Ingram v. Prescott

• Decision Date: 07 July 1933
• Citation: 111 Fla. 320,149 So. 369
• Parties: INGRAM v. PRESCOTT, Sheriff.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

149 So. 369

111 Fla. 320

INGRAM v. PRESCOTT, Sheriff.

Florida Supreme Court

July 7, 1933

En Banc.

Original application by Sterling Ingram, opposed by M. H. Prescott, as Sheriff of Walton County, for a writ of habeas corpus.

Petitioner remanded to custody.

COUNSEL W. W. Flournoy, of De Funiak Springs, for petitioner.

Cary D Landis, Atty. Gen., and Roy Campbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

DAVIS Chief Justice.

By means of a petition for habeas corpus granted by a justice of this court and made returnable before the court en banc petitioner seeks relief from a sentence of seven years' imprisonment imposed upon him by the circuit court of Walton county upon an adjudication of his guilt of the felony of arson. The record before us shows that the sentence was pronounced January 9, 1933, pursuant to a plea of guilty that had been entered by the defendant on September 17, A. D. 1930, but sentence suspended thereafter from term to term pending the continued good behavior of the defendant. The sentence, as finally imposed, recited that the good behavior condition had been violated by the accused, in consequence of which the judgment of conviction was made enforceable by a sentence to imprisonment.

After the imposition of the sentence, petitioner, Ingram, through his counsel, filed a motion before the court for a nolle prosequi, dismissal, and discharge of the prisoner. The ground asserted in the motion was a claim of immunity that the accused declared he was entitled to the benefit of because of an implied contract for his discharge, alleged to have arisen in his behalf, because the state attorney had called and used the indicted defendant as a witness against his codefendants, thereby in effect aiding the state's prosecution of the prisoner's codefendant by depriving the prisoner of his constitutional right not to be subjected to the giving of incriminating evidence against himself so long as the indictment against him stood.

The circuit judge denied the motion. It is now sought to review his action in so doing by examining the proceedings had subsequent to sentence, concerning the motion for nolle prosequi, dismissal, and discharge.

From the earliest times, it has been found necessary, for the detection and punishment of crime, for the state to resort to the criminals themselves for testimony with which to convict their confederates in crime. While such a course offers a premium to treachery, and sometimes permits the more guilty to escape, it tends to prevent and break up combinations, by making criminals suspicious of each other, and it often leads to the punishment of guilty persons who would otherwise escape. Therefore, on the ground of public policy, it has been uniformly held that a state may contract with a criminal for his exemption from prosecution if he shall honestly and fairly make a full disclosure of the crime, whether the party testified against is convicted or not. L. R. A. 1918A, page 376, note to report of case of Faucett v. State, 10 Okl. Cr. R. 111, 134 P 839, L R. A. 1918A, page 372; Camron v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 180, 22 S.W. 682, 40 Am. St. Rep. 763, and notes; section 8311, Comp. Gen. Laws, section 6017, Rev. Gen. St., sets up such a statutory agreement barring the state from prosecution in certain cases where the accused, without any agreement on his part, is compelled to give evidence in certain classes of cases.

But it is generally held that such an agreement is not pleadable in bar of an adjudication of guilt, although it may affect the right of the court to enforce or to impose a sentence for the infliction of punishment. Camron v. State (Texas), supra; Newton v. State, 15 Fla. 610.

Although it is universally conceded that the district attorney or other public prosecutor may, with the consent of the court enter into an agreement with an accomplice that, if he will testify fully and fairly, in a prosecution against his accomplices in guilt, he shall not be...