Richmond Co v. Elliott

• Citation: 149 U.S. 266,13 S.Ct. 837,37 L.Ed. 728
• Decision Date: 01 May 1893
• Docket Number: No. 199,199
• Parties: RICHMOND & D. R. CO. v. ELLIOTT
• Court: United States Supreme Court

149 U.S. 266

13 S.Ct. 837

37 L.Ed. 728

RICHMOND & D. R. CO.

v ELLIOTT.

No. 199.

May 1, 1893.

This was an action by Henry Elliott against the Richmond & Danville Railroad Company for damages for personal injury. There was judgment for plaintiff in the court below, and defendant brings error. Reversed.

Statement by Mr. Justice BREWER:

On February 8, 1887, defendant in error commenced this action in the superior court of Fulton county, Ga., to recover damages for personal injuries. The case was removed to the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Georgia, in which court a trial was had on the 2d of November, 1888, and a verdict returned in favor of the plaintiff for $10,000. Judgment having been entered thereon, defendant sued out a writ of error from this court.

The facts were these: The plaintiff was an employe of the Central Railroad & Banking Company, which company had, under an arrangement with the defendant, the right to use its yard in Atlanta, Ga., for switching purposes, and in the making up of trains. He was one of the crew of a switch engine belonging to the Central Company, and on the night of November 25, 1886, while in the discharge of his duties in the yard, engine No. 515, belonging to the defendant, exploded its boiler, and a piece of the dome thereof struck him on the leg, and injured him so that amputation became necessary. The explosion of this boiler was charged to be owing to negligence on the part of the defendant in this respect: 'That more steam was allowed to generate than the engine had capacity to contain;' that the boiler was defective, and that the defendant had notice of the defect.

Henry Jackson, for plaintiff in error.

C. T. Ladson, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice BREWER, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

The first question to which our attention is directed arises on the admission of testimony in respect to the probability of plaintiff's promotion in the service of his employer, and a consequent increase of wages. It appears that he was working in the capacity of coupler and switchman for the Central Company, and had been so working for between 4 and 5 years; that he was 27 years of age, in good health, and receiving $1.50 per day. He was asked this question: 'What were your prospects of advancement, if any, in your employment on the railroad, and of obtaining higher wages?' In response to that and subsequent questions he stated that he thought that by staying with the company he would be promoted; that, in the absence of the yard master, he had sometimes discharged his duties, and also in like manner temporarily filled the place of other employes of the company of a higher grade of service than his own; that there was a 'system by which you go in there as coupler or train hand, or in the yard, and, if a man falls out, you stand a chance of taking his place;' and that the average yard conductor obtained a salary of from sixty to seventy-five dollars a month.

We think there was error in the admission of this testimony. It did not appear that there was any rule on the part of the Central Company for an increase of salary after a certain length of time, or that promotion should follow whenever a vacancy occurred in a higher grade of service. The most that was claimed was that, when a vacancy took place, a subordinate who had been faithful in his employment, and had served a loug while, had a chance of receiving preferment; but that is altogether too problematical and uncertain to be presented to a jury in connection with proof of the wages paid to those in such superior employment. Promotion was purely a matter of speculation, depending not simply upon the occurreuce of a vacancy, but upon the judgment, or even whim, of those in control. Of course, there are possibilities and probabilicies before every person, particularly a young man, and a jury, in estimating the damages sustained, will doubtless always give weight to those general probabilities, as well as to those springing from any peculiar capacities or faculties. But that is a different matter from proving to the jury the wages which some superior officer receives, and then exaggerating in the minds of the jury the amount of the damage which has been sustained, by evidence tending to show that there is a chance of plaintiff being promoted at some time to such higher office. It is enough to prove what the plaintiff has been in fact deprived of; to show his physical health and strength before the injury, his condition since, the business he was doing, (Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. 34; Nebraska City v. Campbell, 2 Black, 590; Railroad Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545, 554, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1,) the wages he was receiving, and perhaps the increase which he would receive by any fixed rule of promotion. Beyond that it is not right to go, and introduce testimony which simply opens the door to a speculation of possibilities. Nor was the error in the admission of this testimony cured by the instructions. One the contrary, they seem to emphasize that this chance of promotion was a matter to be considered. This is what the court said: 'I permitted some evidence to be introduced on the subject of the line of promotion in the business in which he was engaged. The plaintiff says, and the jury could consider the fact, that he had a probability of promotion in the line of services in which he was engaged; that the salary of the next grade of services in which he was engaged is...