St. Paul Union Depot Co. v. City of St. Paul

• Decision Date: 18 April 1883
• Citation: 30 Minn. 359,15 N.W. 684
• Parties: ST. PAUL UNION DEPOT CO. v CITY OF ST. PAUL.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

30 Minn. 359

15 N.W. 684

ST. PAUL UNION DEPOT CO.vCITY OF ST. PAUL.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed April 18, 1883.

Appeal from a judgment of the district court, Ramsey county.

Gordon E. Cole, for appellant.

Wm. P. Murray and H. J. Horn, for respondent.

VANDERBURGH, J.

The plaintiff corporation was authorized by its charter to acquire, by purchase or condemnation proceedings, such real estate as should be convenient and necessary for the location and construction of depot buildings and appurtenances, and the construction and operation of transfer tracks, so as to unite in one general union depot, owned and managed by the plaintiff, the several lines of railroad centering in the city of St. Paul. In constructing its depot building upon lands purchased for such purpose, it left an open space 31 feet in width along the north side, which is appropriated and used as a sidewalk and as a passage-way through the block for the ingress and egress of teams and baggage wagons to and from the baggage rooms on the east end of the building, located near the termini of numerous railroad tracks entering the depot. The defendant is seeking to lay out a public street on the north side of the depot building, extending through the block upon which it is located from Sibley to Wacouta streets in the city, and to include within it a strip of the plaintiff's land 19 feet in width. The proposed street is to be 38 feet in width. It is conceded that the use of this land for the purposes for which it is opened as a passage-way is necessary for the transportation of plaintiff's business in the receipt and delivery of baggage to and from passenger trains, and that there is no other access to the baggage rooms for teams and vehicles except upon or across it. This action is brought to restrain the defendant from proceeding in the premises.

The record shows that the business transacted at the depot is very large and increasing, and, as the court finds, “more than 100 trains arrive and depart daily, almost continually coming and going within the day; that the depot is too small for the business transacted,” and “said depot grounds are cramped and cannot well be enlarged.” “Vehicles and teams conveying baggage to and from said depot are passing over said strip of land very often, almost continually during the day, and it is necessary for them to remain at rest at said baggage room long enough to load and unload such baggage.”

The court also states in the finding that “if said street is opened as proposed, it will be a public street. The necessity of said street or its importance to the public has not been investigated in this action.” The sidewalk or platform next the depot building, over and upon which the baggage is handled as at present constructed, occupies 12 feet in width, and the strip of land in question, 19 feet wide, is by itself quite circumscribed for the purpose to which it is devoted. It has been constantly used since the depot was built in connection with other portions of the proposed street left open. And the trial court was of the opinion that by doubling its width as proposed, business with the depot would be facilitated, and that its exclusive control by plaintiff was not necessary; and that its use as a public street under the circumstances would not substantially interfere with plaintiff's use thereof. The court, therefore, decided that the city might, under its general power to lay out public streets and to condemn lands for such purposes, include this land in question in the proposed street.

This presents the first and most important question in the case. The fact conclusively appears that the land in question is needed and is actually used for a public purpose, authorized by plaintiff's charter. This places plaintiff's rights upon the same footing as if the necessity and propriety of its appropriation had been preliminarily determined by the court or legislature. Plaintiff's beneficial use is practically exclusive, and cannot be appropriated or taken away except by express authority of the legislature, or by necessary implication. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co. v. City of Faribault, 23 Minn. 169. This amount of land seems to be indispensable now, to say nothing of the future demands of plaintiff's business, and the plaintiff is not necessarily limited to a use of this portion of its depot grounds without any modification of the present arrangement. It is entitled to make any changes in the sidewalk, baggage rooms, or otherwise which may better facilitate the use of the premises for depot purposes.

The power to extend streets and highways across railway tracks at convenient and suitable places is necessarily implied in the general authority conferredon cities and towns for such purposes, without express provisions on the subject. In like manner, railroads necessarily cross streets and highways on their routes. An adjustment of the two public uses is thus demanded by public convenience and necessity wherever practicable, and may well be presumed to be contemplated in the legislation authorizing such improvements, and by corporations in accepting or acting under such legislation. Little Miami, etc., R. Cos. v. Dayton, 23 Ohio St. 517;N. J. Southern R. Co. v. Com'rs, 10 Vroom, 32.

The same principle would doubtless be applicable to other easements sought to be acquired in the land of a corporation, such as the right to extend water-pipes, Which may be enjoyed without any serious detriment to a prior public use. In re Rochester Water Com'rs, 66 N. Y. 413. This general presumption, however, yields...