Jenkins v. Jenkins
Decision Date | 02 February 1983 |
Parties | Paul J. JENKINS, Administrator v. Daniel G. JENKINS. |
Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Paul J. Jenkins, pro se.
Before HALE, C.J., and ARMSTRONG and WARNER, JJ.
RESCRIPT.
The appellant, as administrator of his mother's estate and individually, together with his brother and sister, brought this action for damages. The first count is for wrongful death (G.L. c. 229, § 2). In a second count the appellant and his sister in their individual capacities claim that the defendant assumed and violated a fiduciary duty toward them. The defendant, a brother of the plaintiffs, moved to dismiss the complaint, raising the defenses of (1) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Mass.R.Civ.P. 12[b], 365 Mass. 755 [1974] ); (2) pendency of a prior action in a court of the Commonwealth (Mass.R.Civ.P. 12[b], id.); (3) the statute of limitations; and (4) misjoinder of the plaintiffs in their individual capacities. The motion was allowed, without a statement of reasons, as to all of the plaintiffs, and judgment was entered accordingly. The only appeal was by the appellant acting in his capacity as administrator, 1 and we therefore consider only the propriety of the dismissal as to him of the action for wrongful death on the grounds set forth in (1), (2) and (3) above.
1. Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98, 360 N.E.2d 870 (1977), quoting from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). See Charbonnier v. Amico, 367 Mass. 146, 152-153, 324 N.E.2d 895 (1975); Coolidge Bank & Trust Co. v. First Ipswich Co., 9 Mass.App. 369, 370, 401 N.E.2d 165 (1980). A complaint should not be dismissed simply because it asserts a new or extreme theory of liability or improbable facts. See Shull v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 313 F.2d 445, 447 (5th Cir.1963). 5 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (1969 & Supp.1982). Coolidge Bank & Trust Co., supra. Applying these tests we cannot conclude that it is beyond doubt that the appellant can prove no set of facts in support of his claim under G.L. c. 229, § 2, which would entitle him to relief.
2. None of the three prior actions pending in our courts involved the same parties and issues and those actions would not be a proper basis for dismissal under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(9), 365 Mass. 755 (1974). See Twomey v. Board of Appeals of Medford, 7 Mass.App. 770, 776 n. 11, 390 N.E.2d 272 (1979); Smith & Zobel, Rules Practice § 12.15.1 (1981 Supp.)
3. The complaint alleges that the parties' mother died on December 24, 1977. The complaint was filed on August 31, 1981. General Laws c. 229, § 2, then provided (as it does now), with exceptions not here relevant, that wrongful death actions must be commenced within three years of the date of death. However, the statute may be tolled. G.L. c. 260, § 12. Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 71, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972). The complaint alleges that the defendant first concealed and later denied the facts which are the basis of the complaint and that the appellant could not reasonably have discovered those facts earlier than July 27, 1979. There is no allegation as to the time of the alleged denial. Fraudulent concealment of a cause of action tolls the statute. G.L. c. 260, § 12. See, for discussion, Brackett v. Perry, 201 Mass. 502, 505, 87 N.E. 903 (1909); Maloney v. Brackett, 275 Mass. 479, 484, 176 N.E. 604 (1931); Connelly v. Bartlett, 286 Mass. 311, 317-319, 190 N.E. 799 (1934). The complaint further alleges that prior to the decedent's death the defendant "undertook" a fiduciary duty toward the appellant in his individual capacity and his sister. Where there is a fiduciary relationship the mere failure to reveal may be fraudulent. Stetson v. French, 321 Mass. 195, 198-199, 72 N.E.2d 410 (1947). While the appellant may be hard...
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