was per se "involuntary" and is thus inadmissible against him under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, Taylor claims that he was entitled to use immunity in state court under the terms of his informal immunity agreement with the United States Attorney, and that the circuit court therefore denied him due process by failing to enforce the agreement. Because we find neither of Taylor's arguments convincing, we affirm the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief.

II.

A.

Taylor first argues that his Bancoshares testimony was "involuntary" and thus inadmissible against him at his state trial. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2416, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (holding that a defendant's involuntary statements could not be used to impeach his credibility at trial because "any criminal trial use against a defendant of his involuntary statement is a denial of due process of law"). He asks us to hold that testimony, such as his Bancoshares testimony, that is given in exchange for a governmental promise of immunity is per se involuntary. As we explain in part II.A.1, we decline to do so. A voluntarily-entered informal immunity agreement does not, by virtue of its existence, override a witness' free will such that the witness' testimony is involuntary under the Due...