Pipkin v. Haucke
Decision Date | 15 April 1884 |
Citation | 15 Mo.App. 373 |
Parties | JOSEPH H. PIPKIN, Appellant, v. PHILIP HAUCKE, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
APPEAL from the St. Louis County Court, EDWARDS, J.
Reversed and remanded.
M. F. TAYLOR, for the appellant.
JOHN R. WARFIELD, for the respondent: To warrant a recovery for malicious prosecution, malice and want of probable cause must be shown.-- Sharpe v. Johnson, 59 Mo. 557; s. c. 76 Mo. 660; Vansickle v. Brown, 68 Mo. 627; Brennan v. Tracy, 2 Mo. App. 540; Cottrell v. Richmond, 5 Mo. App. 588; Burris v. North, 64 Mo. 426. It is sufficient that the defendant acted in good faith upon the advice of competent counsel.-- Sparling v. Conway, 6 Mo. App. 283; s. c. 75 Mo. 510.
This is an action for a malicious prosecution. There was a verdict for the defendant. The court gave, at the instance of the defendant, the following instruction:--
“The court instructs that, if the jury believe and find from the evidence, that before the arrest and trial of plaintiff upon the charges mentioned in the petition, the said defendant stated the facts in connection with said charges, so far as he knew them, to the prosecuting attorney of said county, and gave to said prosecuting attorney the names of witnesses who had knowledge of such facts; and upon the information so given, the said prosecuting attorney issued and filed an information before the justice, upon which the warrant issued under which plaintiff was arrested and subsequently tried before the justice upon the charges contained in said information, the jury will find for defendant.”
This instruction was misleading and erroneous. According to all the authoritative rulings, it was insufficient for the defence that the defendant stated to the attorney the facts connected with the charges, “so far as he knew them.” He must also have stated all the facts so connected, which by reasonable diligence he could have ascertained. Hill v. Palm, 38 Mo. 13; Sappington v. Watson, 50 Mo. 83; Sparling v. Conway, 75 Mo. 510; Sharpe v. Johnston, 76 Mo. 660; s. c. 4 Mo. App. 575. The instruction is misleading in its hypothesis which seems to throw upon the attorney the whole responsibility of initiating the prosecution. The defendant himself testified that he swore to the information and filed it with the justice, after the attorney had filled it out. The instruction supposes that the officer may have taken upon himself personally to institute the prosecution. There was no evidence tending to show that fact, in the sense that might easily be inferred from the...
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Pritchett v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co.
...been based upon a full disclosure of all the facts and was therefore insufficient to exonerate defendants, as a matter of law. [Pipkin v. Haucke, 15 Mo. App. 373; Carp v. Insurance Co., 203 Mo. 295, 101 S.W. After plaintiff was placed in jail at the time of the first arrest, Mange immediate......
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