Daughenbaugh v. City of Tiffin, 97-3200

Citation150 F.3d 594
Decision Date31 July 1998
Docket NumberNo. 97-3200,97-3200
PartiesRobert O. DAUGHENBAUGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF TIFFIN; Michelle Craig, Charles W. Boyer, individually and as detective police officers for the City of Tiffin; and James Jarrett, also known as Jim Jarret, individually and as probation officer for the Seneca County Juvenile Court, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Zach Zunshine (argued and briefed), Columbus, Ohio, for Daughenbaugh.

Teresa L. Grigsby (briefed), Spengler Nathanson, Toledo, Ohio, James P. Silk, Jr. (argued), Spegler Nathanson, Toledo, Ohio, for City of Tiffin, Craig and Boyer.

Timothy S. Rankin (argued and briefed), Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor, Columbus, Ohio, for Jarrett.

Before: RYAN, COLE, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

GILMAN, Circuit Judge.

This is a civil action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a homeowner against his municipality and three of its law enforcement officers. The homeowner seeks damages resulting from the warrantless search of his unattached and remote garage in pursuit of stolen goods placed there by a thief without the homeowner's knowledge. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all the defendants, holding that the garage was not part of the home's "curtilage," and that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

For the reasons set forth below, we find that the garage was a part of the home's curtilage. Accordingly, the officers' warrantless search of the garage violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The officers' entrance into the homeowner's backyard also constituted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Because we conclude that the contours of curtilage were not sufficiently clear at the time of the search, however, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of qualified immunity to the officers involved.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 24, 1994, the police arrested a local resident named Mike Hall in connection with a series of burglaries from garages in the city of Tiffin, Ohio. After being interrogated by officers Michelle Craig and Charles Boyer, Hall confessed to the burglaries. James Jarrett, a juvenile probation officer, witnessed the interrogation. Hall informed the police that he had secreted the stolen goods in a garage located behind plaintiff Robert Daughenbaugh's house. Hall also told the police that Daughenbaugh was unaware that the stolen goods were in the garage. The three officers then took Hall to Daughenbaugh's house, where they intended to check out Hall's assertion.

One of the officers apparently had met Daughenbaugh on a previous occasion and believed that he would consent to a search of his garage. After arriving at the house, officers Craig and Jarrett went to the front door. They neither saw Daughenbaugh's car nor heard any noise emanating from the house. There was thus no indication that Daughenbaugh was at home. Notwithstanding this fact, the officers proceeded to the back door because they believed that the common sitting area was located at the rear of the house. Once again there was no answer.

Unable to locate Daughenbaugh, officers Craig and Jarrett met officer Boyer and Hall in the backyard. From that vantage point, they were able to see what appeared to be the stolen goods strewn across the floor of the open garage. They then proceeded to the unattached garage and confiscated the stolen goods. The officers did not obtain a warrant prior to searching the property and seizing the items from the garage.

Daughenbaugh's house is located at the end of his street and is blocked on the left side by a river. The river curves to form an additional barrier behind the house. The side along the river is lined with tall trees and shrubbery, obscuring a view of the house on the left and back sides. On the right side of the house, trees block the neighbors from looking directly into the garage. The extent of the tree coverage on the right side of the house, however, is unclear from the pictures that are part of the record. The pictures clearly show that a large tree stands in the middle of the backyard. This tree as well as the house obstruct the view from the street into the backyard and the garage. In addition, there is no sidewalk in front of Daughenbaugh's property.

The garage is about fifty to sixty yards behind the house, and eighty to ninety yards from the street. A driveway leads from the street to an attached carport, and then continues straight back toward the unattached garage. At the time of the search, the spring on the garage door was broken, and the door was open. Moreover, the roof and the walls of the garage were in serious disrepair. Daughenbaugh stored various tools, extension cords, and a lawn mower in the garage. He did not use the garage to park his car.

