Frederick v. Burg, Civ. A. No. 15004.

Decision Date07 February 1957
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 15004.
Citation148 F. Supp. 673
PartiesRobert H. FREDERICK and Elsie M, Frederick, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. Anchel BURG, Individually and trading as Burg Construction Company, Bernard M. Lee, Norbert Stern and Cizella Stern, his wife, and William Elkind and Sue Elkind, his wife, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Ryan, Geer & Bowser, Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiffs.

Robert E. Kline, Arthur Grossman, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendants.

McILVAINE, District Judge.

In this case the plaintiffs have brought suit against Anchel Burg and Bernard M. Lee, charging that they caused to be excavated and graded the land now owned by defendants, Norbert Stern, Cizella Stern, William Elkind, and Sue Elkind, but apparently not owned by them at the time of the excavation. The plaintiffs charge that Bernard Lee and Anchel Burg in so excavating, grading, and digging removed the lateral support from plaintiffs' property and caused damage to same. They do not charge that Bernard Lee and Anchel Burg were the agents of the other defendants in this case, but charge that the other defendants since they have purchased the property have not provided any lateral support of their property, and that sliding and washouts along the lines of plaintiffs' property are continuing.

This property is situated in the State of Ohio and plaintiffs and defendants, Stern and Elkind, are adjacent property owners. Defendants, William Elkind and Sue Elkind, have filed a motion to dismiss the action on the grounds that the complaint fails to state a claim against them upon which relief can be granted. Counsel for the plaintiff has advised the Court by his Brief that a stipulation was entered into with the defendants, Norbert Stern and Cizella Stern, that the decision on this motion would also affect their status as defendants.

The defendants in support of their motion to dismiss rely on the Restatement of the Law of Torts which provides that:

"* * * a person who withdraws the naturally necessary lateral support of land in another's possession, or support which has been substituted for the naturally necessary support, is liable for a subsidence of such land of the other as was naturally dependent upon the support withdrawn, in the absence of a superseding cause or other reason for relieving him." Restatement, Torts, § 817(1).

In comments explaining the Subsection (1), it is pointed out that:

"The person liable under the rule stated in this Subsection is the actor who withdraws the naturally necessary support. It is immaterial whether in respect to the supporting land the actor be owner, possessor, licensee, or trespasser. The owner or possessor of this land is not liable under the rule stated in this Subsection unless he was an actor in the withdrawal of support.
"* * * Transfer of his land to a third person does not relieve him of risk of liability or subject the subsequent possessor to this liability." Restatement, Torts, § 817 (j).

The plaintiffs in support of their position have been unable to cite any Ohio case that would substantiate the position taken by them that these defendants, Stern and Elkind, should be liable for the removal of the lateral support under the circumstances of this case. The only case that they rely on is Gorton v. Schofield, 1920, 311 Mass. 352, 41 N.E.2d 12, 139 A.L.R. 1262. However, the facts of that case do not support plaintiffs' position for in that case the subsequent landowner was held liable to an adjoining owner where an excavation was made by the predecessor in title of the first owner and a retaining wall which was erected by such predecessor to protect the adjoining property had been allowed to become out of repair so that damage resulted to the adjoining owner. In the case before the Court the defendants, Stern and Elkind, predecessors in title, did not erect any retaining wall to give support to plaintiffs' land; and these defendants have done nothing to alter or affect the conditions as they were when they took title to their property.

Inasmuch as plaintiffs have been unable to cite any Ohio law or cases to support their position,...

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6 cases
  • Noone v. Price
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • 1 December 1982
    ...187 Wis. 567, 204 N.W. 499 (1925); and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 817 comment n illustration 14 (1979).5 E.g., Frederick v. Burg, 148 F.Supp. 673 (W.D.Pa.1957); Paul v. Bailey, 109 Ga.App. 712, 137 S.E.2d 337 (1964); First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Universal Mortg. and Realty Trust,......
  • Fowler v. Pennsylvania Tire Company
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • 10 January 1964
    ...Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 184a, it will be presumed that the law of another state is similar to the law of Texas. In Frederick v. Burg, 148 F.Supp. 673, (W.D.Pa.), plaintiffs brought a damage suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania for injury to their land located in Ohio. When co......
  • Keck v. Longoria, CA
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • 28 June 1989
    ...Spoo v. Garvin, 236 Ky. 113, 32 S.W.2d 715 (Ky.Ct.App.1930); Paul v. Bailey, 109 Ga.App. 712, 137 S.E.2d 337 (1964); Frederick v. Burg, 148 F.Supp. 673 (W.D.Penn.1957). Thus, we think it is clear that the general rule does not hold the owner or possessor of property liable for the withdrawa......
  • Gladin v. Von Engeln
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • 6 March 1978
    ...to the Gladin property, which support had been removed by the City's predecessor in title. In its opinion it cites Frederick v. Burg, 148 F.Supp. 673 (W.D.Pa.1957); Green v. Berge, 105 Cal. 52, 38 P. 539 (1894); Carrig v. Andrews, 127 Conn. 403, 17 A.2d 520 (1941); Lyons v. Walsh, 92 Conn. ......
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