Cabral v. I.N.S.
Citation | 15 F.3d 193 |
Decision Date | 04 November 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 93-1514,93-1514 |
Parties | Acquiles Leonidas CABRAL, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent. . Heard |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit) |
Randy Olen, Johnston, RI, for petitioner.
William C. Lengacher, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, with whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, and Richard M. Evans, Assistant Director, Washington, DC, were on brief for respondent.
Before SELYA, CYR and STAHL, Circuit Judges.
After Acquiles Leonidas Cabral was convicted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as an accessory to murder, he was ordered deported for committing a "crime involving moral turpitude" within five years of his lawful entry into the United States. We deny his petition for review of the final order of deportation.
As the petition for review presents a pure issue of statutory construction, we review de novo, according due deference to the BIA's interpretation of the deportation statute. Mosquera-Perez v. INS, 3 F.3d 553, 554 (1st Cir.1993). See Jaramillo v. INS, 1 F.3d 1149, 1153 (11th Cir.1993); see also INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 101 S.Ct. 1027, 67 L.Ed.2d 123 (1981) (per curiam) ( ). We look first to the language of the statute itself, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, see Mosquera-Perez, 3 F.3d at 554-55, to see if the legislative intent is clear, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). We look to the legislative history only if "the literal words of the statute create ambiguity or lead to an unreasonable interpretation." United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 823 F.2d 685, 688 (1st Cir.1987) (citation omitted). Where Congress has not spoken directly to the issue, the interpretation given by the BIA is entitled to deference unless arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. See Mosquera-Perez, 3 F.3d at 555; see also Alvares-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1990). In all events, as the final authority in matters of statutory interpretation, the courts " 'must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.' " Mosquera-Perez, 3 F.3d at 555 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. at 2782 n. 9).
Section 1251(a)(4) itself states in relevant part:
(a) General classes. Any alien in the United States ... shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be deported who--
....
(4) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after entry and either sentenced to confinement or confined therefor in a prison or corrective institution, for a year or more....
8 U.S.C. Sec. 1251(a)(4). All preconditions for deportation under section 1251(a)(4) are plainly met in the present case, save possibly the CIMT requirement. As to whether an accessory after the fact to murder has committed a CIMT, however, the language of the statute is silent. We therefore look to its legislative history.
The available legislative history reveals that the term "moral turpitude" first appeared in the federal immigration laws in 1891. See S.Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 350 (1950); Charles Gordon, Immigration Law and Practice Sec. 71.05[a], 71-121 (Supp.1993). Justice Jackson offered the following insight into the legislative history of the Immigration Act of 1917, see S.Rep. No. 352, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 390 (1916), the first to authorize deportation of resident aliens convicted of a "crime involving moral turpitude":
The uncertainties of this statute do not originate in contrariety of judicial opinion. Congress knowingly conceived it in confusion. During the hearings of the House Committee on Immigration, out of which eventually came the Act of 1917 in controversy, clear warning of its deficiencies was sounded and never denied.
Despite this notice, Congress did not see fit to state what meaning it attributes to the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude."
Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 233-34, 71 S.Ct. 703, 709, 95 L.Ed. 886 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ( ). 3 The legislative history leaves no doubt, therefore, that Congress left the term "crime involving moral turpitude" to future administrative and judicial interpretation.
Although voluntary murder is universally recognized as a CIMT, see, e.g., De Lucia v. Flagg, 297 F.2d 58, 61 (7th Cir.1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 837, 82 S.Ct. 867, 7 L.Ed.2d 843 (1962), the statutory language and the legislative history are silent as to whether an alien convicted as an accessory after the fact to voluntary murder has committed a CIMT. We therefore inquire whether the agency interpretation was arbitrary, capricious, or clearly contrary to the statute. See Mosquera-Perez, 3 F.3d at 555.
We note first that the record establishes, as the IJ found, that Cabral pled guilty as an accessory to voluntary murder. The Massachusetts indictment, part of the record of conviction, see United States ex rel. Zaffarano v. Corsi, 63 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir.1933) (per curiam) (on rehearing) ("the record of conviction ... mean[s] the charge (indictment), plea, verdict, and sentence") that , alleged:
afterwards, well knowing the said John Doe to have committed the felony aforesaid, did harbor, conceal, maintain and assist the said John Doe, with intent that said John Doe should avoid and escape detention, arrest, trial and punishment.
(Emphasis added.) Under Massachusetts law, murder is defined as "the killing of a human being, with malice aforethought." Mass.Gen.L. ch. 277, Sec. 39 (1990). 4 As the IJ noted, federal courts uniformly have held that voluntary murder is a CIMT, see, e.g., Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 162 F.2d 663, 664 (9th Cir.1947), rev'd on other grounds, 333 U.S. 6, 68 S.Ct. 374, 92 L.Ed. 433 (1948); see also, e.g., In re Johnson, 1 Cal. 4th 689, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 170, 822 P.2d 1317 (1992); Burleigh v. State Bar of Nevada, 98 Nev. 140 643 P.2d 1201, 1204 (1982); State v. Lee, 404 S.W.2d 740, 748 (Mo.1966); In re Noble, 77 N.M. 461, 461, 423 P.2d 984, 984 (1967) ( ). Furthermore, the IJ reasoned, Aquiles Leonidas Cabral, Op. Immigr. Judge No. A 38 496 722, at 5-6 (Nov. 18, 1988).
In re Sanchez-Marin, 11 I. & N.Dec. 264, involved issues and circumstances similar to those presented here. Three resident aliens were convicted under Massachusetts law; two of manslaughter, see Mass.Gen.L. ch. 265, Sec. 13 (1990), and the third as an accessory after the fact, see Mass.Gen.L. ch. 274, Sec. 4 (1990), the same "accessory" statute under which Cabral pled guilty. The BIA found it "reasonable to conclude upon the record of conviction that the homicide committed by the aliens was voluntary and consequently this crime involves moral turpitude," In re Sanchez-Marin, 11 I. & N.Dec. at 266, and, as to the third alien, that the "indictment links him to the manslaughter committed by the other two aliens," id. at 266-67 (emphasis added).
Later, the BIA emphasized the significance of the "indictment linkage," between the underlying crime and the accessory charge in In re Short, 1989 WL 331878, 1989 BIA LEXIS 30 (BIA Nov. 16, 1989), where an alien was charged as an accessory to the crime of assault with intent to commit an unspecified felony under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 113(b). The IJ determined, from the indictment against the principal, that the principal's crime was a CIMT. Thereafter, the IJ's ruling that the accessory had been convicted of a CIMT was reversed by the BIA. Id. 1989 WL 331878, 1989 BIA LEXIS 30, at * 11-* 12. The BIA distinguished Sanchez-Marin: in ...
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