Lawler v. Vette
Citation | 149 S.W. 43,166 Mo.App. 342 |
Parties | ISABELLA M. LAWLER, Respondent, v. JOHN H. VETTE, Appellant |
Decision Date | 02 July 1912 |
Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court.--Hon. James E. Withrow Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
STATEMENT.--Suit to recover from defendant a sum of money alleged to have been usuriously retained by him as compensation for a loan. The plaintiff had verdict and judgment for $ 555, being the amount of the usurious interest with interest thereon from the time of the commencement of this suit. The petition alleges, in substance, that on October , 1907, plaintiff secured a loan of $ 3000 from the defendant on certain real estate; though defendant was entitled only to the legal rate of interest thereon, six per cent, he "without her consent, retained as compensation for the loan of said sum the sum of five hundred dollars ($ 500) in violation of the statute in such cases made and provided." That is, in substance, all the petition alleges or suggests. There is no allegation or suggestion that plaintiff or any one for her repaid any portion of the loan to defendant or actually paid any interest, either lawful or usurious. The case having originated before a justice of the peace, there was no pleading on the part of the defendant. The case was commenced in the justice court on May 24, 1909. It was tried anew in the circuit court before a jury on March 21, 1911.
Viewed in the most favorable light for plaintiff, as we must view it on this appeal, the verdict being in her favor, the evidence tends to prove that in October, 1907, the plaintiff owned a row of flats in the city of St. Louis, which were in charge of Woolley & Fish, her real estate agents. The property was encumbered by a deed of trust for $ 12,000 which was being advertised for sale in foreclosure. She authorized Woolley & Fish to make a loan of $ 3000 for her. Mr. Woolley saw the defendant, a money lender, and disclosed to him his desire to make the loan on the property. The defendant went to look at the property and informed Woolley that he would give $ 2500 for the plaintiff's notes for $ 3000. Woolley then reported to plaintiff what defendant had said and had her execute forty notes for seventy-five dollars each aggregating $ 3000 in amount, and a second deed of trust securing them. At the trial plaintiff offered all of said notes in evidence. The abstract described them as follows "The one of these first maturing is in words and figures as follows:
She testified that when she executed these notes she knew that the money was coming from the defendant. The notes were made payable to Fish, one of her agents, and were indorsed by him without recourse. The notes and deed of trust were delivered to the defendant and he made his check payable to Woolley & Fish for $ 2500. The check was cashed and plaintiff received the amount thereof. She testified that she did not know about the charge for the loan until in November when she received a letter from Woolley & Fish stating that they had charged $ 600 commission. Both of the agents testified, however, that they had fully advised her in that respect before closing the deal with defendant. The evidence on behalf of the defendant tended to prove that, in the ordinary course of business, he purchased the notes from Woolley & Fish, believing that they were the owners, and made no loan to the plaintiff and had no dealings with her or with any one acting for her. That the notes had been made out before Woolley & Fish tried to sell them to any one and that they had offered them to several persons before they came to defendant, but no one would take them because of the large first deed of trust. The only evidence, other than the fact that the notes, when introduced in evidence, were marked paid, tending to show payments on the notes, the times of such payments and the person making them, consisted in the following testimony of the plaintiff herself, elicited by counsel for defendant on her cross-examination:
At the close of all the evidence the defendant asked and the court refused to give an instruction in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence. The defendant duly excepted to such refusal. Thereupon, at the instance of the plaintiff, the court gave to the jury the following instruction, the defendant duly excepting:
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Geo. W. Lubke and Geo. W. Lubke, Jr. for appellant.
(1) Prior to the amendment of the statute (now section 7182, Revised Statutes 1909), in 1905, usurious interest paid could not be recovered in this state. Kirkpatrick v. Smith, 55 Mo. 389; Murdock v. Lewis, 26 Mo.App. 234; Peters v. Lowenstein, 44 Mo.App. 406; Ferguson v. Soden, 111 Mo. 208. At best, prior to the amendment of the statute in 1905, the usurious interest paid might be applied by way of set off to reduce the amount of the principal unpaid. Hawkins v. Welch, 8 Mo. 490; R. S. 1909, sec. 7183. (2) The statute provides that "any person who shall violate the foregoing prohibition of this section (forbidding contracts for more than eight per cent interest per annum), shall be subject to be sued for any and all sums of money paid in excess of the principal and legal rate of interest of any loan by the borower." R. S. 1909, sec. 7182. The remedy to recover usurious interest paid provided by the statute is exclusive. Bank v. Haselton, 155 Mo. 58; Matthews v. Paine, 47 Ark. 54. (3) Assuming that the transaction between plaintiff and defendant is usurious, there is no proof that plaintiff paid any usurious interest. At best she gave notes representing such interest. She, therefore, does not bring herself within the statute and canot maintain this action. Chaplin v. Currier, 49 Vt. 48; Shirley v. Stephenson, 104 Ky. 518; Anderson v. Trimble, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 507; McDonald v. Smith, 53 Vt. 33; 39 Cyc. 1034; Webb on Usury, sec. 466. The giving of notes, even though they are secured, representing or including the usurious interest is not the "payment" of usurious interest under the statute. Rushing v. Bivens, 132 N.C. 273; Chaplin v. Currier, 49 Vt. 48; Shirley v. Stephenson, 104 Ky. 518. The charging of usurious interest on a running account is not "payment" thereof under the statute. Davey v. Bank, 8 S.D. 214. (4) Plaintiff has paid nothing "in excess of the principal and legal rate of interest." Until she does, she does not come within the language of the statute. Hawkins v. Welch, 8 Mo. 490; Kendall v. Davis, 55 Ark. 318. (5) The evidence discloses only a purchase by defendant of negotiable paper in the usual course of business for less than its face value. The transaction is therefore not usurious. Sherman v. Blackman, 24 Ill. 347; Colebour v. Savings Inst., 90 Ill. 152; Primley v. Shirk, 60 Ill.App. 312.
L. Frank Ottofy for respondent.
(1) The right to recover back the usury remained in the plaintiff even though she sold the land upon which the deed of trust was given to secure the notes. 29 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), p. 547; Harper v. Bldg. Assn., 55 W.Va. 149; Lee v. Feamster, 21 W.Va. 114; Mann v Bank, 104 Ky. 856; Whinery v. Garrett, 71 S.W. 856. (2) In an action to recover the penalty given by the statute against usury, it is not necessary to show that the principal money has been paid. The offense is complete, when any thing is received for the forbearance, over and above the rate of six per cent per year. Seawell v. Shomberger, 2 Murph. (N. C.) 200; Loyd v. Williams, 3 Will. 262; Grow v. Albee, 19 Vt. 542. (3) The fact that the lender takes the obligation of the borrower for the whole amount of an agreed loan bearing legal interest, but retains a portion of such amount, is sufficient in the absence of satisfactory explanation to justify the jury in finding the loan to be usurious. Egbert v. Peters, 35 Minn. 312. (4) Where there is a dispute as to the...
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