The police claim that after parking their car in the attached carport, they could see the stolen goods in the garage. Daughenbaugh, on the other hand, claims that the police could not see inside the garage until they actually reached it. The district court, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Daughenbaugh, found that the police "had to walk to the rear of the property in the direction of the garage" in order to see the stolen items. Daughenbaugh v. City of Tiffin, 949 F.Supp. 1315, 1318 (N.D.Ohio 1996).

The district court held that the unattached garage was not a part of the house's curtilage and thus "the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the actions of the officers in this case." Id. 949 F.Supp. at 1319. Instead, the court concluded that "the 'search' of the garage was an 'open field' search, as to which the Fourth Amendment provides no protection." Id. The district court then determined that the officers lawfully proceeded to Daughenbaugh's house after receiving the tip, and that they lawfully approached the garage because it was not part of the curtilage. In making its determination that the garage was not a part of the curtilage, the district court considered the multifactor test outlined by the Supreme Court in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987).

In addition, the district court held that even if the officers violated Daughenbaugh's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches, they were entitled to qualified immunity. The court determined that the officers' actions could not be considered "objectively unreasonable" because "[a]t most, the curtilage question is one about which reasonable officers--and judges--could disagree." Daughenbaugh, 949 F.Supp. at 1322.

In this appeal, Daughenbaugh challenges the district court's decision granting summary judgment to officers Craig, Boyer, and Jarrett and denying his motion for summary judgment against officers Craig and Boyer. Daughenbaugh does not appeal the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the city of Tiffin.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews a district court's order granting summary judgment de novo. Brooks v. American Broad. Cos., 932 F.2d 495, 500 (6th Cir.1991). All factual inferences "must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Summary judgment is only appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact is in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. All factual inferences alleged by the nonmoving party must be taken as true for the purposes of a summary judgment motion. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (citations omitted).

Both parties, on the other hand, contend that this court must adopt all of the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. They support this contention by citing numerous criminal law cases that conclude that curtilage questions are factual determinations. See United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1275 (2d Cir.1996) (joining the Third, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits in concluding that curtilage is essentially a factual question); United States v. Traynor, 990 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.1993) (noting that the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have found curtilage to be a factual question). None of the cases cited by the parties, however, address the standard of review in the context of a civil action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, in particular, the standard for reviewing a grant of summary judgment. Because this is an appeal of a civil case dismissed on summary judgment, our review of the district court's decision de novo is clearly the appropriate standard.

III. ANALYSIS
A. The Garage as Curtilage

To successfully establish a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove the following two elements: (1) the defendant was acting under the color of state law, and (2) the offending conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by federal law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). Because the defendants acted in their official capacity as law enforcement officers on the day in question, they do not dispute that they were acting under the color of state law. As for the second element, Daughenbaugh alleges that his constitutional rights were violated when officers Craig, Boyer, and Jarrett searched his backyard, and when officers Craig and Boyer entered his garage and seized the stolen items without a warrant.

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. It provides that:

The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by...

To continue reading

Request your trial
106 cases
  • In re Meridia Products Liability Litigation
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio
    • July 7, 2004
    ...242 F.3d 353, 358 (6th Cir.2001). A fact is material if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Daughenbaugh v. City of Tiffin, 150 F.3d 594, 597 (6th Cir.1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). In deciding whe......
  • Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio
    • May 26, 2009
    ...the outcome of the lawsuit." Martingale LLC v. City of Louisville, 361 F.3d 297, 301 (6th Cir.2004) (citing Daughenbaugh v. City of Tiffin, 150 F.3d 594, 597 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 The moving party meets its......
  • United States. v. Johnson
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • July 20, 2001
    ...the issue have found that officers must have "objective data" about the use of the area prior to entry. See Daughenbaugh v. City of Tiffin, 150 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding search unreasonable when officers lacked prior objective knowledge that area searched was not used for activ......
  • Hart v. Myers
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • January 23, 2002
    ...established at the time it was taken." X-Men Security, Inc. v. Pataki, 196 F.3d 56, 66 (2d Cir.1999); see also Daughenbaugh v. Tiffin, 150 F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir.1998). Under the first [t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that wh......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT